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ABSTRACT 
 
BRYCE HUEBNER: Distributing cognition 
(Under the direction of Jesse J. Prinz) 
 
 
While ordinary language allows for the attribution of mental states to collectivities, 
there is broad agreement among philosophers and cognitive scientists that such attributions 
should not be taken literally because they are at best explanatorily superfluous and at worst 
wildly implausible. I argue that the widely shared philosophical assumption that mentality is 
exclusively a property of individuals is mistaken. One prominent objection to the idea that 
collectives could be in genuinely mental states is that they lack self-consciousness and the 
capacity for qualitative consciousness. I argue that neither self-consciousness nor qualitative 
consciousness is necessary for mentality. But I also show that both collective self-
consciousness and qualitative consciousness are possible. Another objection states that 
collectives cannot possess representations above and beyond the representations in the minds 
of the individuals that compose them. I counter that representations in individual minds often 
depend on representations in lower-level subsystems and I argue that collective 
representations can arise in a similar way. I conclude by demonstrating that collective 
cognition is not a mere possibility; there are cases of collective cognition in the actual world. 
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CHAPTER I 
I’VE GOT HALF A MIND TO RETHINK THE POSSIBILITY OF  
COLLECTIVE MENTALITY 
 
I have a cat named Nutmeg, and there is little that you could say to dissuade me from 
thinking that Nutmeg, like Fodor’s (1987) Greycat (and unlike rocks, trees and spiral 
nebulae), has beliefs, desires, and a whole host of other mental states.1 You might wonder 
what makes me so sure—and luckily I’ve got good reasons for my belief. First, when I go to 
sleep and Nutmeg finds her food bowl empty, she paws at my face and meows until I get out 
of bed and replenish her supply of cat food. Second, Nutmeg meows incessantly when I open 
the cabinet where I keep her kitty treats, and it’s pretty clear that she both wants one of those 
delicious fish flavored delicacies and believes that if she meows at me she will get some of 
them. To put the point briefly, using “commonsense belief/desire psychology explains vastly 
more of the facts about [Nutmeg’s] behaviour than any of the alternative theories available” 
(Fodor 1987, x).  
The important thing to notice here is that these ascriptions of mental states to Nutmeg 
                                                 
1 There are, of course, people who would deny this. Donald Davidson (1982) argues that the attribution of 
content to a subject requires substantial agreement between the attributor and the subject across a broad network 
of interrelated beliefs. This argument turns on holistic intuitions that I am unwilling to grant. I am inclined to 
think that there are other ways of individuating content that don’t require such a substantial overlap. Stephen 
Stich (1979) offers another argument against animal beliefs that does not turn on such holistic considerations. 
His argument is based on the claim that the commonsense notion of belief requires that a belief has some 
specifiable content and that this content figures into the explanation of the systems behavior. I’m inclined to 
think that teleological theories of content (e.g., Millikan 1984) offer a promising response to these worries. 
However, defending this claim would take us far beyond the boundaries of this thesis. 
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are grounded on the same psychological considerations that I use when I ascribe beliefs and 
desires to my friend, Jacek, when he frowns while staring at the empty pickle jar in the fridge 
or complains about having no sardines left for breakfast. Of course, I do ascribe fewer, and 
simpler, beliefs and desires to Nutmeg than I ascribe to Jacek, commonsense psychology 
does a fairly good job of allowing me to predict and explain both Jacek’s and Nutmeg’s 
behavior—and this gives me very good reasons for thinking that both of them to have mental 
states.2  
I have a lot to say about both Jacek’s and Nutmeg’s psychology (in fact, more than 
anyone should ever have to listen to). However, this isn’t a thesis about Jacek’s psychology 
nor is it a thesis about Nutmeg’s psychology. It is a thesis about another sort of cognitive 
system to which we often ascribe mental states.3 I’ll refer to the sorts of systems with which I 
am concerned as collectivities.4 The central contention of this thesis is that some ascriptions 
of mentality to collectivities ought to be understood literally, that is, they ought to be 
understood to refer to theoretical entities like beliefs, desires, and the like, in precisely the 
same way that ascriptions of mentality to Jacek and Nutmeg. Of course, the claim that 
                                                 
2 At this point, there are two open options. You can either make the abductive inference to the conclusion that 
the mental states you ascribe to an organism are token-token identical to some physical state of that organism, 
or you can take that inference to be bogus. At this point, have little to say about this debate. My point here is 
merely that my evidence for the truth of the claim that Jacek has mental states is of a piece with the evidence for 
the truth of the claim that Nutmeg has them as well. How we understand the truth conditions for either of these 
organisms is, however, a further question to which I will return below. 
 
3 I use the term ‘cognitive system’ to refer to any information-processing system that possess the capacity to be 
in some mental state or other. Which sorts of things fall within the extension of ‘cognitive system’ is itself an 
interesting question—and one that I have many thoughts about. However, answering the question “what is a 
cognitive system?” falls beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
4 I use the term 'collectivity’ to pick out cognitive systems that are themselves constituted by other (preferably 
paradigmatic) cognitive systems. A few examples will be helpful for giving an idea of what I intend this term to 
pick out: sports teams (such as the 2005 Tarheel basketball team and the New Zealand All Blacks), corporations 
(such as Microsoft and Macintosh), herds and flocks, rioting crowds, the Communist party, the proletariat, 
anarchist collectives, avant-garde jazz ensembles, military units, and ant and bee colonies. 
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collectivities literally possess mental states in the same way that individuals do may seem to 
be a strange claim; however, it will help to note that we often ascribe mental states to 
collectivities in saying things like: 
Hewlett-Packard believes that loading Yahoo as the default search engine on its 
consumer PCs is the correct response to a similar agreement between Dell and 
Google. 
 
More importantly, using commonsense psychology to ascribe mental states in cases like this 
is explanatorily useful for much the same reason that ascriptions of such states to Nutmeg 
and Jacek are explanatorily useful: in numerous cases where we want to predict and explain 
the behavior of a corporation such as Hewlett-Packard, using commonsense psychology 
proves to be a fairly reliable means for these predictions and explanations.5  
Unfortunately, however, the instrumental values of prediction and explanation will 
never be sufficient to establish the literal truth of such ascriptions of mental states. As Daniel 
Dennett (1987a) notes, commonsense ascriptions of mental states to various purportedly 
cognitive systems do not form a natural kind; instead, they form a motley assortment of 
serious belief attributions, metaphors, facons de parler and other sorts of dubious ascriptions. 
So, we can’t just look to the ascriptions actually allowed by commonsense psychology in 
order to demonstrate the existence of collective mental states. What we need is an answer to 
the following question: are commonsense attributions of mentality to collectivities more like 
attributions of such states to Nutmeg or Jacek or are they more like attributions of such states 
to simple thermostats (e.g., “it thinks it’s colder that it really is”) or to plants (e.g., “you 
                                                 
5 NB: My claim is not that the sole end of commonsense psychology is prediction and explanation. It’s an open 
and empirical question what sorts of phenomena commonsense psychology is directed towards and how 
commonsense ascriptions of mental states are used. Josh Knobe has recently adduced evidence suggesting that 
there might be other, perhaps moral, ends toward which commonsense psychology is directed. While I don’t 
want to come down on either side of this issue at this point, I’m inclined to think that even if this is true, it 
would still be the case that a large number of our ascriptions of beliefs and desires will still take as their end the 
prediction and explanation of (both overt and covert) behavior. 
 4 
should put the grass seeds in the freezer the night before you plant them; that way they’ll 
think that winter is over and they’ll start growing”)? In this thesis I argue that we ought to 
construe at least some ascriptions of mental states to collectivities literally. However, I’ll 
start with a quick look at the sorts of claims commonsense allowed by commonsense 
psychology in order to see what sorts of collectivities might qualify as cognitive systems.  
 
1.1. The individualist dogma and commonsense psychology:  
There is a commonplace dogma that holds that the mind cannot extend beyond the 
physical boundaries of an individual organism.6 As Robert Wilson (2004, 3) articulates this 
dogma, “minds do not float free in the air or belong to larger, amorphous entities, such as 
groups, societies, or cultures. No, they are tightly coupled with individuals.” From the 
standpoint of commonsense, it seems that individuals might even be identified by, or even be 
identical to their minds. And this seems to hold true even in the face of the intuitive dualism 
that pervades commonsense psychology (cf., Bloom 2004). That is to say, there is at least a 
pre-reflective intuition, prevalent in commonsense psychology, that there is psychological 
states supervene on neurological states. Most people seem to take it to be intuitively obvious 
that the correct way of studying the mind is by studying the brain. However, this is not just a 
commonsense mistake. In fact, cognitive science has also been unabashedly wedded to a 
focus on the individual—with some philosophers (cf., Fodor 1980 and 1991) going so far as 
to claim that psychology can only be practiced as a science of the individual. But what are we 
                                                 
6 Difficulties can arise at this point; there can be some debate over what counts as an individual system. Cases 
like slime molds (Physarum polycephalum) and corals (phylum Cnidaria) push the boundaries of our intuitions 
about what counts as a single organism, as do colonies of termites (order Isoptera) ants (family Formicdae) and 
bees (superfamily Apoidea) that are sometimes studied as superorganisms. For the time being, I’ll not get into 
any of these issues. For the purposes of this intuition all that I mean is a single member of a biological species 
(e.g., a tiger, a human, a marmoset, a cat, or a raccoon). 
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to say of this dogma? Like many pre-reflective intuitions in commonsense psychology, this 
one seems to be in tension with a number of the other intuitions that we find in commonsense 
psychology. 
Let me begin to draw out this tension by considering some of the cognitive systems to 
which we ascribe mentality. The first thing to notice is that the cognitive systems with which 
we take ourselves to engage on a daily basis aren’t limited to individuals; we also interact 
with collectivities. Corporations, institutions, states, nations, jazz ensembles, faculties, and 
other sorts of collective entities play a central role in helping us navigate our social world, as 
well as a central role in practical reasoning. We at least talk as though the faculty of the 
philosophy department is considering a tenure case—something that can have quite a 
substantial effect on an individual. We also talk as though a corporation like Shell Oil can 
believe that it needs a new environmental policy in order to respond to the criticisms of 
environmentalists. And I’m inclined to think that many of the avant-garde jazz ensembles 
that I listen to want to be innovative and provocative. As with the individuals to whom we 
ascribe mental states, many of these collective entities seem to engage in various sorts of 
actions and seem to do so on the basis of various sorts or intentional states. This presents us 
with at least a prima facie reason to attribute mentality to collectivities. And attribute 
mentality to collectivities we do.  
Consider a few quotes from various news sources: 
Israel accuses others of terrorism at the same time as it carries it out in the harshest 
forms”…“The Lebanese government estimated the damages at more than $500 
million, not including loss of tourism and commerce (Mouawad and Erlanger 2006, 
emphasis mine). 
 
With the battle between Israel and the Lebanese militia Hezbollah raging, key Arab 
governments have taken the rare step of blaming Hezbollah, underscoring in part their 
growing fear of influence by the group’s main sponsor, Iran (Fattah 2006, emphasis 
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mine) 
 
North Korea said Sunday that it was not bound by a United Nations Security Council 
resolution imposing weapons-related sanctions on it, and insisted it would ‘bolster its 
war deterrent” in every way’ (Reuters 2006, emphasis mine) 
 
Microsoft fears that Google could become a kind of operating system of the Internet 
in the same way that Windows is the dominant operating system of personal 
computing (Lohr and Hansell 2006). 
 
Whether Mr. Sokolof will be as successful this time is not so clear, but he certainly 
made McDonald's angry (Burros 1990) 
 
In many cases, we are perfectly willing to accept it as true that the locus of a particular 
mental state is not the individual but a group, corporation or collective entity of some other 
sort. 
Cases from contemporary fiction and contemporary film also provide data suggesting 
that intuitions about the possibility of collective mentality abound. Consider an example from 
Carson McCullers’ The ballad of the sad café:  
Some eight or ten men had convened on the porch of Miss Amelia's store. They were 
silent and were indeed just waiting about.  They themselves did not know what they 
were waiting for, but it was this: in times of tension, when some great action is 
impending, men gather and wait in this way.  And after a time there will come a 
moment when all together they will act in unison, not from thought or from the will 
of any one man, but as though their instincts had merged together so that the decision 
belongs to no single one of them, but to the group as a whole.  At such a time, no 
individual hesitates.  And whether the matter will be settled peaceably, or whether the 
joint action will result in ransacking, violence, and crime, depends on destiny. 
(McCullers 1992)7  
 
And another, from Robert Heinlein’s Methuselah’s Children:  
Since each of their egos was shared among many bodies, the death of one body 
involved no death for the ego. All memory experiences of that body remained intact, 
the personality associated with it was not lost, and the physical loss could be made up 
by letting a young native "marry" into the group. But a group ego, one of the 
personalities which spoke to the Earthmen, could not die, save possibly by the 
destruction of every body it lived in. They simply went on, apparently forever. 
(Heinlein 1941) 
                                                 
7 Thanks to Bill Lycan for pointing me to this passage. 
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Thoughts about collective mentality are commonplace in contemporary science fiction—and 
the interesting thing to note is that they don’t seem all that bizarre or far fetched. We can all 
make sense of the Borg of Star Trek, the bugs in Heinlein’s Starship troopers, the Overmind 
in Clarke’s Childhoods end, and the Precogs from Dick’s “Minority Report”. More 
importantly, we do so without questioning the ascription of mentality to various systems 
larger than the individuals that constitute these groups. Although this is science fiction, the 
fact that ascriptions of mentality to collectivities are so pervasive suggests that collective 
mentality is at least a possibility that we don’t find too surprising—whether there are any 
actual collective cognitive systems is, of course, another question. 
If all I had to go on was this data, it might be reasonable to say that I was using a 
biased sample. After all, newspaper headlines and modern fiction can often be sensationalist 
or rely on merely metaphorical turns of phrase. But, commonsense attributions of mentality 
to collectivities aren’t reserved for the hyperbolic prose of newspapers, contemporary 
literature, and science fiction. In fact, recent social psychological data suggests that 
commonsense psychology is quite willing to attribute mentality to a number of actual 
collectivities. In a review of linguistic data, Bloom and Kelemen (1995, 25) found that 
“collective nouns, such as family, bunch, and army, refer to sets of objects that bear some 
salient and enduring relationship with one another, either by being spatially or perhaps 
physically connected like the grapes in a bunch, or by having more abstract social 
connections”. Noting this diversity in the sorts of considerations that underwrite judgments 
of entativity,8 Bloom and Kelemen (1995) argue that such judgments are best understood as 
grounded in the commonsense theories that we adopt in making sense of the world around us. 
                                                 
8 By ‘entativity’ I mean to refer to those judgments about what counts as a single entity.  
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However, this just raises a question about what sorts of commonsense theory could 
underwrite a judgment that a particular system is capable of intentional action.  
One option here stems from the psychological literature on theory of mind 
ascriptions. In a well-known experiment, Heider and Simmel (1944) presented volunteers 
with a short animation consisting of simple geometric shapes moving around the screen. 
When volunteers were told to ‘write down what happened in the picture,' most of them 
offered interpretations of the animation in terms of the purposeful actions of animate beings. 
Heider and Simmel took these responses to suggest the presence of theory of mind 
mechanism that generates ascriptions of mental states in any case where such ascriptions 
facilitate explanations and predictions about the behavior of an entity. On the basis of this 
hypothesis, Paul Bloom and Csaba Veres (1999) have collected data suggesting that this 
system can also be brought on-line in order to facilitate the ascription of psychological states 
to some sorts of collectivities. Using computer simulations based on those that were used by 
Heider and Simmel, Bloom and Veres found that in conditions where subjects were presented 
with collections of objects moving in an apparently unified way, almost all subjects described 
the animation in terms of the intentional states of groups (e.g. ‘the blue circles tried to stop 
the green triangles').9 This seems to suggest that there are some conditions under which 
people are willing to attribute mentality to collectivities.  
                                                 
 
9 Is there any reason to believe that subjects intended these ascriptions literally? Of course not; however, this 
does not go against the general point that I wish to make about commonsense psychology. The point is merely 
that commonsense psychology utilizes the same mechanisms for ascribing mental states to individuals and to 
collectivities. With this in mind, two further questions must be addressed then. First, does commonsense 
psychology take attributions of mentality to collectivities literally? Second, should cognitive science take them 
literally? I have little to say about the first question, though Arico, Fialla, and Nichols (unpublished data) have 
collected some evidence for the claim that ascriptions of mental states to collectivities are treated literally from 
the standpoint of commonsense psychology. The remainder of this thesis is dedicated to answering the second 
question. 
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We might wonder at this point, however, whether there are any actual cases where we 
see the behavior of some group of individuals as unified in the right way for us to track them 
using this sort of attribution. As we know, there are some intentional actions that can only be 
carried out collectively. Moreover, we typically make sense of these activities by ascribing 
intentional states to the collectivities in question. Consider the following examples: 
• No single individual can play Steve Reich’s Music for 18 musicians (according to 
Reich, the piece should be played with a minimum of 18 musicians—more musicians 
are preferable to prevent doubling on instruments). If this piece is to be played, it will 
be necessary for a group of individuals to intend to play it. 
 
• No single individual can play a Balinese gamelan; a gamelan can only be played 
collectively. So, in order to play a gamelan, a number of people have to collectively 
intend to produce a single piece of music. 
 
• In the King Crimson song “Frame by frame”, from the album Discipline, Robert 
Fripp and Adrian Bellew play similar single note melodies on two guitars.10 One 
guitar plays in 13/8, the other plays in 14/8. This creates an offset metric that grows 
and shrinks over 7 measures of 14/8. Playing the multi-meter in this song is 
something that neither Fripp nor Bellew could do on their own, though it is something 
that they intend to do together—and in fact they execute it perfectly as a joint 
activity.11 
 
• No single individual is capable of running the Princeton Offense, the Flex offense, or 
of playing a zone defense in basketball; however, these are things that teams, under 
the direction of a knowledgeable coaching staff often intend to do.  
 
• I can’t carry a piano by myself; however, Carlo and I have moved a piano together. In 
order to successfully carry the piano, Carlo and I had to intend to do this together. 
 
Of course, the mere fact that we explain these behaviors in collective terms from the 
standpoint of commonsense psychology doesn’t, by itself, commit us to the actuality of 
collective mentality. These examples do, however, demonstrate that commonsense 
psychology is at least open to the possibility of collective intentional action. Noting this, 
                                                 
10 Thanks to David Ripley for pointing me to this piece as well as helping me think through this example. 
 
11 Note, however, that a particularly proficient drummer could play the analogous multi-meter on her own. 
Unfortunately, the world has very drummers that are so proficient at playing their instruments. 
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philosophers, and theoretically minded social scientists, have argued that there are some 
actions that are possible only by way of collective action; some philosophers have even 
argued that collective intentions are thereby required to explain how such actions are 
possible. However, things in this area become quite complicated very quickly. 
In an analysis of newspaper headlines containing ascription of intentional states to 
collectivities and individuals, Menon et al. (1999, 702), found that “while prevailing 
American theories hold that persons have stable properties that cause social outcomes and 
groups do not, the theories prevailing in Confucian influenced East-Asians cultures 
emphasize that groups have stable properties that cause social outcomes”.12 They suggest that 
while Americans are willing to engage in some ascriptions of mentality to collectivities, they 
are actually far less willing to do so than their Asian counterparts. Building on this data, as 
well as data of their own, Kashima et al. (2005, 149) have argued that there are two 
characteristics of systems that might underwrite the judgments of entativity that would allow 
for a literal understanding of different sorts of intentional actions. On the one hand, perceived 
internal consistency (i.e., the extent to which perceptions of individuals that belong to a 
group are likely to resemble one another in appearance and behavior) and perceived 
unalterability (i.e., the belief that the properties of a collectivity aren’t changeable because it 
has some underlying essence) seem to play a key role in some judgments of entativity;13 on 
the other hand, considerations of agency (Kashima et al. 2005, 150) are also at play, and 
sometimes seem to be doing all the work.14 Kashima et al (2005) found that insofar as being 
                                                 
12 Cf., Morris, Menon, and Ames (2001) for evidence suggesting that East Asians employ a conception of 
agency that allows a collectivity to count as a single entity and Kashima, et al. (1995) for evidence that suggests 
that such considerations of agency are capable of explaining the intentional actions of a collectivity. 
 
13 The thought here echoes considerations about natural kinds in folk biology that there is some essence to being 
an individual that is best understood in terms of some sort of internal mechanism (cf., Keil 1989) 
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a single entity is understood in terms of psychological essentialism (i.e., in terms of 
considerations of consistency and unalterability), individuals are perceived to be more entity-
like than collectivities cross-culturally. Considerations of agency, however, are applied to 
individuals more often than collectivities in English-speaking and continental European 
cultures, but not in East Asian countries. (Kashima et al. 2005, 162). This suggests that 
people who are raised in East Asian cultures are far more willing to ascribe agency to 
collectivities than are Westerners. 
Moreover, while there are significant differences in the number and sort of entities to 
which Americans and Asians are willing to concede agency, Menon et al. (1999, 702) have 
found that there are a number of cases on which the judgments of Americans and Asians 
seem to overlap. For example, almost everyone is willing to ascribe at least some mental 
states to collectivities. Recent data collected by Josh Knobe and Jesse Prinz (forthcoming) 
suggests that American volunteers are likely to ascribe a wide range of cognitive states to 
corporations. Knobe and Prinz presented subjects with sentences ascribing either cognitive 
states (e.g., beliefs, intentions, and desires) or phenomenal states (e.g., experiencing great 
joy, getting depressed, and vividly imagining) to corporations and asked them to judge the 
naturalness of the ascriptions. Volunteers found ascriptions of cognitive states far more 
natural than ascriptions of phenomenal states to collectivities.15 In another study, where 
subjects were presented with sentences ascribing emotional states to corporations (e.g., 
                                                                                                                                                       
14 Note that ‘agency’ is not intended to pick out any philosophically robust kind; it is merely intended to pick 
out “the extent to which a social being is attributed mental states such as beliefs, desires, and intentions’ 
(Kashima et al. 2005, 150). 
 
15 Subjects were asked rate sentences on a scale from 1 (‘sounds weird’) to 7 (‘sounds natural’).  “The mean 
ratings were as follows: Non-phenomenal states: 6.6: Deciding; 6.6: Wanting; 6.3: Intending; 6.1: Believing; 
5.2: Knowing; Phenomenal states: 4.7: Experiencing a sudden urge; 3.7: Experiencing great joy; 2.7: Vividly 
imagining; 2.5: Getting depressed; 2.1: Feeling excruciating pain” (Knobe and Prinz, forthcoming). 
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Microsoft is upset) and ascriptions that contained both emotional terms and the word 
‘feeling’ (e.g., Microsoft is feeling upset), Knobe and Prinz found that subjects even took the 
ascription of emotional states to collectivities to be natural so long as the emotional state was 
not overtly picked out as a phenomenal state.16 Knobe and Prinz take this to demonstrate that 
commonsense psychology is willing to allow for that ascription of a large number of mental 
states to collectivities—what it precludes is the ascription of phenomenal states to 
collectivities.  
In coordination with Hagop Sarkissian and Michael Bruno, I have also ran a similar 
survey of willingness to ascribe mental states to collectivities. We replicated Knobe and 
Prinz’s findings; but we also found that although American subjects differ considerably in 
their willingness to ascribe mental states to individuals as opposed to groups, subjects in 
Hong Kong do not. That is, although Americans think that it is more often acceptable to 
ascribe mental states to individuals than groups, a similar difference is not present in East 
Asian volunteers. This suggests that the willingness to ascribe mentality to collectivities 
might be, at least partially, an artifact of cultural conditioning. But unfortunately, this can’t 
be the end of the story. 
We’ve known for a long time that commonsense psychology is willing to ascribe 
mental states to collectivities. However, the question has always been: how are we to make 
sense of commonsense ascriptions of mentality to collectivities? Although there is good 
empirical data suggesting that people tend to conceive of their ascriptions of mentality 
                                                 
16 Using the same scale as before, the mean responses were: 
 With ‘Feeling’ Without ‘Feeling’ 
Upset 1.9 5.3 
Regret 2.8 6.1 
.  
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literally as opposed to metaphorically (cf., Arico et al, forthcoming), this does not rule out 
the possibility that they are instrumentally useful but false claims or that they are hyperbolic 
assertions of some other form.17  
 
1.2. Foundations for a theory of collective mentality. 
So far, I’ve argued that commonsense psychology sometimes allows for the ascription 
of mentality to collectivities in order to explain apparently intentional actions. I’ve also 
argued that people often take such ascriptions literally. However, the mere fact that people 
often ascribe mentality to collectivities cannot, by itself, tell us whether collectivities ever do 
have mental states. Perhaps none of these ascriptions are true in the same way that ascriptions 
of mentality to my housemate or my cat are. And, at this point I have offered no resources for 
determining what facts about collectivities could possibly make these ascriptions true. If I am 
to answer questions about the literal truth of ascriptions of mental states to collectivities, I 
must offer an account of what it takes for a system to have genuinely mental states.  
Thus, rather than offering an account of collective mentality, I must begin by offering 
a brief account of what it takes for a system to count as genuinely psychological. Once I’ve 
developed this account, it will offer the frame for an answer to questions about the possibility 
of collective mentality. In the absence of a more general theory of the mental, there would be 
no way to demonstrate that the mental states of a collectivity should be viewed as belonging 
to the same kind as the mental states of an individual. Thus, without a more general theory of 
                                                 
17 Here’s the relevant data from Arico et al (in prep). Subjects were asked to judge the literalness of the 
following sentences (on a scale of 1=figurative to 7=literal). 1) Some corporations want lower taxes; 2) Some 
millionaires want lower taxes; 3) Many corporations are overjoyed by a strong economy; and ). Microsoft feels 
sad when it loses customers. With 67 participants, the means were as follows: 1: 6.12, 2: 6.21, 3. 4.33, 4. 3.25. 
There is no statistically significant difference between 1 and 2  (t =-.564, p=.575) and there’s a pretty good 
correlation between them (r=.323, p = .008). However, there’s a statistically significant difference between 
responses 1 & 3 (t=7.735, p<.001) and also between 1 & 4 (t=11.559, p<.001). 
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mentality, it would be unclear why the states of a collectivity should be seen as mental states 
at all. In the remainder of this chapter I offer an outline of a theory of mentality that will 
provide conditions for the literal construal of claims about collective mentality. The key point 
to note at this point is that the theory of collective mentality I develop, any attribution of 
mentality—be it to an individual or a group—will have to be held to the same standards. My 
contention is that once we examine our best philosophical and psychological theory of 
mental states, we find a theory that applies both to collectivities and to individuals. In 
developing a theory of collective mentality, I must, then, attend to the following sorts of 
considerations. 
1) An adequate account of collective mentality must demonstrate that the domain of 
psychological explanation is not exhaustively specified by appeal to individuals. 
Instead, psychological generalizations apply to both individuals and collectivities.  
 
2) An adequate account of collective mentality must demonstrate that psychological 
explanations are autonomous from facts about their realizers: individual mental states 
can be understood independently of their neurophysiological realizers; and, collective 
mental states can be understood independently of the mental states of the individuals 
that compose that collectivity. 
 
3) An adequate account of collective mentality must distinguish between those systems 
that have genuine intentional mental states and those systems that merely behave as-if 
they had mental states (that is, we need a non-behaviorist account of mentality that 
applies to both individuals and collectivities). Any theory of mentality should 
distinguish between true believers and systems that are merely usefully described 
using mental terminology. 
 
To begin with, it will help to get some structure on the table. The most promising 
view of the mind currently on offer suggests that the study of minds must occur at (at least) 
three levels of analysis. In his seminal work on the visual system, David Marr (1982) claims 
that an adequate theory of a cognitive system must explain phenomena at three distinct, 
though interrelated, levels of explanation. First, such a theory must explain what a system 
does as well as why it; Marr calls this the computational level of explanation. Second, such a 
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theory must explain the behavior of the system in terms of the representations over which it 
runs computations as well as the transformational rules governing the manipulation of 
representations; Marr calls this algorithmic level of explanation. Finally, such a theory must 
explain how the physical structure of a system is able to implement the algorithmic and 
computational structure of that system. Over the next several subsections, I will explain how 
these three sorts of explanations are relevant to our understanding of cognitive systems in 
general, as well as how they can be brought to bear on our understanding of collective 
mentality. 
1.2.1 Computation and functions: I begin with the computational level of analysis for 
a cognitive system. According to Marr, such analyses are attempts to make sense of what a 
particular system does and why it does it, at a fairly high level of abstraction (Marr 1982, 20). 
This claim, however, fails to offer anything in the way of a model for giving a computational 
analysis of a particular system. After all, there are many, perhaps innumerably many ways of 
answering questions of what something does and why. However, we can get a more adequate 
idea about where to start by looking to the ascription of mental states in commonsense 
psychology. This does not, of course, mean that there will not be reason to revise and 
systematize commonsense psychology as scientific data are acquired. In fact, commonsense 
psychology might be wrong about a whole host of issues concerning cognitive systems; there 
may be some cognitive structures that fail to be adequately captured by commonsense 
psychology and there may be some cognitive structures that are not present as they are 
posited by commonsense psychology. However, commonsense psychology does suggest a 
number of avenues for inquiry into the cognitive structures that must be posited in order to 
explain the behavior of cognitive systems.  
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I, thus, propose to start by adopting a sort of intentional realism that posits internal 
representational states like beliefs and desires. Adopting this sort of intentional realism, then, 
opens up the possibility of adopting and account of psychology that is commonly known as 
functional analysis. Functional analysis begins by looking to the explanations offered by 
commonsense psychology, introducing modifications to the theory where necessary and 
attempting to make these explanations more systematic. We begin by noticing that the 
paradigmatic ascription of mental states like beliefs and desires occur where making such an 
attribution is the best explanation of a system’s behavior. That is, we typically individuate 
mental states by their causal consequences. Another way of putting this point is to note that 
functional analysis occurs when we ask of part of a system what role it plays in the activity 
of the system as a whole. To see how such functional analyses work, it will help to start with 
some examples.  
Consider the various ways that we might describe the parts of an internal combustion 
engine (cf., Fodor 1968). Adopting some terminology in such a description entail a 
commitment to the existence of particular structures, while other terminology entails a 
commitment only to functional characterizations of a structure. For example, referring to an 
engine component as a ‘camshaft’ carries with it a commitment to the existence of a 
cylindrical mechanism with a number of protruding lobes that are used to operate poppet 
valves. Thus, in finding that an engine contains a camshaft, one already learns a number of 
facts about the structure of the engine. However, if a device is merely referred to as a ‘valve 
lifter’ this carries with it only a commitment to functional characterization—there are many 
ways to lift a valve! Now, in speaking about valve lifters in general, there will be a lot of 
things that can be said about what a valve lifter does; however, being a valve lifter is not 
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reducible to the structural properties of an engine component because valve lifters are 
explicitly defined by their function. Similarly, what it is to be a poison is functionally defined 
(cf., Armstrong 1980).18 Poisons are substances that have the function of causing a system to 
sicken or die when introduced and they have this function even when they fail to exhibit 
these causal powers (e.g., when blocked with an antidote).19  
The important question for my purposes, however, is whether it is right to take mental 
states to be functionally characterized in the way that valve lifters and poisons are. The first 
thing to notice in making this claim is that many, if not all mental states are purposive. For 
example, if I want to write a song, this desire (when couple with the right sorts of beliefs and 
physical capacities) will cause me to pick up my guitar and start playing. There are, of 
course, many behaviors (picking up the guitar could be a getting-ready-to-write-a-song 
behavior, a straightening-up-the-living-room behavior, or even an ignoring-my-house-mate 
behavior) that are caused by many different psychological states, and this makes it more 
difficult to explain exactly what the function of a particular mental state is. Fortunately, we 
do know a more about how the function of a mental state is to be individuated.  
We know, for example, that many of our mental states are intentional or 
representational. Beliefs, desires, and perceptions all represent the world as being a certain 
way. For example, I have a number of beliefs about the cup of coffee that I am currently 
drinking. I believe that it is starting to cool off, and that it has nice chocolate and nutty 
                                                 
18 Note that in introducing this example Armstrong is not defending a functionalist account of the mind. 
However, his example of a poison nicely demonstrates a number of features of functional analysis. I use this 
example without following Armstrong’s (1980) causal theory of the mind. I also disagree with Armstrong that it 
is a part of the meaning of concepts like POISON, BELIEF, and DESIRE that they have a particular causal 
structure.  
 
19 Note that this leaves a couple of empirical questions open. First, we can’t determine a priori what is and what 
is not a poison. Second, it leaves open the mechanisms that make something poisonous. This will become 
important shortly. 
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overtones. I also desire that my coffee be hotter and less bitter. Each of these thoughts 
represents the world as being a certain way and each of these thoughts takes and intentional 
object (i.e., the cup of coffee in its current form). As Fodor (1980) puts the point, 
representations understood in this way have at least two dimensions.  
First, mental states qua representations have semantic content. This allows for a 
distinction between the belief that this coffee has nice chocolate overtones and the belief this 
cup of coffee is getting too cold. I distinguish these thought by the fact that they are about 
different things—in one case, the content is, in part, the temperature of the coffee, and in the 
other the flavor, but not the temperature, is important. Second, mental states stand in some 
relation to their content. Thus, my belief that a cup of coffee has a particular flavor and my 
wish that it did are distinguished by way of the relation between my mental state and the 
world. One way of putting this point is in terms of direction of fit—beliefs are meant to fit 
metal states to the world and desires try to make the world fit them. This claim about 
direction of fit is, of course, not subtle enough to make the fine discriminations that we can 
make between different sorts of mental states. However, whatever the complete story is, there 
must be some difference in the way that different types of mental states relate to the world. 
Another thing that has become a commonplace assumption about mental states is that 
they are not only semantically evaluable, but they are intimately tied to the production and 
control of behavior in virtue of their semantic content. My belief that this cup of coffee is too 
cold when coupled with my desire to have a nice warm cup of coffee will, ceteris paribus, 
cause me to get a new cup of coffee. My hopes concerning the well-being of migrant farm 
workers and my belief that attending a rally will make it more likely that people will take 
note of the lack of healthcare options for migrant workers will, ceteris paribus, cause me to 
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go to migrant farm worker’s rallies. Moreover, these sorts of representational states facilitate 
the pursuit of a particular goal in a way that’s flexible. As William James (1890) notes, we 
attribute a desire for food to a frog because when we prevent the frog from getting food by 
putting a glass barrier in its tank, it will modify it’s behavior in an attempt to get around the 
barrier. This sort of state stands in sharp contrast to the merely metaphorical attribution of the 
desire to make it warmer in the house that I might attribute to my heating unit. After all, if I 
turn off the switch on the thermometer, the heater will not attempt to modify its behavior in a 
way that will allow it to fulfill this desire. This leads to the supposition that there are states of 
some systems, call these the mental states, that have the purpose of producing and modifying 
behavior.  
Spelling out the nature of these mental terms as they are individuated by their 
function from within commonsense psychology is by no means the end of the story. 
However, it is at least a point at which we can begin to inquire into the nature of the mind. 
Provided there is some functional characterizations of a particular cognitive state (e.g., belief, 
desire, or visual experience), we come to a second sort of question: what needs to be the case 
for a system to execute these functions. In thinking through this issue, it helps to think of a 
function as an abstract entity that takes an input and uses an algorithm of some sort to map 
this input onto some output. Ned Block (1978), for example, claims that functionalism about 
the mind just is the thesis that “each type of mental state is a state consisting of a disposition 
to act in certain ways, and to have certain mental states, given certain sensory inputs and 
certain mental states.” In explaining how a mental states can do this, however, it is necessary 
to move to Marr’s algorithmic level of explanation. 
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1.2.2 Algorithms and RTM: At the algorithmic level of explanation, it is necessary to 
commit to both a range of representations that can be used by a system and to a set of 
transformational rules that operate over these representations. The functional 
characterizations that are developed at the computational level do not entail any particular 
theory about representations; however a functionalist theory of a cognitive system whose 
outputs are semantically evaluable as well as causally efficacious sits quite well with a 
representational theory of mind  (hereafter RTM). In response to considerations about the 
semanticality and causal efficaciousness of human thought, RTM was self-consciously 
developed as a theory of cognitive systems that explains how the functionally characterized 
mental states of psychological explanation can be semantically evaluable as well as causally 
efficacious.  
Developing a plausible representational theory of the mind is, of course, quite 
complicated. So, it will help to begin with a better idea about what the proponent of RTM 
actually claims. According to RTM, mental states are best understood—at the algorithmic 
level of explanation—as relations between a cognitive system and a mental representation. 
Fodor this formally as follows: 
For any organism O and any proposition P, there is a relation R and a mental 
representation MP such that: MP means that (expresses the proposition that) P; and O 
believes that P iff O bears R to MP (Fodor 1990, 16) 
 
According to proponents of RTM, the algorithmic level of explanation for mental states 
should be seen as an attempt to discover the sorts of representations over which a cognitive 
structure operates as well as the syntactic transformations utilized by the system in order to 
carry out some function.  
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The most promising explanation for why we should think that the mind is a 
representational system, as supposed by proponents of RTM, turns on an analogy between 
thought and language. This argument begins from the assumption that thought, like language, 
is infinitely productive. That is, from a finite stock of primitive representations, we are able 
to construct an infinite number of complex thoughts. For example, just in virtue of having the 
constituent concepts, you can have the thought FRANK ZAPPA AND BENITO 
MUSSOLINI USED TO TANGO IN PARIS WHILE SMOKING CATNIP FROM A 
TWELVE FOOT BONG—though that thought probably had not ever crossed your mind 
before reading it. Fodor, thus, contends that any viable theory of mental states like beliefs 
and desires must be able to account for the boundlessness of thought. In a natural language, 
we have an easy story about how each sentence decomposes into sub-sentential components. 
From this stock of sub-sentential components, different sentences can be arranged by simple 
recursive rules, and the meaning of a complex sentence can be determined in a regular way 
by its constituent structure. All we need is a base of words, a set of syntactic rules, and a 
series of transformation rules, and you’re off and running. The assumption is that if we had a 
story about how propositional mental states could be built out of things that are sub-
propositional then we could have a parallel story for thought. If there were a language of 
thought that paralleled the structure of natural language, then we would have such a story. A 
language of thought is a structure of syntactic rules and mental representations as constituent 
semantic structures—so RTM follows.  
RTM provides a story about the semanticality of thought. However, RTM must also 
offer a story that explains how semantic states can also have causal powers. On this point, 
Fodor has argued that we should think of the mind as computational system. His reasoning 
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here is that if the mind is a computer (call this the computational theory of mind, or CTM), 
this provides a story explaining how non-arbitrary content relations among causally related 
thoughts can be possible. The representational states of a computational system are capable 
of being transformed into other representational states or into output states merely in virtue of 
their formal properties because of the way that the computational structures of the system are 
organized. Now, if the mind is computational, then there have to be some mental particulars 
that have syntactical properties. Just as we see in a computer, transformation rules and data 
structure will be represented in the architecture of the system. In this case we would have a 
story about how the operations over syntactic primitives could give rise to semantically 
evaluable states. Elaborated in this way, thought is not just representational it is also 
computational in the sense that mental states understood in this way are symbolic (i.e., they 
are defined over representations) and they are formal (in that they apply to representations in 
virtue of their syntax).  
With this computational theory of mind in hand, it is possible to turn to explanations 
at the level of the implementation (Marr 1982, 22) for these semantic and syntactic 
structures. The thought here is that it must be possible to move from a how-possibly story 
about the semantic and syntactic structures of a mind, to a how-actually story that explains 
how the sorts of computations that we ascribe to a system at other levels of analysis can be 
physically implemented in a system.  
1.2.3 Implementation and realization: One approach to questions about 
implementation is to avoid them and adopt the instrumentalist project suggested by Daniel 
Dennett (1978a, 1987a, 1987b, 1991b). Dennett has spent much of his career attempting to 
undermine ‘industrial strength realism’. In order to achieve this, Dennett distinguishes 
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between two claims might be made about the existence of mental states. Given that we can’t 
directly observe mental states, and that we have to infer their existence, there are two ways in 
which this inference can be carried through (cf., Reichenbach 1938). First, they mental states 
might be illata: independently existing entities whose existence is inferred from observable 
phenomena, but which are themselves unobserved. Second, they might be abstracta: abstract 
objects that exist only within a theoretical framework—the existence of which is settled by 
way of theoretical convention. Dennett (1991b) contends that mental states are abstracta and 
that we need not be concerned for the purposes of psychological theorizing about whether 
these states are implemented at the level of neural architecture. We are interested in such 
abstracta as beliefs and desires because, and only because they allow for the prediction and 
explanation of behavior, empathetic responses to others, the organization of memories, and 
the interpretation of emotions (Dennett, 1991b).  
Adopting a view that treats mental states as abstracta turns on understanding the 
ascription of mental states exclusively in terms of adopting the intentional stance. To a first 
approximation, adopting the intentional stance is a matter of treating a system whose 
behavior you want to predict as a rational agent with beliefs, desires, and other mental states 
exhibiting intentionality. Dennett claims that a system whose behavior is predictable on the 
assumption of rationality, and whose behavior cannot—for practical purposes—be explained 
merely in terms of its physical structure, is in the fullest sense of the word a believer. 20  
                                                 
20 There are, of course, a number of other arguments that can get you to this point. Dennett often argues in the 
following way. Recent neuroscience suggests that the brain is an inherently plastic system (cf., Churchland 
1979, and Ramachandran 1993) and that the brain structures that produce any complex behavior are likely to be 
distributed across multiple heterogeneous brain regions (cf., Clark 1989, and McClelland and Rumelhardt 
1986). Given these facts about the human brain, it is quite likely that the neural structures that could realize 
beliefs and desires (if there are any) are likely to be extremely plastic and distributed across multiple brain 
structures especially since the constituents of beliefs and desires are likely to be tied to particular long term and 
working memories (cf., Prinz 2002 and Barsalou 1987) of particular agents—and our best neuroscience 
suggests that memories are multiply distributed if anything is (cf., Cabeza and Nyberg 2000 for a review). Thus, 
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But why should we believe Dennett on this point? So far as I can see it, we have two 
choices. Either we can follow Dennett (1978a, 1987a, 1987b, 1991b) and take mental states 
to be the abstracta that we use in ascribing mental states, or we can take the behavioral 
regularities that are predicted and explained by way of our mental state ascriptions to be 
evidence for the presence of some underlying causal mechanism that gives rise to such 
states.21 Dennett is certainly right that when we find some system for which the intentional 
stance works, we endeavor to interpret some of its internal states as internal representations 
(Dennett 1978a). However, there are some very good reasons for taking mental states to be 
illata (cf., Lewis 1972, Fodor 1968, 1989, and Lycan 1987, et al).  
As Jerry Fodor (1987, 16) puts the point, “We have no reason to doubt that it is 
possible to have a scientific psychology that vindicates commonsense belief/desire 
explanation." However, Dennett’s claim that beliefs and desires are abstracta—when he is 
pushing more industrial strength versions of his instrumentalism—is partly grounded on the 
empirical claim that generalizations applicable at the neurophysiological level of explanation 
will not be sufficient to justify the sort of isomorphism psychological realism requires 
between kinds in commonsense psychology and kinds in neurophysiology. The 
psychological realist, however, has a response to this claim. This leaves industrial strength 
instrumentalism in the following awkward position: if there is no way to vindicate the 
                                                                                                                                                       
the tokens of a particular type of belief are unlikely to have enough structural properties in common to explain 
why they are tokens of that type. Now, if our best neuroscience finds no way of mapping all the tokens of a 
particular belief to underlying neural structures, then so much the worse for the inner cause story of mentation. 
Moreover, Bill Lycan (1988, 518-519) has suggested two other reasons for Dennett’s instrumentalism: 1) 
Dennett’s objections to the language-of-thought (the most plausible inner cause theory) and 2) Dennett’s 
implicit commitment to verificationism about meaning.  Dennett concedes these as his reason for 
instrumentalism, though he thinks that appealing to verification conditions in the absence of an underlying 
causal mechanism is innocuous (cf., Dennett 1988, 543). 
 
21 NB: If I were to adopt the former strategy, my work here would be done. Provided that there are cases in 
which the behavior of a collectivity were best predicted in terms of intentional ascriptions, that collectivity 
would have mental states. On Dennett’s brand of instrumentalism, collective mentality follows straight away! 
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functional patterns of commonsense psychology by appeal to structural realizers of some 
sort, then there is little reason to think that we wouldn’t be better served by adopting patterns 
of explanation that were couched in terms of neurophysiological states (or whatever the 
relevant patterns are) and abandoning all talk of beliefs and desires. But, as Fodor (1987, 10) 
puts the point, "we can't give them up because we don't know how to. So maybe we had 
better try to hold on to them".22 
Given that all parties to this dispute recognize that it is an empirical question whether 
mental states are realized in a way that allows them to count as illata, we cannot say, a priori, 
that the relevant sorts of states won’t be found in the brain or in whatever else happens to 
realize a mind. Moreover, because there is currently no overwhelming evidence on either 
side of this issue, it strikes me as reasonable to look for some story about the sorts of states 
that we are tracking with our belief talk that will allow them to be viewed as illata. This story 
will probably be told, at the end of the day, in terms of the architectural features of a system 
that facilitate computations over intentional states in a way that yields beliefs. What this class 
includes is, at least currently, not easy to settle. Moreover, the mere fact that we have a 
difficult time articulating the neurophysiological realizers of particular beliefs, for example, 
doesn’t mean that there is no interesting class of realizers that cluster as a natural kind at both 
neurological and psychological levels of explanation. And even Dennett, in some moods, 
agrees with at least this claim.  
However, Dennett also argues that even if you want to defend a view of mental states 
as illata that are grounded on certain sorts of computational structures, there are serious 
                                                 
22 Dennett is, of course, unclear about his position on this point. In some cases, Dennett would agree entirely 
with this sort of position. Dennett has, indeed, at points exhibited a sort of eliminativist tendency. However, 
Much of Dennett’s work is also grounded on humanist assumptions that preclude the possibility of 
eliminativism about mental states.  
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worries about how the brain could possibly implement a semantic engine. Although the mind 
seems to be a semantic engine, any architecture of the brain seems only to be able to realize a 
syntactic engine (Dennett 1987b). Neural structures just are not capable of doing anything 
more than discriminate structural, temporal, and physical features of inputs. Moreover, the 
brain is an entirely mechanical system whose activities are governed by the syntactic features 
of inputs by way of (likely) incredibly simple transformation rules. However, if CTM is to be 
an adequate theory of minds, then there must be a story about how the brain manages to get 
from syntax to semantics. Given that syntax cannot, by itself, determine semantics, this 
seems to generate an unbridgeable gap. However, Dennett also notes that there is good 
reason to think that a purely syntactic system could be designed in such a way that it 
approximates a semantic engine. 
Promising strategies for such approximations emerge when we consider analogies to 
other cases of approximations in biological systems. Consider the animal that needs to know 
when it has found and eaten food. In many cases this organism will settle for a friction-in-
the-throat-followed-by-stretched-stomach-detector, a mechanical system that can be tricked 
but that works pretty well in its normal environment (cf., Dennett 1987b). To consider 
another philosophically commonplace example of such approximations, we can note that 
magnetotactic bacteria succeed in avoiding deadly oxygen rich waters without oxygen 
detectors. In their natural environments, these bacteria utilize a set of magnetosomes that 
ensure that they are constantly impelled towards magnetic north. This mechanical system that 
can be tricked by placing a southern-dwelling bacteria in northern waters; however, it does 
well enough to get these bacteria around in their natural environments. Borrowing from this 
sort of model, Dennett claims that if we are to explain how to get semantics from syntax, “the 
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system has to be put together as a bag of tricks that functions to pick out and type classify 
stimuli, filtering out irrelevant data, in the end seeming to discriminating meanings by 
actually discriminating things (no-doubt tokens of wildly disjunctive types) that reliably 
covary with meanings” (Dennett 1987b, 63).  
The only way in which we could possibly specify mental states as illata, then, is by 
doing sub-personal cognitive psychology on the design specifications for a cognitive system. 
Making the ontology of belief an empirical question, however, we are faced with a 
potentially troubling result. If we find that the brain does not include systems that can 
facilitate the computations required for beliefs, we must worry that the system is not actually 
a believer. To put the point another way, if we posit black boxes that cannot be causally 
sustained by mechanisms internal to a system, a theory that ascribes beliefs to that system has 
got to be mistaken! 
This argument does not, however, tell against computationalism per se without a 
number of additional premises. Surely a computational model that offers an account of the 
mind that doesn’t refer to the world probably isn’t going to be viable; however, this does 
leave open at least one version of computationalism open. If we want to have a syntactic 
engine, that is at least virtually a semantic engine, then there will have to be some syntactic 
relations that reliably covary with semantic relations (Dennett 1987b, 63). However, this 
requires constantly checking outside the system to see how the internal states of a cognitive 
system operate in that system’s natural environments, determining how it responds to 
different stimuli as well as whether the states of that system actually covary in the right way 
with states of the environment. It is only in this way that we begin to make sense of both the 
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function of mental representations as well as the requisite flexibility that must be present in 
mental states. 
At this point, we see that the way to start with the interpretation of a system as a 
cognitive system is to work from the level of commonsense mental ascriptions, use such 
ascriptions to construct an account of the various functional tasks that a system can 
undertake, and then to see whether there are any syntactic structures at place in the system 
that covary with the semantic states ascribed to the system. This however, suggests that we 
cannot make assumptions about what sorts of systems will have semantic states. It is only by 
working through what it takes to be a mental state (at the level of psychology) and then 
checking for the right sorts of isomorphism with some realizers that we can ascribe genuinely 
mental states to a system. Now, if there are good reasons to attribute mentality to 
collectivities from the standpoint of psychology, the next question will be whether there are 
any states of the system that stand in the right relation to semantic states. Surely this is not a 
question that can be answered by dogma—only doing the empirical inquiry can answer the 
question about whether collective mentality is possible. 
1.2.4 The autonomy of commonsense psychology: Insofar as commonsense 
attributions of mentality are concerned, we do not typically seem to care about the 
implementation of cognitive states; this brings us to a final component of an adequate theory 
of mentality: how can psychological explanations be autonomous from claims about their 
realization. Fortunately, taking mental states to be functional kinds suggests an initial story 
about the autonomy of psychological explanation. My claim, here, follows Dennett’s in 
noting that Laplacean Martians who could predict the movement of every physical particle in 
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the universe would still be missing something perfectly objective.23 Dennett explains this in 
terms of the patterns in human behavior that can be described only by adopting 
commonsense functional psychology. I agree with Dennett that the Martians wouldn’t be 
able to see the right sort of counterfactual stabilities.24 While they might be able to compute 
some counterfactuals, they would not be able to see the indefinitely many unique patterns of 
physical motions that could be substituted for particular physical realizers without perturbing 
the patterns of human behavior. 
Let me try to spell this point out with an analogy. Consider the question: What makes 
something a carburetor? One way to answer this question is by an appeal to the fact that its 
operation corresponds to a function detailed by the theory of internal combustion engines. 
Now, suppose we want to know what the structure of a particular carburetor is. There will be 
an account of the physical parts out of which a particular carburetor is made; however, before 
we can begin to investigate the relevant mechanisms in an engine, we have to have a theory 
about what carburetors are. Otherwise, we would have no criteria for determining which 
parts of the engine constitute the carburetor. That is, we need to have a theory of carburetors 
that is stable enough and projectable enough to pick out a carburetor in any internal 
combustion engine that we approach—even in cases where the particular mechanism that is 
doing the carburetion is one that we haven’t encountered before.  
                                                 
23 I am quite fond of Dennett’s argument on this point. However, he typically denies functionalist theories about 
the mind; I, on the other hand, think that there is no reason why we cannot adopt Dennett’s argument on this 
point without denying functionalism. 
 
24 Both Frank Jackson and David Braddon-Mitchel argue that there is no reason to suppose that the Martians 
wouldn’t be able to compute the counterfactuals. However, the point here is a bit more subtle. In order to be 
able to compute the right sorts of counterfactual stabilities, the Martians would have to have the capacity to 
track the relevant class of behaviors that constitute a particular sort of intentional state. However, because at the 
physical level these states are quite heterogeneous, they wouldn’t be classified as belonging to a particular kind 
except by way of psychological explanation. See the next four paragraphs for an elaboration of this point. 
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Similarly, if we want a genuine science of psychology, we need to know is how to 
generalize over psychological states in a way that is stable and projectable. However, the 
only way that we can get to these sorts of generalizations is to begin at the level of 
psychological explanation.25 Had we not adopted a view of functional psychological, we 
never would have picked out the kind at the neural level in the first place. The reason here is 
that the similarities at the neural level (e.g., similarities in the sorts and density of cells or in 
the range of tasks for which different areas show activity) do not always recapitulate 
similarities at the psychological level, so were we to start at the level of neurophysiology, we 
might end up carving up the world in a radically different way. Neurophysiological states just 
don’t cluster into the right sorts of patterns for us to start with generalizations about them and 
infer upwards to psychology.  
To put a finer point on this claim, it’s a well-known worry about functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) that neuroanatomical localization is highly variable across 
subjects. Merely looking to the areas that happen to be active at a particular time is never 
sufficient for determining what the function of a region is. It is only by deciding on a 
functional task before hand (hence the f in fMRI) that it’s possible to understand the tasks to 
which a particular region of cortex is dedicated. However, once a task is functionally 
specified, we find that particular regions of the brain are active for particular sorts of tasks in 
a single individual. Now, while our current imaging techniques are insufficient to figure out 
precisely what areas are active in which tasks, it is plausible to think that we will eventually 
be able to discriminate distinct areas of cortex that are dedicated to particular sorts of 
                                                 
25 The exact starting point here is going to vary from case to case. In some cases (e.g., beliefs and desires), the 
best place to start is with folk psychological ascriptions. In these cases, the intuitions will have to be made 
rigorous by constructing a theory of such states. In other cases, the relevant sorts of phenomena will be 
scientific psychological phenomena (e.g., attention, long term memory, or semantic memory) that do not have 
clear equivalences in folk psychology. 
 31 
functional tasks, but it is only on the assumption of functional characterization that the data 
collected in neurological studies is interpretable. 
However, things get even worse for a theory that starts at the neurological level. If 
functionalism is true, then there are lots of ways of realizing such kinds that don’t happen to 
be instantiated in the actual world right now. And here’s the important point. While we do 
get token identities between psychological states and their structural realizers, this does not 
entail much of anything in the way of a reductive story about psychology. As Fodor (1968) 
puts the point, functional kinds (e.g., psychological states) are not easily seen as being 
capable of being micro-analyzed in any way; after all, the mere fact that we have identified a 
certain mousetrap with its physical structure does not commit us to thinking that all 
mousetraps have to be built like that—otherwise it would be impossible to build a better 
mousetrap. 
 
1.3. Functionalism, CTM and collective mentality 
At this point I’ve collected all the tools necessary for constructing a theory of 
collective mentality that shows how they are analogous to the mental states of other cognitive 
systems. I’ll start to develop this theory of collective mentality by considering an argument 
offered by D. H. M. Brooks (1986) in his paper “Group minds”. Brooks argues that accepting 
functionalism entails at least some cases where we would be warranted in attributing mental 
states to collectivities. I’m inclined to think that the sort of story he tells is insufficient in the 
end, however it does provide a foundation, and with some elaboration this view becomes 
incredibly plausible.  
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If materialism is true,26 then there will be some supervenience relation between the 
mental and the physical. What this relationship is, however, is far from immediately obvious. 
One way of looking at this relationship is in terms of type identities between mental states 
and brain states. However, alternatively, and far more plausibly, we can adopt a functionalist 
view with token identities between mental states and brain states.27 Type identity seems too 
strong to adequately capture our standard understanding of the mental. After all, we should 
expect no psychological change in a person where one of her neurons is replaced with an 
artificial neuron (Brooks 1986, 456). But if replacing one neuron with an artificial neuron 
maintains psychological identity, there is no reason to suppose that a system consisting 
exclusively of artificial neurons having the same functional properties as neurons and the 
same relational properties as your neurons would have different psychological properties 
from you.28 But, artificial neurons can be built in a variety of ways given that the relevant 
function of a neuron is merely to be on/off-signaling devices. So, anything that can function 
as an on/off-signaling device can be used as an artificial neuron. A person can function as an 
                                                 
26 I think that you can get away without buying this supposition provided that you’re willing to concede a 
supervenience relation between the mental and the physical (which even Descartes was willing to do). There 
are, of course, deep questions here that would turn on a particular sort of reading of Descartes dualism—and 
answering these questions would lead us quite far a field of my main line of argument. However, this is Brooks’ 
(1986) argument and he presupposes materialism. 
 
27 I have serious reservations about the truth of this claim. To begin with, there is reason to think, with Burge 
(1979 and 1986), that the content of mental states depends not just on these molecular identities but also on 
facts about the social histories in which the relevant concepts were learned. Moreover, if the extended mind 
thesis pushed by Clark (1997), Clark and Chalmers (1998), Clark and Wilson (forthcoming), and Wilson (1995, 
2004) is correct, then the environment (both physical and social) of an entity will also be relevant to the identity 
of mental states because according to this view mental states are not to be understood just as states of brains but 
instead as the computational states that facilitate various sorts of actions by a system—some of which may be 
extended or embedded in various ways that are not wholly dependent on the neural state of the system. I’ll 
return to these worries throughout the thesis.  
 
28 This argument, of course, comes far too quickly. Although a commitment to functionalism does entail the 
truth of the proposition that a system whose functional characteristics were identical to yours would be 
psychologically identical to you, Brooks claim only follows if you suppose that there would be no difference in 
the functional characteristics of a system that consisted exclusively of artificial neurons. This, of course, has not 
been established—and Brooks does not attempt to establish it. 
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on/off-signaling device, so a person can be an artificial neuron. So, there is no reason to 
suppose that a system that consisted of a number of persons arranged so as to replicate the 
relational and functional architecture of the neurons in your brain would have different 
psychological properties from the individual that such a system replicates. 
As Brooks (1986, 457ff) puts the point, if we were to collect everyone in the nation of 
China and create a Brain City that replicated the functional architecture of your brain, there is 
no reason to suppose that Brain City would lack any of the psychological properties that you 
possess. In fact, Brain City could even have a ‘drink’ that had the same effect of it that 
alcohol has on us provided that we could introduce runners into the system that would “dash 
through the appropriate parts of the city doing the analogue of whatever it is that alcohol 
molecules do, damping down neurone response levels or changing the signal relations or 
whatever” (Brooks 1986, 457). The thought is spelled out simply as follows: If functionalism 
is the correct account of the mind, then it is not the biological properties of neurons that 
allows them to realize mentation, rather it is their functional properties; and if a group of 
people can have the same functional properties as a person then they can realize a group 
mind that has all of the same psychological properties as that person does.  
Sure enough, this is one way to defend collective mentality. However, there are other 
ways of spelling out functional analysis of mentality that provide equally plausible accounts 
of the mentality of collectivities—indeed accounts that will diverge in interesting ways from 
this model. While we might choose, with Brooks, to look to the implementation level for an 
account of the relation between psychological states and their realizers (In fact, this is the 
way that much of the literature on collective intentionality has gone),29 there is reason to 
                                                 
29 I leave this literature to the side; however, I return to it briefly below. 
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think that there might be some systems were what we should pay attention to the functional 
organization of a system at the level of computational structures and the algorithms that they 
carry out. While looking to the implementation level might suggest some places where 
collective mentality is possible, in order to get to the most interesting cases of collective 
mentality in the actual world it will help to look at a variety of other levels of explanation. In 
order to get a handle on how this might be possible, it will help to look to a distinction 
between functional roles and the occupants of those roles, between programs and realizers, 
or between software and hardware. Now, we might rest content with a picture of the mind 
that operates just in terms of two-level explanations, looking to see which sorts of physical 
structures underlie which sorts of psychological functions and then trying to find analogous 
structures to see if a system can have mental states. The worry, however, is that this picture 
fails to capture all of the relevant similarities between mental states.30 
Consider what it takes for something to count as the program that we know as 
Mozilla Firefox. To begin with, we can find a LINUX version of Firefox, a MAC OS X 
version, a Windows version, etc., and each of these programs counts as Firefox in virtue of 
the sorts of computations and algorithms that the program is running. Even though the 
program is running on different platforms, we identify the program in virtue of what the 
system can do. Now, a functionalist might assume that there is exactly one way to make 
sense of the relation between the mental and the physical. The functionalist might claim that 
the only relevant analogies between cognitive systems are at the implementation level—but 
doing so is surely a mistake (cf., Lycan 1987). Brooks supposes that the best way to defend 
                                                 
30 I do not, here, mean to claim that Brooks (1986) is committed to two-levelism. What I intend to suggest here 
is that there is no reason to think that this is the only way in which collective mentality can be realized. 
Numerous attempts to explicate the relations between collective intentionality and individual psychological 
states have focused on this sort of explanation—I find none of these stories compelling. I turn to some of the 
problems with this approach in subsequent chapters. 
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the hypothesis of collective mentality is by showing that the functional role of belief, for 
example could be realized in terms of artificial neurons. However, this is not the only level of 
explanation to which we might look if we are to develop a story of collective mentality. In 
fact, for many of the collectivities to which we might be willing to attribute mentality, there 
is a far more promising story to be told. As Bill Lycan has correctly pointed out, it only 
makes sense to say that something is a role as opposed to an occupant modulo a particular 
level of explanation. Thus, where an individual person is concerned, it might make sense to 
say that a language of thought is the software and the wetware is the hardware, there might 
be also be reason to say of a corporation that the marketing plan is the software and the 
individuals in various departments at the corporation are the hardware. All of this will 
depend on what sort of explanation we are looking for. Let me, then, turn to an elaboration of 
the claim that there might be another way to look at the realization relationship in 
collectivities. 
In the remainder of this thesis, I adopt the sort of position that Lycan (1987) refers to 
as homuncular functionalism, or homunctionalism. The key claim of homunctionalism is best 
put in terms of Marvin Minsky’s (1988) notion of a society of the mind. The thought is that 
the functional architecture of the mind is best understood as having a similar structure to a 
corporate hierarchy. There are various different divisions of the mind, each of which is 
dedicated to a particular sort of computational task. Consider the visual representation of a 
beer bottle being thrown at your face as you watch Patti Smith play the last show ever at 
CBGBs. In this case, there will be a system dedicated to detecting motion, a system dedicated 
to constructing representations of objects (presumably out of the representations of edges and 
colors that have been constructed by simpler systems), and a system connecting these 
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perceptual representations to an action system, and probably a whole host of other systems 
beyond these. On the homunctionalist theory of mind, the way to explain the functioning of 
each of these homunculi is by an appeal to the more specialized homunculi that constitute it, 
and by detailing the behaviors of these homunculi to explain how they produce a corporate 
output rather than going all the way down to the level of neurology. Lycan (1987) contends 
that mental states are type-identical with the property of having such-and-such an 
institutionally characterized state obtaining in one (or more) of one’s appropriate 
homunctional departments or sub-agencies.31 
Now, suppose that we find cases where we are willing to ascribe mentality to 
collectivities from the standpoint of commonsense psychology. Further, suppose that we 
develop an account of what it is to have a particular sort of mental state in terms of the 
functional characteristics of such a state. At this point, the important questions focus on the 
how this function is actually realized in the system. We have garnered some tools at this 
point for thinking about these functions in terms of the sort of information that they are able 
to process. What we will need to look for is a functional decomposition of the particular sort 
of mental state that we are attributing to the system. What we will do at this point is try to 
spell out a sort of boxology, or corporate hierarchy for the relevant sort of belief. 
Assuming that it is possible to develop such a picture, we will then look not to the 
level of physical mechanisms, but instead to the computational processes that need to take 
place in order for a particular sort of mental state to be possible. This story will be told in 
terms of the passing of information from homunculus to homunculus. Provided that there are 
the right sort of homunculi in a system and provided that these homunculi are able to pass the 
                                                 
31 Lycan spells this out in the case of pain: To be in pain of type T is for one’s sub…sub-personal Φ-er to be in a 
characteristic state St(Φ), or for a characteristic activity At(Φ) to be going on in one’s Φ-er 
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right sort of information to one another, this will yield a system that can possess genuinely 
mental state. At this point it will be a further question what the realizers are for the function 
of each of the relevant homunculi. This question will either be answered in terms of a further 
homuncular decomposition, or at some point just a story about the brute physical primitives. 
This is the important point: for something to count as a legitimate psychological 
process, all that needs to be the case is that the process is realized on some sort of 
representational mechanism that is running the right sorts of computations. For collective 
mentality to be possible, all that will need to be the case is that there is an isomorphism 
between the computational processes that occur in individuals when we attribute a 
psychological state ψ to them and the computational processes that occur in collectivities 
when we attribute ψ to them. Here also lies the key to the story about the autonomy of 
psychological explanation from neurology. Neurological explanations are irrelevant to 
psychological explanations except (and this is a very important consideration) in so far as the 
neurological explanations suggest that the psychological story can’t be realized in the system 
in question. So long as the homunctionalist decomposition comes out right, psychology 
should be happy to concede mentality regardless of how the computations happen to be 
realized. Thus, we should concede that a collectivity has mental states to the extent that it 
exhibits the right sort of homuncular decomposition, regardless of the sorts of states that are 
possessed by the individuals that compose the collectivity. 
If we have reason to suppose that the right sorts of computations are being carried out 
by some subsystem (or sub-subsystem) of a collectivity, then we have good reason to say that 
our ascriptions of collective mentality are warranted. Alternatively, if the system is 
behaviorally identical to a system that has a particular mental state but there are no such 
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computations going on, then we have no reason to think that the system in question is a 
cognitive system, and thus we have reason to suppose that our attributions of collective 
mentality are not warranted. It at least seems possible that there could be a collectivity that 
engaged in computations that were functionally equivalent to the computations that 
individuals engage in. Thus, it seems like collective mentality is possible.  
 
1. 4. Concluding remarks: 
There are three points that I want to make clear about this preliminary sketch of the 
view I wish to defending. First, what I am concerned about is the functional architecture of 
cognitive systems. While there are a number of views that have been defended in recent years 
about the nature of collective intentionality (e.g., John Searle 1990a, 1995; Raimo Tuomella 
1992; Margaret Gilbert 1987, 1989), these views have typically been concerned with 
explanations at the level of the implementation of collective intentions by individual 
psychological states of various sorts. I do not want to argue that such explanations are 
unimportant. In fact, I am inclined to think that it will, at some point, be quite important to 
determine how it is that the individuals who compose a collectivity can implement collective 
intentions. This is true in just the same way that it will be important to know how the brain 
realizes mental states in individuals. However, we do not, at least for the purposes of doing 
psychology, need to be committed to any particular story about the implementation of 
collective mental states.  
Second, we need to be careful with the sorts of states with which we concern 
ourselves in the analysis of collective mentality. If we start with the sorts of cases that are 
typical of the collective intentions literature, we find ourselves entangled in a number of 
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debates that are better left to the side. Margaret Gilbert, for example, often starts with cases 
like deciding to take a walk with someone. However, if we start with these sorts of cases, we 
will focus on facts about the individuals and what it takes for them to intend to walk together 
rather than facts about the functional organization of the system in question. This leads to a 
number of serious worries about how it is that you can get from facts about the psychological 
properties of aggregations of individuals to facts about genuine collective states. However, if 
we start with more complicated cases where the corporate architecture is more salient, the 
functionalist picture that I want to defend becomes much clearer—we see how the 
psychological properties of the group are actually isomorphic in the right way to the 
psychological facts about individuals. This being done, it is easier to see that the actual 
psychological states of individuals aren’t really what are at issue in defending collective 
mentality. My contention is that we need to have the right sort of functionally characterized 
system in any case where we find collective mentality. The problem with the previous 
literature on the topic is that it’s just harder to see this sort of organization in simpler 
systems. 
Finally, I’ve argued mental states form a natural kind from the standpoint of 
psychology and cognitive science. We should not expect there to be one account of 
individual mental states and another completely distinct account of collective psychological 
states—at least not so long as we are attempting to develop a theory of collective psychology. 
Once we know what it is to have a mental state, we can apply this theory either to the 
individual or to the group and the explanation will be the same sort of explanation in both 
cases. In the same way that we don’t need a story about the properties of individual neurons 
to explain the psychological properties of an individual, we don’t need to look to facts about 
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the individuals that compose a group (e.g., whether we have ‘we-intentions’) to see if there 
are collective intentions. We start from the psychological posits and then we check to see if 
the system in question has the right sort of functional organization to give rise to the mental 
state in question.  
In the remainder of this thesis, I argue that there are reasons not just for thinking that 
such an account of collective psychology is not merely a metaphysical possibility, but that 
there are real world cases of collective cognition. But, that’s a long and arduous road that 
must take us through the snags and snarls of a number of serious objections to the possibility 
of such systems in the actual world. 
Chapter II:  
THE COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUS? 
 
It used to be taken as obvious that there were cognitive social phenomena that needed 
to be accounted for by any science of the mind. At the end of the nineteenth century, 
numerous accounts of the mentality of crowds, for example, appeared in the foundational 
documents of social psychology; Emile Durkheim argued for the possibility of collective 
representations as a way to make sense of census data and suicide rates; and, a number of 
biologists argued that we should understand social insects as superorganisms. However, such 
appeals are rarely offered these days; when they are, things don’t go too well. Even if our 
best theory of mental states allows for collective mentality, the argument in the previous 
chapter is bound to leave philosophers and non-philosophers alike unpersuaded. I have 
argued that accepting functionalism about mental states entails that there are no a priori 
reasons to rule out the possibility of collective mental states. However, a pernicious argument 
waits in the wings, intent on undercutting any position that purports to demonstrate the 
possibility of collective mentality. 
Although there is a substantial consensus regarding the functionalist view of the mind 
in philosophy and cognitive science, there are detractors. When faced with the possibility of 
collective mentality, philosophers, and non-philosophers tend to turn to worries about the 
impossibility of collective consciousness. They claim that since there is nothing that it’s like 
to be a collectivity there must be something wrong with this project of justifying collective 
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mentality. The argument, in brief, runs as follows. Functional and representational capacities 
are not sufficient to distinguish genuinely cognitive systems from computational systems that 
are not genuinely cognitive. What’s left out in such explanations is the fact that cognitive 
systems are conscious and merely computational systems are not, and consciousness is a 
necessary condition on mentality. So, since collectivities can’t be conscious, they can’t be 
cognitive systems.  
There are two ways in which this argument can be answered. First, it is possible to 
resist the argument by demonstrating that consciousness is not a necessary condition on 
mentality. If it is possible for a system to have mental states without having conscious states, 
then the impossibility of collective consciousness will not impugn collective mentality. 
Second, it is possible to argue that our most plausible account of consciousness strongly 
suggests that a collectivity could be conscious. Most of my arguments in this chapter are 
directed at establishing the former claim. However, I also claim that collective consciousness 
is possible, even if highly unlikely in the actual world. However, before developing these 
claims, I turn to the ways in which the argument from the absences of collective 
consciousness might be elaborated. In this chapter, I argue that none of these arguments 
impugn the possibility of collective mentality. 
 
2.1 There are things collectivities can’t do: 
The first worry that might be suggested concerns the possibility of limitations on the 
sorts of states that collectivities might be able to exhibit. While people possess myriad mental 
capacities, it’s difficult to imagine a collectivity that could possess all of these. However, the 
thought goes, if a collection of humans is to count as minded, it must be capable of having at 
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least the same sorts of mental states that we find in the human beings that compose the 
collectivity; otherwise there would be no reason to suppose additional mental states beyond 
those possessed by the individuals that compose the collectivity. So, if there are mental states 
that collectivities can’t possess but that their constituents can, the collectivities must not have 
minds. But there are clearly states that can be possessed by the individuals that compose a 
collectivity but not by the collectivity itself. For example, every member of a human 
collectivity could have the capacity to enjoy a sunset; however, it’s difficult to imagine what 
it could mean to say that a collectivity has the capacity to enjoy that same sunset without 
appealing to the phenomenal states of the individuals who enjoy it. A proponent of this 
objection would claim that any system to which we ought to be willing to concede mentality 
will have to be able to experience such qualitative states as enjoying the sunset. However, if 
every qualitative experience of enjoyment is localized in an individual, and if ascriptions of 
enjoyment to collectivities should always be read distributively, then collectivities aren’t the 
sort of thing to which we ought to be willing to concede mentality.  
This objection is misguided on a number of levels. First, there are very few sorts of 
organisms that take enjoyment in watching the sunset. It may just be humans that watch 
sunsets for the purposes of enjoyment; and if it’s not just humans, it’s probably just people 
and some tribes of bonobos. So, if particular qualitative experiences are a necessary 
condition on mentality, then humans, and perhaps some bonobos, are the only cognitive 
systems that we know of—and this is such a bizarre claim that it’s not worth adopting. This 
point is, of course, rhetorical. However, the rhetoric generalizes in an incredibly robust way. 
We know that there are a number of mental states that can occur in human systems that 
cannot occur in some simple systems. Humans have the capacity for normative reflection; 
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scorpions and badgers probably don’t. When I get a phone call from a friend inviting me over 
for dinner, I can decide whether I want to go or not; but when a scorpion detects vibrations in 
the air with its trichobothria and in the sand with its pedipalps it has no choice, it just moves 
toward the prey (and sometimes to its death). The scorpion is immediately pulled toward the 
food by the vibration sensations; it doesn’t decide to act. In fact, it’s probably true that all 
scorpion activity is driven by pushmi-pullyu representations—they get around in the world 
without reflection, decision or higher-order cognitive, states. However, it seems quite 
reasonable to me to say that such states are mental states. 
Moreover, there are a number of capacities that are not possessed by all members of 
Homo sapiens sapiens. We know of lots of mental disorders that make it impossible for a 
person to be in certain sorts of mental states. Some people are achromats, seeing the world 
only in black and white. Others are autistic and don’t have the capacity to attribute complex 
mental states to others that are different from their own. The cases go on and on. Now, it 
would seem crazy to rule out all of these organisms as cognitive systems. So, to put the 
response briefly, we ought to recognize that mentality is not an all or nothing affair.  
Perhaps collectivities will lack qualia. However, even this is an open question that 
will turn on what our best theory of what qualia are in humans. While it’s probably true that 
collectivities will only be able to possess the sorts of mental states that are exhaustively 
explained in terms of their computational structure, whatever those happen to be, I’m 
inclined to think that a representational theory of qualia is probably the right sort of view, I 
don’t want to come down on that issue at this time. Instead, I’ll just say that we need to be 
careful to specify precisely what claim we’re making when we say that collective mentality is 
possible. We need to be precise about what sorts of mental states we mean to be talking about 
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and we need to be careful to specify the computational structure that underwrites this 
attribution of a mental state (or mental states). Thus, I begin with the reasonably 
untendentious assumption that there are no collectivities around these parts that exhibit 
conscious states. However, without further argument, this does not, by itself, offer a good 
reason to deny mentality to collectivities.  
This first argument can, thus, be set aside, and I suggest that we follow Rob Wilson 
(2004) in noting that in order for collective mentality to be possible, it will only have to be 
possible that there could be a collectivity that had at least one sort of psychological state. 
Since there is a spectrum of mentality running from systems that possess a wide range of 
mental states and systems that possess relatively few, we shouldn’t begin by asking whether 
there are any group minds, but we should, instead focus on the question: can any collectivity 
have beliefs (or desires, or memories, or perceptions, or emotions)? There are, however, 
other objections lurking in the area. 
 
2.2. Collectivities can’t be self-conscious 
A more substantial argument against the possibility of collective mentality based on 
the lack of conscious states rests on a purported connection between the capacity for 
conscious thought and the capacity for thoughts that you are conscious of as being your own 
(cf., Rosenthal, 1986). There are, of course, many ways to spell out this connection. The most 
promising of which seems to be grounded on the claim, possibly Kantian in origin,32 that 
only a self-conscious organism could have the sort of conceptual representations that 
constitute thought. Building on this intuition, Jay Rosenberg (1986, 10) has argued that the 
                                                 
32 David Landy (unpublished manuscript) has argued that the Kant’s “Transcendental deduction” in the Critique 
of pure reason contains an argument that requires self-consciousness for the acquisition of object concepts. 
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“conceptual representation of an objective world is possible only for self-conscious subjects”. 
But this position leaves us with a rather significant worry. After all, it seems a bit strange to 
think that a collectivity could be the subject of it’s own thoughts. But if it is true that 
collectivities can’t be self-conscious, they won’t be able to engage in conceptual 
representation. And if collectivities can’t engage in conceptual representation, then the range 
of possible representations that are attributable to collectivities might be too narrow to be 
psychologically interesting.33  
Fortunately, there is a fairly straightforward response to this worry. To begin, we 
need to be careful to specify what sort of self-consciousness is necessary for conceptual 
thinking. Rosenberg, for example, claims that having a representation of a self is a necessary 
condition on the possession of object concepts because object concepts require a subjective 
ordering of representations that picks out a series of impressions as constituting a 
representation of a single thing. This does require a representation of a self, but it’s a 
relatively thin representation—what Kant might call a transcendental unity of apperception. 
To put the point briefly, an ‘I think’ representation must accompany every representation of 
an object. But, there is no reason to assume that it would be impossible for a collectivity to be 
structured in such a way that it could have such a self-concept. Let me sketch briefly what 
such a collective self could be. 
First, there is a thin sense of ‘self’ under which any system that is in the business of 
self-preservation has to be able to distinguish itself from other systems. As Dennett (1989, 
                                                 
33 Robert Rupert (2005, n4) offers this worry as a possible objection to collective mentality. He argues as 
follows: “It is often thought that a mental representation of the self plays a special role in the life of a mind, 
particularly in self-consciousness.  Admittedly, many group systems have names, written on letterhead or 
painted on signs.  It is another matter, though, to show that such representations play the role of a concept of 
one’s self.” Rupert does not develop this objection, however, because he thinks that other worries are far more 
pressing for accounts of collective mentality.  
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1991) puts the point, nobody can preserve the whole world, so even incredibly simple 
systems have to distinguish self from other. Some collectivities are clearly in the business of 
self-preservation, so will clearly have at least this sort of minimal self.34 Unfortunately, this 
minimal concept of the self won’t be enough to answer the objection. After all, merely being 
able to preserve one’s self doesn’t require any conception of one’s self at all. However, 
thinking in terms of what a collectivity must do in the service of self-preservation points the 
way to a thicker conception of the self that can be possessed by a collectivity. The thing to 
note is that many collectivities monitor their own behavior and modify it in light of current 
circumstances—providing conditions under which a collective self-concept may be 
manifested.  
To put the point another way, collectivities are not one and all Darwinian systems 
(Dennett 1996, 84-85) whose behavior is unreflective and static. Nor are they all Skinnerian 
systems (Dennett 1996, 85-88) that modify their behavior in response to stimuli by way of 
some sort of dumb feedback mechanism operating in accordance with Thorndike’s Law of 
Effect. In fact, some collectivities even appear to be able to decouple indicative from 
imperative representations (cf., Millikan 1984, 1989, 1996) in a way that marks them off as 
Popperian systems (Dennett 1996, 88-93) that are able to allow their hypotheses to die in 
their stead by preselecting behaviors on the basis of internal models. Some collectivities 
might even reach the level of Gregorian systems (Dennett 1996, 99-101) that are able to 
engage in meta-representation to the extent that they can genuinely ask if they are correctly 
modeling the world in a way that produces the optimal response to the circumstances at hand. 
                                                 
34 Remember, even an anarchist collective that the CIA is attempting to dismantle has to try to preserve itself to 
some extent if it is to be stable enough to make it to Heiligendamm to protest the next G8 summit. Even clearer 
cases of self-preservation come in the cases of large multinational corporations (e.g., Microsoft), Universities, 
cultures, and the like.  
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In order to make this claim clear, consider what happens in the case of an E. Coli outbreak 
linked to the monster-burgers at Burgerzilla.  
In the face of such an E. Coli outbreak, Burgerzilla must defend its interests, but it 
doesn’t want to defend the meat at every burger joint in town. So Burgerzilla has to respond 
in a way that is driven by its own interests in self-preservation (suggesting that Burgerzilla 
has at least a minimal self). In responding to the outbreak, Burgerzilla will attend to the 
fluctuation of its profits (ignoring for all intents and purposes the profit margin at 
BurgerTown, for example) in response to the E. Coli outbreak. Burgerzilla will also pay 
close attention to where the E. Coli infected meat came from as well as what it will take to 
ensure that there won’t be any more infected meat sold at Burgerzilla. But most importantly, 
Burgerzilla has to respond to this crisis in a way that will facilitate a continued presence in 
the monster-burger market, there will have to be a public response demonstrating that 
Burgerzilla is committed to preventing such an outbreak in the future.35 
In responding to the crisis, suppose some department or division of Burgerzilla, Inc. 
monitors both public opinion and the internal organization of the corporation—call it Public 
Relations.36 When faced with the E. Coli outbreak, the PR department would see that public 
opinion about Burgerzilla is declining, but it might also see other trends. The PR department 
might also come to realize, when it collects data on the public perception of Burgerzilla via 
phone and internet surveys (in true Gregorian fashion), that for a long time Burgerzilla has 
                                                 
35 Note, however, that it won’t be enough to show that the individual members of Burgerzilla’s board of 
directors are committed to preventing E. Coli outbreaks. After all, boards of directors change often: some 
people die, other people leave Burgerzilla to go to BurgerTown (or Halliburton), new members are added, etc. 
However, Burgerzilla must demonstrate that it is committed to preserving the health of its clientele if it is to 
preserve its profit margin. 
 
36 Note, this need not be the only task that this division or department undertakes. Although the clearest case in 
the vicinity is one in which there is such a distinct department, a case in which the owner or CEO of Burgerzilla 
Inc. takes this to be her job, or some other case is equally plausible and equally a case in which the relevant sort 
of self-concept will be possessed by the collectivity. 
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been seen as a ‘dive’ burger joint. In response to this perception, the PR department at 
Burgerzilla might attempt to create a new public view of what it means to get a burger from 
Burgerzilla. But in order to do this Burgerzilla will have to be able to develop a model of 
how it is to govern its behavior as well as how it is likely to be perceived by others. This, 
then, would require both a model of how Burgerzilla is to understand itself as well as a meta-
representational model of how it is to be understood by others. 
In attempting to demonstrate its commitment to the health of its customers, suppose 
that the PR department of Burgerzilla writes press releases, recommend modifications of 
Burgerzilla’s mission statement, and in general engages in and overall restructuring of 
Burgerzilla. Burgerzilla might even place a full-page add in the New York Times stating that 
they will now be using only the finest Kobe beef. Burgerzilla might change the appearance of 
its restaurants from the drab purple and brown interiors that have always been the hallmark 
of a Burgerzilla, to a sleek, bright, red and yellow with fancy new menus designed by the 
finest graphic designers that money could buy. And most importantly, Burgerzilla might 
make a self-conscious decision to be perceived as the safest burger-joint in the world—even 
offering a new tag-line on their commercials: “we’ve gone from the last place you’d wanna 
buy a burger to the first place you’d think to buy a burger!” 
All of these things seem like reasonable things to expect from Burgerzilla. However, 
all of these moves require an incredible amount of internal monitoring that yields much more 
than a minimal self. Burgerzilla has to represent itself in various ways, recognize that 
Burgerzilla exists above and beyond the members of Burgerzilla, and it has to act in such a 
way that its actions will be seen as the actions of Burgerzilla. This is at least enough to yield 
an apperceptive self-representation for a collectivity, and in order to meet Rosenberg’s 
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version of this objection that’s all that’s required. There is more to say about the nature of 
collective selves; however, this thesis is not the place to address such issues. 
 
2.3 Is phenomenal consciousness necessary for mentality? 
This brings me to the most difficult argument to address, as well as the argument 
most likely to occur to the philosopher. The argument rests on a worry generated by one of 
Ned Block’s familiar thought experiments. Block (1978) asks us to imagine a case where that 
the nation of China is forced by a ruthless leader—a ‘true believer’ who has recently 
converted to functionalism—to implement a person’s functional architecture just for an 
hour.37 In a massive philosophical undertaking, every person in China is given a two-way 
radio that is connected to some other radios and to a body that looks (from the outside) just 
like a human body. Each person is then asked to carry out a relatively simple task. For 
example, a person might be told that if she sees a Φ projected on an overhead screen attached 
to a satellite, she should send radio signal ψ. If all goes well, the two-way radios will be 
wired in a way allows the nation of China to be in the same functional state as some person. 
Now, if functionalism were a true and complete theory of the mind, such a system would 
implement a person’s functional architecture and would thereby have mental states. 
However, while the functionalist would take a properly organized group to possess mental 
states in just the same way as an individual does, Block thinks that such a homunculi-headed 
                                                 
37 After all people do have a tendency to get bored quite easily and we can’t expect the nation of China, even 
under such a ruthless leader, to stay focused for any longer than maybe an hour. 
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system is probably not the sort of thing that we should be willing to say is capable of 
mentation.38  
But is Block right? Should we be unwilling to attribute mentality to such a 
homunculi-headed system?39 Block argues that homunculi-headed systems are missing an 
important class of states that should be possessed by a system capable of mentation (i.e., 
qualitative states, raw feels, etc). Borrowing a phrase popularized by Nagel (1974),40 there’s 
nothing it’s like to be the nation of China—and Block claims that if there is nothing that it’s 
like to be a system, then the system probably isn’t capable of mentation. In the absence of 
qualitative states, Block contends that this example of the nation of China ought to be seen as 
providing a prima facie doubt about the plausibility of functionalism. Block does not, of 
course, purport to defend this intuition that a group could not have phenomenal mental states; 
rather, the prima facie implausibility of qualitative states in such a system is supposed to do 
all of the work.  
I’m not sold here, and I don’t think anyone else should be either! As I see it, Block’s 
nation of China example can be read in at least two ways. The first, which seems most 
                                                 
38 It is important to keep in mind here that Block is just remaining true to one of the fundamental commitments 
of functionalism: what goes for one system goes for any system that is functionally identical to that system. So, 
if it turns out that there is one system that is functionally identical to a second system, but the first system 
possess a property that is not possessed by the second, then said property will not be exhaustively explained in 
terms of the functional states of the system. 
 
39 Note that this sort of argument could just as easily be developed as an argument against the possibility of 
collective mentality in general. Given that there is a rather dominant intuition against the possibility of 
consciousness in any collectivity (cf., Knobe and Prinz, forthcoming), it could just as easily be the case that 
Block’s intuition could be marshaled in an attack on the possibility of collective mentality simpliciter. If his 
argument works at all, it is meant to show that the mere fact that a collectivity is functionally equivalent to an 
individual is insufficient to establish its capacity for mentality. So, while I address Block’s version of the 
argument, it is meant to generalize to any claim about collective mentality whatsoever. 
 
40 To the best of my knowledge, the phrase ‘what it’s like’ as it is used by Nagel is first adopted by the 
psychologist B.A. Farrell (1950) in a paper called “Experience”. Unlike Nagel, Farrell considers the case of 
‘what it’s like to be a bat’ in order to motivate a form of eliminativism about sensations and other qualitative 
states given the impossibility of a third-person, public criteria for the truth of claims about what it’s like. 
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consistent with the rest of Block’s work, is to take the nation of China case as suggesting 
strong prima facie reasons against the ascription of qualitative mental states based on 
functional organization. On this reading, Block doesn’t intend to make any argument 
whatsoever against purely representational states in homunculi-headed systems. In fact, at 
points Block (1978, 306) does claim that homunculi-headed systems would at least have 
some mental states: 
Propositional attitudes are an example. Perhaps psychological theory will identify 
remembering that P with having ‘stored’ a sentence-like object that expresses the 
proposition that P (Fodor 1975). Then if one of the little men has put a certain 
sentence-like object in "storage," we may have reason for regarding the system as 
remembering that P. 
 
Unfortunately, reading Block’s argument in this way reduces his claim to an intuition about 
the possibility of a collectivity possessing qualitative states—though it is a perfectly common 
intuition (cf., Knobe and Prinz, forthcoming; Huebner, Sarkissian and Bruno, under review). 
However, it is not clear that this is an intuition that our best philosophical and psychological 
theory of the mind should lead us to retain. 
To begin with, imagine what would happen if a team of cognitive scientists decided 
to run a series of experiments on the nation of China system (while it was implementing the 
functional architecture of a single individual). Perhaps they would run some tests to see 
whether or not the nation of China were capable of having the qualitative experience of 
hearing unresolved dissonance. In order to test this, the team of cognitive scientists would 
broadcast a series of consonant chord progressions to the nation of China and a series of 
chord progressions containing unresolved dissonance. Suppose that the homunculi-headed 
system engages in reports of having a particular qualitative experience—suppose that upon 
probing, the system reports feeling uncomfortable when presented with unresolved 
 53 
dissonance and the system reports that the consonant chord progressions sound pleasant and 
appealing. Suppose, moreover, that the nation of China engages in precisely the sort of 
behavior the cognitive scientists would expect from a system that was experiencing 
unresolved dissonance for the first time (e.g., the reporting system—whatever it may be—
outputs the request not to be presented with such stimuli again, without provocation system 
outputs a yuck response, etc). It seems that in this case we have the best evidence that we 
could possibly have for the claim that this system is having that sort of qualitative 
experience.41 
The point is this. Even when we try to figure out whether another person is having a 
particular qualitative state, the best that we can do is to pay attention to her overt behavior. 
But given that we’ve got a team of cognitive scientists involved, we can do even better than 
that. Suppose that while broadcasting the chord progressions, various subsystems of the 
nation of China could be monitored for activity (for example, by paying attention to the 
expenditure of energy in areas of the country that have been assigned particular roles) to see 
if there were differences in the processing relevant to the parts of the nation of China that 
have been dedicated to attention and the processing of emotional stimuli (a sort of macro-
scale EEG). Suppose that the team of cognitive scientists finds that there is an increase in 
activity in the areas that are intended to process acoustical stimuli and associated affective 
                                                 
41 This move is a bit too quick. After all, as Block (1981) argues, knowledge of the mechanisms that give rise to 
a particular sort of behavior are relevant to distinguishing systems that are genuinely cognitive from those that 
are behaviorally indistinguishable from, but not actually cognitive systems. Block contends that unless a 
systems processes information in a similar way to paradigmatic cognitive systems (i.e., humans)—from the 
standpoint of cognitive psychology—we will have reason to suppose that the system in question is not a 
cognitive system but merely behaviorally identical to a cognitive system. The realization of mental states does, 
however, allow for variance in etiology provided that information is processed in relevantly similar ways for 
various cognitive systems. I am inclined to think that certain sorts of collectivities do process information in a 
way that is captured by the kinds laid out by cognitive psychology. However, much of this argument will have 
to wait until later Chapters. For now, I just ask that you assume that the sort of information processing that 
occurs in an individual and in this particular collectivity is functionally equivalent. 
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responses. This would then suggest that the covert behavior of the system was functionally 
equivalent to the covert behavior that we find in the processing of such stimuli for humans. If 
all of this were to be the case, as it would in Block’s case ex hypothesi, we would have 
evidence from overt and covert behavior that the system was in fact having the qualitative 
experience. And, as Lycan (1987, 27) puts the point “in the presence of such behavior, a 
skeptic would have to come up with substantial defeating evidence in order to overrule the 
presumption of genuine…qualitative states.”  
It might, however, turn out that there are no actual collectivities that are capable of 
experiencing such qualitative states. Qualitative states might presuppose a sort of unity that 
cannot be possessed by collectivities in the actual world. However, even if it is impossible to 
attribute qualitative states to other collectivities, this won’t, by itself, be a problem for the 
hypothesis that functionalism allows for the possibility of collective mental states. Of course, 
we would have to be careful in ascribing various states to collectivities, making sure not to 
ascribe states with phenomenal content; however, the lack of some mental states needn’t 
worry us at all about the possibility of collective mental states in general. 
There is, however, another strain in Block’s argument that proves far more 
troublesome for the proponent of collective mentality. At some points, Block makes the 
stronger claim that "there is a prima facie doubt whether [the nation of China] has any mental 
states at all" (1978, 278 emphasis mine). While Block would not typically claim that 
qualitative consciousness is a necessary condition on mentality,42 there is good reason to 
                                                 
42 In fact, Block (cf., 2003) typically argues that qualitative states are a sort of mental paint (sensory qualia that 
are vehicles of mental representation) or mental oil (sensory qualia that are not vehicles of mental 
representation) that can be distinguished from the merely representational states of an organism. Block typically 
argues for no more than the claim that a computational cum functional view of the mind is not sufficient to make 
sense of all of human mental life. Instead, something more has to be added to make sense of our intuitions in 
absent qualia cases (Block 1978, 1980) and inverted qualia cases (Block 1990). 
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think that only a stronger sort of intuition could underwrite an argument against the mentality 
of groups. To put the point succinctly, the fact that a system lacks qualitative consciousness 
does not imply anything about the systems capacity for mentation unless there is some reason 
to think that qualitative consciousness is a necessary condition on mentality simpliciter.43 
This understanding of Block’s position is made more plausible by the fact that during 
this period Block found many of the intuitions that underwrite Searle’s Chinese room thought 
experiment quite palatable. For example, Block (1980a) offers a thought experiment in which 
a person and her homunculi-headed doppelganger are asked a series of questions via a two-
way television system in an experimental paradigm styled after the Turing test (Turing 1950). 
Block supposes that the person and her doppelganger will, given that they are functionally 
equivalent, respond to interrogation in a perfectly indistinguishable manner. Contra 
functionalism, however, Block (1980a, 261) notes that although the person would understand 
the interrogator’s questions and reply to them in a way that would express her own thoughts, 
we cannot say the same of her homunculi-headed doppelganger. The absence of 
understanding in this case is supposed, then, to demonstrate that the “homunculus-headed 
system seems as lacking in thought as in qualia, and so any argument against functionalism 
based on such an example could as well be couched in terms of absent thought as well as 
absent qualia” (Block 1980, 261). These claims are further developed against the nation of 
China case in “Troubles with functionalism” where Block claims that: 
 
                                                 
43 Block (personal communication) has noted the sort of view that is pressed in his papers on homunculi-headed 
systems is not indicative of his considered view on the subject. Block believes, and has believed for a long time 
that functionalism is true as an account of most mental states. His considered position is that functionalism fails 
in the case of qualia—for qualia, however, an identity theory is needed. Block does acknowledge, however, that 
his position may have wavered in the 1970s when his papers on absent qualia were written. 
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There is a prima facie doubt whether it [the nation of China] has any mental states at 
all (1978, 278 emphasis mine). 
 
The Absent Qualia Argument rested on an appeal to the intuition that the homunculi-
headed simulations lacked mentality, or at least qualia (1978, 281, emphasis mine). 
 
Keeping these claims in mind, Block might make the claim that homunculi-headed systems 
lack mentality simpliciter. However, the only reason that Block has given for this claim is 
that it seems prima facie implausible that the nation of China could have qualitative states. If 
this is to be, as it is billed, a demonstration that functionalism is too liberal (i.e., that it 
attributes mentality to too many entities), then the lack of qualitative states will have to be 
sufficient to demonstrate the absence of mentality simpliciter. Unfortunately, all that Block 
has offered by way of argument on this point is the intuition that homunculi-headed 
simulations lack qualia and on this basis he has claimed that "there is no independent reason 
to believe in the mentality of the homunculi-head, and I know of no way of explaining away 
the absurdity of the conclusion that it has mentality." (1978, 282, emphasis mine). Now, 
supposing we concede that there’s nothing it’s like for the nation of China to be the 
homunculi-headed system that it is, what would motivate the claim that such a system lack 
mentality simpliciter? The claim here rests on the thought that possessing qualitative states of 
consciousness is a necessary condition on possessing intentional mental states; and there is a 
philosophical option in this vicinity that Block, or someone who wanted to push Block’s 
argument further, might be willing to consider. 
John Searle (e.g., 1992) defends this stronger position as follows.44 To begin with, it 
is perhaps one of the least contentious claims in the philosophy of mind that many mental 
states are intentional. Intentional states (e.g., my belief that it is too hot outside, my desire to 
                                                 
44 Thank you to Felipe de Brigard for his assistance in understanding Searle’s argument. 
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drink another cup of coffee, and my hope that the next album I hear at the café alleviates my 
desire to dig out my eyes with a sugar spoon) are all directed at, or about something. In fact, 
many philosophers agree that anything that is going to count as a mental state of a system 
must exhibit intentionality—that is, it must be about something (i.e., the temperature, a cup 
of coffee, and the next album that they put on at the café).45 Now, supposing that mental 
states are intentional, there is a question about what this intentionality amounts to.  
Searle (1990, 586) contends that mental states must have intrinsic intentionality rather 
than as-if intentionality. This means that mental states must have conditions of satisfaction 
(e.g., truth conditions in the case of beliefs) that are intrinsic to the state rather than relative 
to an interpreter.46 This, however, merely raises the problem of what could account for the 
fact that mental states have this sort of intentionality. Searle (1990, 587) argues that intrinsic 
intentionality of mental states can only be understood in terms of the aspectual shape of the 
satisfaction conditions of thoughts. Briefly, the intentional content of a thought is always 
intensional. That is, human thought exhibits what Quine calls opacity, in the sense that 
thoughts are always entertained under a particular description. Searle argues that opacity 
results from the fact that every thought is entertained from some perspective and under some 
aspect (and eo ipso not from other perspectives or under other aspects). Searle (1990, 587) 
contends that this aspectual character of thought cannot be captured by third-person 
                                                 
45 A bit of a qualification is required here. If there are, conscious states that take the form of what Ned Block 
(2003) has called ‘mental oil’, these states would be states of a system that don’t have any representational 
content and thereby aren’t intentional. For the purposes of this section, I don’t think that much turns on the 
plausibility of mental oil. What needs to be established is that the nation of China has no mental states 
simpliciter, not merely that it has no purely qualitative states and if it were true that there are purely qualitative 
states this would not have any bearing at all on the presence, or lack there of, of intentional mental states. 
46 In order to make sense of the notion of interpreter relativity, consider the sort of intentionality that the words 
on this page have. These words have intentionality in the sense that you or I can interpret them to be about 
Searle’s views on consciousness; however, in the absence of an understanding of the English language and in 
the absence of and understanding of the ways in these symbols represent words the symbols are utterly 
meaningless. Although these words can succeed in being about Searle’s theory of consciousness, they can do so 
only as interpreted (cf., Searle 1980, 199). 
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descriptions but can only be entertained as first-personal states with aspectual character. 
Finally, on the basis of these considerations, Searle (1990, 588) argues that any mental state 
must at least be ‘in principle accessible’ to consciousness because otherwise the state that is 
being picked out would just be a neurophysiological state that played some role in the 
production of some behavior and not a truly mental state. Thus, what it means for a belief to 
be a tacit belief, for example, is for it to be a belief that you can become conscious of having. 
In the absence of this possibility, Searle holds that the state cannot be a mental state. 
Building on this argument, it is possible to develop a stronger version of Block’s 
initial claims about the mentality of the nation of China. Suppose we’ve conceded for the 
sake of argument that “there is a prima facie doubt whether there is anything which it is like 
to be [the nation of China]” (Block 1978, 278). If there is nothing that it is like to be the 
nation of China, then there is nothing that it’s like for the nation of China to be conscious of 
entertaining a particular thought. If there is nothing that it is like for the nation of China to be 
conscious of entertaining a particular thought, then there is no first personal aspectual 
character for any state of the nation China. But if there is no first personal aspectual character 
for any state of the nation China, then no state of the nation of China exhibits opacity. If no 
state of the nation of China exhibits opacity, then no state of the nation of China are 
intensional; and without intensionality none of the states of the nation of China are 
intrinsically intentional. But mental states have to be intrinsically intentional, so the nation of 
China has no mental states.  
What, then, is to be said of this argument? To begin with Block (1980b, 425) argues 
that "the burden of proof lies with Searle to show that the intuition that the cognitive 
homunculi head has no intentionality (an intuition that I and many others do not share) is not 
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due to doctrinal hostility to the symbol-manipulation account of intentionality." Block’s 
considered judgment on the issue is that there is good reason to think that functionalism does 
give us a powerful account of most of human mentality (pesky qualia excluded). The position 
here follows Fodor (1968), Dennett (1978), Cummins (1975), and Lycan (1981), and it is of a 
piece with the position that I adopted in chapter 1—claiming that some version of 
homuncular decomposition or functional analysis is the correct methodology for the practice 
of cognitive science.47 Building upon this methodological assumption, Block (1995, 418) 
argues that the best criticism of Searle’s Chinese room argument—and presumably of the 
sort of Searlesque argument that I’ve just developed—comes in the form of what Searle 
(1980) refers to as the systems reply to the Chinese room case. This reply holds that although 
there may be no individual component of the Chinese room that can properly be held to 
speak Chinese, this all by itself is insufficient to entail much of anything at all about the 
cognitive system as a whole’s mental characteristics. But more must be said about why one 
should accept the systems reply. 
Block defends the systems reply as follows. First, he notes that just as we can’t reason 
from the fact that “‘Bill has never sold uranium to North Korea’ to ‘Bill's company has never 
sold uranium to North Korea’…we cannot reason from ‘Bill does not understand Chinese’ to 
‘The system of which Bill is a part does not understand Chinese’” (Block 1995, 418). 
Second, he argues that there is no reason not to construe the system in question (composed of 
the person, the translation manuals, and the input/output doors) as a cognitive system—and 
this is the really important point for us. If functional decomposition offers the correct 
                                                 
47 Here’s how Block (1995) puts the point: “Think of this homunculus as being composed of smaller and 
stupider homunculi, and each of these being composed of still smaller and still stupider homunculi until you 
reach a level of completely mechanical homunculi.” Faced with a particular ability that a person exhibits, 
cognitive scientists then attempt to spell out the mechanisms that realize that particular ability by breaking down 
the task into simpler systems that could do the work.  
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explanation of any systems cognitive behavior, then a person’s cognitive behavior will be 
best explained in terms of subsystems and subroutines jointly capable of producing her 
behavior, though none of them is capable of doing so individually. Similarly, if functional 
decomposition offers the correct explanation of any systems cognitive behavior, perhaps the 
system that Searle calls the Chinese room will exhibit cognitive behavior that is best 
explained in terms of a subsystems and subroutines jointly capable of producing its behavior, 
though none of them is capable of doing so individually. Similar considerations apply 
mutatus mutandus to the nation of China case that we are here considering. 
In concluding his argument against Searle, Block (1995, 420) argues that “to the 
extent that we think of the English system as implementing a Chinese system, that will be 
because we find the symbol-manipulation theory of the mind plausible as an empirical 
theory.” At this point, the dispute then becomes not a dispute over intuition, but a dispute 
over what is the best theory of human mentality from the standpoint of an informed cognitive 
science. Block contends that the most plausible account of human mentality will be spelled 
out in terms of some form homuncular functionalism—aside from qualia, which he believes 
will rest on an identity theory of mind. 
However, if the systems reply works as an argument against Searle’s Chinese room 
argument, then it will also work as an argument against the Searlesque reading of Block’s 
nation of China example. The systems argument for collective mentality would hold that 
there are intentional states exhibited by the collectivity that are distinct from the intentional 
states of the individuals. Now, if functional decomposition offers the correct explanation of 
any systems cognitive behavior, then perhaps the nation of China will exhibit cognitive 
behavior that is best explained in terms of a subsystems and subroutines jointly capable of 
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producing its behavior, though none of them is capable of doing so individually. Block’s 
argument against Searle thus provides reason to think that the nation of China is a cognitive 
system as well. Since the nation of China could, if properly organized, have some sorts of 
intentional mental states, then collective mentality can be saved from this worry about 
consciousness.  
This response is not, of course, a knockdown argument against Searle’s claim that 
consciousness is required for mentality simpliciter. In fact, Searle will contend that this sort 
of response misses the point given that if fails to address his concerns about the necessity of 
every mental state having an aspectual shape and a first person character. This is, after all, 
the reason that Searle is not going to be willing to accept functionalism and RTM as an 
adequate theory of the mind. Given his commitment to the first-personal nature of 
psychology Searle (1990b) thinks that starting from these sorts of functional explanations 
will prevent us from giving any adequate scientific account of mentality precisely because all 
mental states are supposed to be conscious (or at least available to consciousness). However, 
there is more to say in response to Searle’s requirement that all mental states must be 
conscious.  
At this point, it will help to get clear on what, precisely, the connection is supposed to 
be between consciousness and intentionality. After all, to deny that there are unconscious 
processes in human cognition should strike everyone as wildly implausible. And, in fact, this 
is not the possibility Searle wants to deny. Searle’s argument is meant to demonstrate that 
any unconscious state that is genuinely intentional is the sort of state that about which one 
could be conscious (Searle 1992, 153). The primary claim that Searle (1992, 132) wants to 
advance is that “only a being that could have conscious intentional states could have 
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intentional states at all, and every unconscious intentional state is at least potentially 
conscious.” However, there are a number of points here that beg for clarification. 
First, it isn’t clear what it means for a state to be potentially conscious. There are at 
least two different ways in which this possibility could be articulated. Metaphysical 
possibility won’t work; in fact it is metaphysically possible that the states of a magnetotactic 
bacteria’s magnetosomes could be conscious (in some possible world), or that I could be 
conscious of the secretion of hormones in my pituitary gland in some other possible world, 
and Searle doesn’t want these states to count as possibly consciousness.48 Searle’s primary 
concern is with the laws of psychology, so following Uriah Kriegel we would do well to 
construe the relevant range of possibilities as psychological possibilities, that is, a mental 
state “M is potentially conscious iff there is a possible world W, such that the laws of 
psychology in W are the same as in the actual world, and M is conscious in W” (Kreigel 
2003, 275). Second, there are at least two ways of reading Searle’s claim about the necessity 
of consciousness for intentionality (cf., Block 1990b). Searle can either mean that every 
genuinely mental state is potentially conscious in the sense that there are worlds consistent 
with the laws of psychology in which this state is accessed by reasoning and reporting 
mechanisms, or he can mean that there are worlds consistent with the laws of psychology in 
which there is something it’s like to be in this state.  
Suppose we adopt the first reading of potentially conscious. I’ve offered a number of 
arguments both in this chapter, as well as in Chapter 1, for the claim that the laws of 
psychology do not preclude the possibility of reasoning and reporting mechanisms in a 
collectivity. It is, of course, an open and empirical question whether there are any 
                                                 
48 That a state is “metaphysically-possibly conscious appears to be a purely logical property (or perhaps a 
“metaphysical” property) of it, rather than a genuinely psychological property” (Kriegel 2003, 274). 
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collectivities that actually have the relevant sorts of mechanisms for accessing their 
representational states (and indeed whether collectivities can have representational states at 
all). However, the homunctionalist position that underwrites my argument for the possibility 
of collective mentality suggests that if individuals have such functionally specified 
mechanisms for reasoning and reporting, then a properly organized collectivity could just as 
easily have such mechanisms. So, it would at least be psychologically possible for a 
collectivity to have conscious states, and there would be no reason to claim that collectivities 
could not have intentional states even on Searle’s picture. 
Searle must, then, adopt the ‘what it’s like’ sense of consciousness. However, If 
higher-order representationalist accounts of consciousness succeed (which I’m inclined to 
think that they do), then the ‘what it’s like’ of a particular mental state can be specified in 
terms of the higher-order monitoring systems used to attend to the internal states of the 
psychological system. However, there’s no reason to suppose that such mechanisms could 
not be present in a collectivity, and if such mechanisms can be present in a collectivity, the 
problem of ‘what it’s like’ for a system to be in a particular states reduces to a special case of 
consciousness as access by reasoning and reporting mechanisms. But if this is the case then 
there is no reason to claim that collective consciousness is psychologically impossible, in 
which case there is no reason to claim that collectivities couldn’t have intentional states, even 
on Searle’s picture. 
Searle won’t concede the higher-order representationalist theory of consciousness, 
and there is, thus, a stronger version of Searle’s argument that must be addressed. Searle 
contends that what distinguishes a genuinely mental state from a derivatively representational 
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state is that genuinely mental states have an intrinsic aspectual shape.49 However, since 
mental states are nothing but neurophysiological events, and since there is no intrinsic 
aspectual shape for merely physical states of a system, Searle contends that the only thing 
that could make my unconscious belief a belief about Superman and not about Clark Kent is 
the way in which this belief is understood by a conscious system: were this to be a conscious 
belief, it would have the aspectual shape, for me, of being about Superman. 
According to Searle the psychologically impossibility of collective mentality depends 
on the intuition that a collective representation cannot have an aspectual shape for the 
collectivity. More importantly, the sorts of collectivities that seem most promising as avenues 
of inquiry for claims about collective mentality don’t seem to be the sorts of things that could 
have conscious states. These collectivities consist of various people, connected only by 
informational and causal relations, engaging in a variety of functionally specified tasks that 
lead to various sorts of collective actions. Searle would contend that each person understands 
what she is doing as contributing to the goals of the group (in fact, she will likely explain her 
own actions by saying that ‘we are trying to Φ); however, he would also claim that there is 
no understanding at the level of the collectivity. Searle is thus inclined to claim that the 
content of any collective representation will be derived from the representations of the 
individuals that compose the collectivity, and this rules out genuinely mental collective 
representations. Fortunately, there are deep problems with this Searle’s reliance on first-
personal states in making sense of the cognitive content of a particular representation.  
The first response to this stronger version of the argument is to resist Searle’s claim 
that you need to have first-person consciousness in order to make sense of aspectual shape. In 
                                                 
49 Searle is not particularly clear about what aspectual shape is: however, it is something like this. 
Psychologically speaking, my belief that Louis Lane loves Superman is a belief about Louis Lane and 
Superman, it’s not a belief about Louis Lane and Clark Kent, and this is true even if this belief is unconscious. 
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order for a representation to have an aspectual shape, it must be able to be represented-as 
something. Thus, we have the capacity to represent a duck-rabbit either as a duck or as a 
rabbit. We have the capacity to represent Clark Kent either as Clark Kent or as Superman. 
There is some introspective data that seems to suggest that it is because these things appear to 
us to be a particular way that they have the aspectual shape that they do, and it is on this basis 
that Searle claims that aspectual shape is only possible within a conscious system. However, 
although Searle claims that there is no way for a non-conscious system to be able to represent 
something as having a particular aspectual shape, it’s not at all clear whether this is true. Sure 
enough, we haven’t yet worked out what sorts of computational structures can give rise to a 
representation with a particular aspectual shape. However, as David Chalmers (1996, 
360n10) notes, there is no reason to suppose that the storage of information about a person in 
a database could occur either under their name or social security number. I don’t find this 
particular claim of Chalmers’ compelling. However, The sentiment is quite promising.  
Computational theories of vision based on feature detection (e.g. Marr 1992 and 
Edelman 1999) have retained a great deal of prominence in cognitive science.  By studying 
the ways in which the human visual system responds to various sorts of stimuli, 
computational neuroscientists have been able to design computational models of vision that 
succumb to the same sorts of illusions to which persons succumb (Cf., Purves and Lotto 2003 
for a review of the evidence). It doesn’t seem too unlikely that computational systems could 
be constructed that would behave exactly like a person does when faced with a duck-rabbit. 
On the supposition that we could build a computational visual system that could attend to 
various features of a display (cf., Ullman and Sali 2000 for some promising suggestions here) 
and then ‘saccade’ over the image in the right way to produce the switch, it’s not at all clear 
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to me why we should be unwilling to say that this system is not represent the stimuli as 
having a particular aspectual shape. 
Moreover, and more importantly, if there is a naturalistically plausible theory of 
intentional content, that is spelled out in terms of the relation between the computational 
states of an organism and particular feature of the world that matter to that system (whether 
the system be the organism or some subcomponent of the organism), such a model will also 
provide us with an account of the aspectual shape of mental states without an appeal to 
consciousness. Searle, of course, denies this possibility. He claims that the only way in which 
a cognitive system could possibly be appeared to both in a way that respects aspectual shape 
and that explains how the particular aspectual shape of a representation could matter to that 
subject is by way of conscious representation. However, it’s not clear why he believes this.  
Consider a system whose representational states stand in nomic relations to the 
features that distinguish the various different aspects of representation from one another. 
Now, suppose that the features of the representations that are represented determine the 
categorization behavior of a system in a way that either allows the system to succeed or fail 
in some intentional task that the system happens to care about. Now, regardless of whether 
the aspect under which a representation occurs is cognitively available to a system, it’s 
behavior will be determined by the aspectual shape of the representation and it’s having such 
a representational state will matter to a system. The important point here is one that is not 
often noticed by proponents of wide content. In order for it to be true that a system is 
representing something under a particular aspect, it need not be the case that the system is 
aware of representing it as such. If it is true that nomic relations between features and states 
of a system are what is constitutive of content, then whether I take myself to be representing 
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the watery stuff as water or as twater, as a duck or a rabbit, as superman or Clark Kent, it’s 
the nomic relations that exhaustively determine the content. The thoroughgoing naturalist has 
to claim that introspective failures are possible, and that the production of a representation, in 
a way that is important for psychology, is not a matter of what we happen to think that we are 
representing, but what we actually are representing. Given that introspection is a process 
anterior to the process of producing representations, these processes can come apart, although 
it is rarely the case that they actually do.50 This is not, of course, to say that I committed to 
the truth of some naturalistic theory of representation. In fact, it might, in the end, turn out 
that naturalistic theories of representation are a miserable failure. However, CTM, a theory 
plausibly grounded on a naturalistic semantic theory seems to be a rather successful theory of 
the mind for the time being; and in the absence of a adequate successor theory, it seems 
perfectly reasonable to see how far this research program can be pushed. 
Searle, of course would remain unmoved, claiming that the relevant ‘sort’ of 
aspectual shape hadn’t been captured. However, as Chalmers (1996, 360n10) puts the point, 
Searle might claim that “the only true aspectual shape is phenomenal aspectual shape; but 
this would seem to trivialize the argument.” However, if Searle is going to hold out and claim 
that this sort of phenomenal aspectual shape is the only thing that can possibly underwrite 
intentional content, there is another response to his worry. At this point the best way to 
respond to Searle is by demonstrating the falsity of the claim that the phenomenal states 
could not be present in collectivities. 
                                                 
50 Such a distinction between representation and introspective representation might seem strange. However, 
consider bizarre neurological breakdowns like Anton’s syndrome (in which a person is cortically blind but has 
an introspective representation of sight), and Cotard’s delusion (in which a person who is alive has an 
introspective representation of being dead). Mechanisms of representation and introspection are typically in 
synch. However, the interface can, and does, break down on very rare occasions. This being the case, the mere 
fact that introspection does not happen to access the aspectual shape of a representation does not, all by itself, 
entail that the representation does not have a particular representational content. 
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For his argument to be conclusive, Searle needs to demonstrate not merely that there 
is a logically possible world where something that’s functionally equivalent to me has no 
conscious states. He needs to make the stronger claim that all worlds that are consistent with 
the laws of psychology are worlds in which there is nothing that it’s like to be a collectivity. 
Although thought experiments like Block’s ‘Nation of China’ and ‘homunculi headed robot’, 
and Searle’s ‘Chinese room’ might be sufficient to demonstrate that the lack of 
consciousness is possible in a system that is functionally isomorphic to me, they aren’t strong 
enough to demonstrate that no collectivity could possibly be conscious.  
Note that the intuition that no collectivity could possibly be conscious is nothing 
more than an intuition. But it’s an intuition that’s not even universal. Although Knobe and 
Prinz (forthcoming) found that Americans are typically uncomfortable with the attribution of 
conscious states to groups, Huebner et al (under review) found that East Asians were 
significantly more willing to attribute conscious states to groups. It’s true that these data are 
far from conclusive; however, it does give us some reason to worry about the intuition that 
no group could be conscious. Additionally, the mere fact that it’s hard to imagine how the 
nation of China could give rise to phenomenal experience shouldn’t trouble us either. As 
Lycan (1987) points out, it’s also really hard to imagine how a mass of neurons, skin, blood, 
bones and chemicals could give rise to phenomenal experience. These counter-intuitions, 
however, merely scratch the surface of the problems with Searle’s project.  
Most importantly, the modal force of these absent qualia intuitions is nowhere near as 
secure as Searle might hope. Consider a version of the ‘fading qualia’ thought experiment 
offered by David Chalmers (1996, 253ff). Suppose absent qualia are nomologically possible 
in a system made entirely of homunculi instead of neurons. Now, consider the intermediate 
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cases between Chalmers and homunculi-headed Chalmers (with one neuron replaced with a 
homunculus, two neurons replaced with homunculi, all the way up to the point where 
Chalmers is a homunculi-headed system). At each point, the system is functionally 
isomorphic to Chalmers and shares all of his behavioral dispositions. Now, if it is it’s true (as 
the absent qualia intuition holds) that there is nothing that it’s like to be homunculi-headed 
Chalmers, we are left with a couple of options: “Either 1) consciousness gradually fades over 
the series of cases before disappearing, or 2) somewhere along the way consciousness 
suddenly blinks out, although the preceding case had rich conscious experience” (Chalmers 
1996, 255).  
First, let’s note that (2) doesn’t seem too promising. After all, any point you pick for 
the disappearance of qualia will be entirely arbitrary (Chalmers 1996, 255). Why think that 
consciousness blinks out of existence after replacing 75% of the neurons in a system rather 
than replacing 1%. It doesn’t seem as though there is any straightforward reason to suppose 
that any point along the continuum of cases suggests a promising point for ruling out 
consciousness. Moreover, (1) doesn’t fair much better. Consider an intermediate case 
between Chalmers and homunculi-headed Chalmers (call him half-Chalmers). If we are 
allowing for fading qualia, half-Chalmers will see faded colors where we see vivid ones, and 
the subtle distinctions between similar qualitative states will have begun to collapse 
(Chalmers 1996, 256). The important thing to notice about half-Chalmers is that he will be 
systematically mistaken in his reports of his qualitative states. He will claim that today feels a 
lot hotter than yesterday even though he experiences no differences in the temperatures 
between yesterday and today. More importantly, if a functional theory of belief is right, he 
will even believe that today feels hotter than yesterday! “Here we have a being whose 
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rational processes are functioning and who is in fact conscious, but who is utterly wrong 
about his own conscious experience” (Chalmers 1996, 257). 
Here’s the problem with fading qualia. It is a commonplace of functional psychology 
and functional neuroscience that subjects are able to introspect upon their qualitative 
experiences and give veridical reports thereof. In fact, it might even be true by definition that 
qualia are introspectable.51 Moreover, we have reason to believe that it’s an empirical fact 
about consciousness that subjects are capable of making correct judgments about at least 
some of their qualitative experiences—but half-Chalmers is systematically mistaken about all 
of his conscious experiences. Abandoning this claim about consciousness is possible. 
However, doing so has costs. Unless we can expect the reports of a person about her 
conscious experiences to adequately represent her qualitative states at least most of the time, 
this will force us to abandon any use of first-person reports within psychology—and this 
would be a bad result for Searle. Alternatively, we could claim that the only psychology 
worth doing is armchair reflection on one’s own mental states. But this would hardly count as 
psychology and it sure as hell wouldn’t count as science.  
Searle could (and in fact he has cf., 1992, 66-67) object to this worry by claiming that 
fading qualia are accompanied by changes in the propositional attitudes of the person who is 
being changed. According to Searle, although the various versions of Chalmers would be 
able to recognize the changes in his qualitative states, his continued reporting of changes in 
the temperature would be out of his control; although he would recognize that it didn’t feel 
any different today than yesterday, he would hear himself saying “it feels hotter today than 
yesterday”. However, as Chalmers (1996, 258) correctly notes: 
                                                 
51 I’m inclined to follow Bill Lycan (2001) in taking qualia to be the introspectable phenomenal features that 
characteristically inhere in sensory experience. 
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An organization-preserving change from neurons to [homunculi] simply does not 
change enough to effect such a remarkable change in the content and structure of 
one’s cognitive states. A twist in experience from red to blue is one thing. But a 
change form [“it feels hotter today than yesterday”] to “Oh no! I seem to be stuck in a 
bad horror movie!” is of a different order of magnitude. 
 
Supposing that being so radically disjoined from your conscious experience seems far less 
plausible than supposing that every intervening Chalmers between regular Chalmers and 
homunculi-headed Chalmers has conscious states. But if this is possible, and if there is no 
reason to suppose that consciousness could just disappear from a system on the basis of a 
small change, there is no reason to suppose that homunculi-headed system lacks 
consciousness. Now, given that Block has acknowledged that the nation of China is a special 
case of a homunculi-headed system, there is no reason to suppose that the nation of China 
couldn’t have conscious states. But if this is true, then even the strongest version of Searle’s 
arguments does not rule out the possibility of collective mentality. 
Of course, at the end of the day these arguments will not be surprising to Searle. In 
fact, one can always adopt Searle’s picture of the mind; however, the costs of doing so are 
remarkably high. First, Searle has a rather unscientific view of what is for something to count 
as a mental state. Ever since Freud (and probably earlier) we’ve been inclined to think that 
there are some mental processes that you just can’t be conscious of (e.g., you’re desire to 
sleep with your mother and kill your father, or the fact that the American dream is really just 
an artifact of a massive propaganda machine). Moreover, continuity with animal models and 
evolutionary history requires that we attribute some mental states to systems that may or may 
not be conscious, and the sort of sub-personal psychology that’s carried out in much of 
cognitive science (especially in cases of priming and attention) require appealing to systems 
that are below the level of conscious awareness. 
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Second, Searle’s position requires us to abandon any hope of having a naturalistic 
semantics. So far as Searle is concerned, the aspectual shape of thought grounded in the 
conscious perspectivality is the only way to make sense of primary intentionality. This rules 
out a priori any account of mentality that grounds mental content on ontogeny, phylogeny, or 
computational structure. Searle would not, of course, see this as an objection, and one can 
surely decide to abandon RTM and CTM, however, doing so requires offering an alternative 
account of mental content that can answer concerns about systematicity, productivity, 
compositionality, and other syntactic qualities of thought. Now, it’s unclear to me exactly 
where we should go with these exclusively first person methods for studying consciousness. 
While I am inclined to think that there is some role to be played by first person conscious 
reports in cognitive science, such claims only seem to make sense as embedded in a field of 
third-personal results.52 As it turns out, these are all options (or bullets, as the case might be) 
that Searle is willing to take (or bite). I’m not! And neither are most cognitive scientists. I 
thus propose at this point to leave Searle’s arguments to the side. 
Before moving on to my argument that there is actually good reason to suppose that 
research programs investigating collective mentality will offer both interesting explanations 
of phenomena in the actual world and interesting research projects for a more collective 
cognitive science, I must address some more lurking worries. While I have suggested in this 
chapter that worries about the consciousness of collectivities need not worry us, there are 
further objections to both the autonomy of collective psychological explanation and the 
possibility of collective representation. In the following two chapters I’ll turn to each of these 
worries.
                                                 
52 I do have arguments for this claim; and I offer them elsewhere. However, I cannot defend them here. 
Chapter III: 
I JUST CAN’T GET YOU OUT OF MY HEAD 
 
John Searle claims that any theory of collective intentionality must “be consistent 
with the fact that society consists of nothing but individuals. Since society consists entirely of 
individuals, there cannot be a group mind or group consciousness” (Searle 1990a, 404). 
Holistically inclined social scientists and philosophers of social science do, of course, 
maintain that we have good reason to appeal to collective mental states. In fact, some claims 
about social ontology and social epistemology seem to require the possibility of collective 
mental states that are distributed across individual agents. However, the intuition that 
collective mentality is not a viable option cuts deep, and at least one prominent philosopher 
of social science has argued that: 
Treating society as an organism, even metaphorically, and taking latent functions 
seriously force the holist to make difficult choices. He must either opt for Durkheim’s 
‘âme collective’—the group mind—to explain how society arranges institutions to 
meet its needs, or embrace a Darwinian evolutionary view, according to which all 
long lasting social institutions arose through variation and selection for their 
beneficial functions…the individualist considers either of these alternatives 
unattractive enough to reject holism (Rosenberg 1988, 134). 
 
To put the point briefly, there is a prevalent intuition that any theory that’s as ‘offensive to 
the intellect’ as the existence of collective mentality cannot possibly be right. However, this 
apparent offensiveness to the intellect is insufficient, by itself, to undercut the possibility of 
collective mentality. In this chapter I address one of the primary philosophical objections to 
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collective mentality, the thought that any appeal to collective mentality would be better 
cashed out in terms of aggregations of individual mental states in their social context.  
 
3.1 A bit of history: 
Auguste Comte developed one early attempt to establish the autonomy of collective 
psychological explanation, appealing to collective phenomena that appear to obey objectively 
specifiable laws distinct from the laws of individual psychology. He offered few arguments 
for his claim; however, Comte took the emerging sciences of social psychology and 
sociology to require generalizations over collective phenomena that were autonomous from 
generalizations over psychological states of individuals. John Stuart Mill demurred, and 
spent Chapter Six of A system of logic attempting to refute this claim. Mill famously argues 
that there are no collective psychological phenomena that cannot be better explained by 
appeal to individual psychology, so long as all of the relevant social relations and contextual 
facts are taken into consideration. Mill’s arguments against Comte provide a foundation for 
the most troubling objections to the possibility of collective mentality. 
Mill begins from what he sees as an uncontentious starting point: the assumption that 
individual behavior is law governed. Consider what would happen were I to put a cockroach 
in your coffee mug and ask you to drink out of it. My money is on your refusing to drink the 
coffee, and my reason for being so sure about this is that there are incredibly robust 
psychological generalizations about human behavior in response to cockroaches grounded on 
the human disgust responses (cf., Rozin & Nemeroff, 1990). There are, however, a minority 
of people who may still be willing to drink from the mug—maybe you’re one of them. 
However, even in this case, we typically assume that there is some other psychological fact 
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that explains why your disgust response to the cockroach has been swamped. Mill’s 
overriding principle, in the pursuit of explaining human behavior, is that human action is 
always explicable in terms of reasons for action. Unless psychological explanation is doomed 
from the beginning because there are chaotic psychological drives that are neither predictable 
nor explicable, Mill claims that there must be psychological explanations for all human 
behavior. On the basis of such considerations, Mill is unabashed in his defense of the 
lawfulness of human behavior. In fact, he goes so far as to say that: 
given the motives which are present to an individual’s mind, and given likewise the 
character and disposition of the individual, the manner in which he will act might be 
unerringly inferred; that if we knew the person thoroughly, and knew all the 
inducements which are acting upon him, we could foretell his conduct with as much 
certainty as we can predict any physical event (1843/1988, 23). 
 
This is not, of course, to say that we actually have—or in fact that we ever will have—the 
tools required to produce such accurate descriptions of the motives, character, dispositions, 
etc, of individuals. Perhaps psychology will never be able to advance these absolutely certain 
predictions and explanations. However, Mill claims that on the basis of the relative accuracy 
of psychological predictions, it is at least possible that psychology could produce such 
predictions and explanations. 
Mill does, however, recognize that it is likely that a science of psychology will 
always, because of human epistemic frailty, be cashed out in terms of ceteris paribus laws  
(what Mill (1843/1988, 31) calls empirical laws). But we do well enough with these. If, for 
example, I know that Granny refuses to talk about the French before she’s had a stiff martini, 
and I try to talk to her about Comte, I can predict that she’ll put up her index finger, walk to 
the kitchen and pour herself a stiff martini, ceteris paribus. However, even here I have to 
keep in mind the fact that there might be other beliefs and desires that I’ve failed to 
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acknowledge in Granny. Perhaps Granny also believes that Comte was Italian, or that the 
French have poisoned her Gin, or that the earth is about to be hit by a giant meteorite. In any 
of these cases, we won’t actually be able to predict Granny’s behavior. However, this is only 
because of our ignorance of a range of facts that happen to be pertinent to our psychological 
explanation of Granny’s behavior.  
The ceteris paribus nature of the laws of psychology does not, however, impugn their 
status as laws for Mill. In part, this is because Mill takes the ceteris paribus nature of 
psychological laws to be a result of human epistemic limitations rather than a fact about the 
psychological phenomena itself.53 In this regard, Mill takes psychology to be analogous to 
the science of tideology, in which “circumstances of a local or casual nature, such as the 
configuration of the bottom of the ocean, the degree of confinement from shores, the 
direction of the wind, &c., influence in many or in all places the height and time of the tide” 
(Mill 1843/1988, 31). Developing a precise tideology, thus, must include all of these factors; 
likewise a precise psychology must rely on a number of ever-changing and hyper-local facts 
about the systems in which particular humans happen to find themselves.54 Thus, when we 
study the psychology of individuals, we necessarily rely on approximations and idealizations 
in order to do the predictive work. However, people are relatively similar to one another and 
circumstances aren’t really all that variable, at least concerning the issues we typically care 
                                                 
53 Mill actually believes that no fundamental laws are ceteris paribus laws. He even goes so far as to claim that 
ceteris paribus laws amount to nothing more than the lowest sort of empirical law (Mill 1843/1988). 
 
54 It’s actually worse than this. Mill argues that “the impressions and actions of human beings are not solely the 
result of their present circumstances, but the joint result of those circumstances and the characters of the 
individuals; and the agencies which determine human character are so numerous to be diversified (nothing 
which has happened to the person throughout life being without its portion of influence,) that in the aggregate 
they are never in any two cases exactly similar. Hence, even if our science of human nature were theoretically 
perfect, that is, if we could calculate any character as we can calculate the orbit of any planet, from given data; 
still, as the data are never all given, nor ever precisely alike in different cases, we could neither make positive 
predictions, nor lay down universal propositions.” (Mill 1843/1988, 33) 
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about for the purposes of prediction and explanation, and this allows us to generate 
approximate generalizations—which Mill thinks will be good enough for the purposes of 
social psychology (Mill 1843/1988, 34).  
This predictability of human psychology, however, leads Mill to question the 
relationship between psychological and neurological laws. Mill recognizes that many of the 
predictions required in order to develop a completely lawful theory of human action will be 
facts about her neurophysiology. In fact, the analogy to tideology suggests that a completely 
articulated human psychology will appeal to circumstances of a local or casual nature, such 
as the configuration of a person’s brain and the influence on her brain from outside forces 
influence in many or in all places the behavior of that individual. But if this is true, then the 
generalizations of psychology begin to look useful merely because of our epistemic 
limitations—and, a better explanation of human behavior might be the one that appeals to 
these lower-level causal processes. However, Mill argues, there are compelling reasons to 
take psychological laws to be more than useful shorthand for generalizations over 
neurological states.  
Consider what would happen were we to come to be aware of all of the uniformities 
obtaining between psychological states and physiological states. Even in this case, we would 
still have to admit that there is at least a difference in mode of access to facts about human 
psychology and facts about physiology suggesting that generalizations over psychological 
states and generalizations over neurological states are about different sorts of things. We are, 
as a matter of fact: 
wholly ignorant of the characteristics of these nervous states; we know not, and at 
present have no means of knowing, in what respects one of them differs from another; 
and our only mode of studying their successions and co-existences of the mental 
states of which they are supposed to be the generators or causes. The successions, 
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therefore, which obtain among mental phenomena do not admit of being deduced 
from the physiological laws of our nervous organization; and all real knowledge of 
them must continue, for a long time at least, if not always, to be sought in the direct 
study, by observation and experiment, of the mental successions themselves. Since, 
therefore, the order of our mental phenomena must be studied in those phenomena, 
and not inferred from the laws of any phenomena more general, there is a distinct and 
separate Science of Mind. (Mill 1843/1988, 37) 
 
The thought, here, is that we come to know about psychological states of persons in the 
absence of any knowledge about their neurophysiology. Moreover, we recognize 
immediately that facts about human psychology could remain stable across counterfactual 
variations in states on which these psychological states are realized. Psychology is meant to 
explain the regularities in human behavior, and such explanations do not require any 
particular story about the realizers for these states (though they may make some of these 
stories more or less plausible). 
Given that there are significant differences in our mode of access to psychological 
and physiological facts, Mill argues that we have strong prima facie reason for thinking that 
psychological explanations ought to remain autonomous from physiological explanations. 
Perhaps more interestingly, Mill thinks that the only way we have of studying physiological 
states qua realizers of the psychological states is by first looking at the psychological facts 
that explain a person’s behavior, and then trying to see if there are interesting similarities at 
the level of realizers. Mill thinks that unless we start with an account of psychological kinds, 
we’ll have no way to way to construct a psychological story even from a complete science of 
neurology. On the basis of such considerations, Mill argued for an autonomous science of 
psychology to be pursued by way of experimental methods. Unfortunately, Mill thinks that 
things don’t go so well for attributions of mentality to collectivities.  
Mill claims that when we examine social structures, we find that there is nothing new 
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in large-scale a social phenomenon that is not already present in a fully articulated account of 
the psychological states of the individuals. As Mill puts the point, “the effect produced, in 
social phenomena, by any complex set of circumstances, amounts precisely to the sum of the 
effects of circumstances taken singly” (Mill 1843/1988, 83). Whereas the science of 
psychology requires the emergence of new phenomena such as beliefs, desires, and emotions 
that are not specifiable in terms of the aggregation of the underlying neurological 
phenomena, there is nothing new in kind that is introduced by appeal to states of a 
collectivity. In defense of this position, Mill offers an argument on the basis of a commitment 
to empiricism and a commitment to deductive relations between the laws of psychology and 
laws about social phenomena—I turn now to these arguments. 
 
3.2 Mill’s argument for reduction: 
Mill claims that the empirical investigation of social phenomena never rests on the 
observation of emergent entities (Mill 1843/1988, 65). In observing groups of people, we 
find aggregations of people, each of whose behavior is describable in terms of her 
psychological states. Mill, thereby, claims that empiricist considerations always militate 
against reifying collective mental states. When we explain the behavior of a rioting crowd, 
for example, we do so in terms of the rioting individuals: some people are setting things on 
fire, others are breaking windows, others are turning over cars, and still others are throwing 
rocks at the police. There’s a prominent intuition here that there’s nothing more to explain 
about the behavior of the crowd per se than what’s specified by facts about the behavior of 
individuals and the relations between these individuals as they come together in a crowd. 
Building on this intuition, Mill argues that in every case where a social scientist posits a 
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social phenomena, such posits are shorthand for, and are conceptually entailed by a complex 
set of facts about the individual psychological states that constitute and produce that social 
phenomenon. To put the point briefly, since we don’t encounter social phenomena per se in 
the world, claims about these social phenomena must be conceptually reducible to 
psychological phenomena.  
One way of reading Mill’s argument for the reduction of collective psychological 
posits to individual psychological explanations is grounded on the claim that laws ranging 
over collective psychological phenomena will always be reducible to laws of individual 
human psychology. On the basis of his commitment to individual behavior being completely 
determined by psychological laws, Mill argues that if we had a complete story of individual 
behavior as it occurs in the social world, there would be nothing more to explain at the level 
of the collective psychology once the laws of individual psychology are applied. This would 
make collective psychological phenomena at best, redundant and at worst, explanatorily 
superfluous. Thus, while it might be true that interesting local circumstances arise in groups, 
these circumstances don’t generate any new phenomena that require autonomous social laws 
above and beyond the laws of individual psychology and an account of the circumstances 
that constrain the behavior of individuals within a particular collectivity. Were there 
autonomous psychological states of collectivities, we would expect new laws for social 
phenomena distinct from the laws of individual psychology—and we just don’t seem to need 
such laws in order to explain human behavior. As we approach rock-bottom explanations of 
human behavior, Mill contends that we’ll find that “human beings in society have no 
properties but those which are derived from, and may be resolved into, the laws of the nature 
of individual man” (Mill 1843/1988, 65). Perhaps an example of such a reduction will be 
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useful here.  
At the foundation of the science of political economy, a social science in which Mill 
was thoroughly invested, Adam Smith (1776) argued for the claim that apparently large-scale 
phenomena such as fluctuations in industrial revenue could be explained in terms of the 
aggregation of self-interested psychological states of individuals. Given that all economic 
behavior is grounded on the pursuit of a greater gain over a smaller gain (cf., Mill 1843/1988, 
105), Mill claims that we can deductively explain the apparently emergent phenomena of 
market trends. However, most cases of the emergence of social phenomena are much more 
complicated that this (because of the variety of factors that contribute to their production—
some of which are psychological, some of which are not), and for this reason, their deduction 
is far less obvious—though Mill contends, there is no case where it is obvious that this 
deduction is impossible or even improbable. This is why, in most cases, we have to start by 
positing ceteris paribus laws about social phenomena and explain how these phenomena are 
likely given what we know about human psychology and contingent facts about the particular 
humans that happen to constitute the relevant collectivity. This is less than complete 
reduction of these social laws, but it’s good enough, claims Mill, to demonstrate the 
possibility of such reductions. 
 
3.3 Initial troubles for the Millian argument: 
There are a number of ways in which this idea of inter-theoretical reduction can be 
spelled out. When Mill makes the claim that the laws of the social sciences will always be 
reducible to the laws of psychology, he likely had something like the following in mind. 
Suppose that there is a law of collective psychology that takes the following form. If a 
 82 
corporation, C, fears a decrease in its profit margin. D, it will change its marketing strategy, 
M, ceteris paribus. If Mill’s thesis about the reduction of collective psychology to individual 
psychology is correct, then we will need a series of bridge laws such that: 
1) Cx  P1x 
2) Dx  P2x 
3) Mx  P3x 
 
where ‘P1x’, ‘P2y’, and ‘P3x’ are predicates of psychology. These laws are called bridge laws 
because they contain predicates of both the higher-level collective psychology and the lower-
level individual psychology and are thus capable of bridging the gap between the higher-
level and the lower-level sciences. However, to complete the reduction, there must also be a 
law of psychology such that: 
4)  P1x•P2xP3x 
If this sort of picture is correct, then any law that includes an apparently collective 
psychological phenomena will be related to a law at the level of individual psychology such 
that if we knew all of the laws of psychology and all of the bridge laws, we could, thereby, 
explain the apparently collective psychological states of a system in terms of the 
psychological regularities that underwrite that collective behavior. Such reductions were the 
wildest dreams of the positivists. However, there are serious, and well-known problems with 
adopting such a reductionist project. 
On the reasonably untendentious assumption that laws must range over natural kind 
predicates,55 the sort of reduction posited here comes out to be far too strong. So, suppose 
that the predicates picked out in the antecedents and consequents in (1) through (4) are 
                                                 
55 If you’re worried about the natural kind talk here, you can feel free to replace it with something more 
amenable to your empiricist proclivities. I’m inclined to think that the same argument will go through even on 
the minimal assumption that the predicates used in scientific laws must be projectable predicates rather than 
gerrymandered, gruesome predicates. I’ll run it in terms of natural kinds; however, since I’m borrowing the 
argument from Fodor (1980) and that’s the way that he does it. 
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supposed to be natural kind predicates. While it might indeed be true that it’s possible to 
spell out notions like ‘profit margin’, ‘corporation’ and, ‘marketing strategy’ at the level of 
economics, sociology or cultural anthropology, it seems reasonable to assume that these 
notions will not be realized on anything that looks like a natural kind at the level of 
individual psychology. After all, these are functional kinds if anything is. So, while an 
individual may play a key role in designing a marketing strategy in response to a change in 
profit margin, she does so only in her role as a member of a corporation.  
To put the criticism another way, there are numerous psychological attitudes that any 
particular individual within the corporation can adopt toward the development of a marketing 
plan without affecting the eventual outcome. Given that this is the case, we actually do find 
the sorts of counterfactual stabilities that Mill claimed were absent at the level of collective 
psychology. Suppose someone who is involved in the production of a marketing plan for 
Wine and Co. is lambasted by a supervisor for failing to wear a Hawaiian shirt on the second 
Friday of the month. She might, given her everlasting hatred of tropical climates, adopt the 
policy of attempting to undercut the corporation by producing the worst marketing plan she 
can possibly muster. Fortunately for Wine and Co., however, there are structures in place to 
mitigate breakdowns in the functional architecture of the corporation. Despite her best efforts 
to the contrary, a viable marketing plan may emerge because her supervisors might see that 
her version of the marketing plan, recognize that it looks miserable, and thereby redirect the 
project so as to allow another person to produce a more viable plan for increasing profits.56 
Alternatively, the same person could decide that she ought to become more of ‘team player’ 
                                                 
56 If V.S. Ramachandran (1988) is right, then something similar occurs across a broad range of neurological 
breakdowns in individuals. Areas of cytoarchitecture that would typically play one role in the functional 
architecture of a person are recruited in order to do the work of some area that is damaged, and so if failing to 
perform it’s standard function. Perhaps the most interesting cases here are Ramachandran’s studies on phantom 
limb pain. 
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and might decide that producing a viable marketing plan is the best way to begin—in the end 
producing a relevantly similar and viable marketing plan. 
Psychological states of corporations, if there are such things, are often produced in a 
way that is resistant to local breakdowns; they, thereby, exhibit counterfactual stability across 
variations in the psychological states of the individuals that compose these collectivities. The 
distribution of cognitive tasks across a number of individual psychological systems, at least 
as this occurs in the most interesting cases of collective mental states, facilitates the 
realization of a particular psychological state of a collectivity on a variety of different 
individual psychological bases. Thus, just as we should be unwilling to engage in a 
straightforward type reduction of the mental states of an individual to her neural architecture 
because the kinds that are present at the psychological level are multiply realized on 
different, heterogeneous neural structures, we should be unwilling to engage in a 
straightforward type reduction of collective psychological states to individual psychological 
states because these states are multiply realized on a variety of heterogeneous individual 
psychological states. The important point here is that the counterfactual stability of things 
like corporate beliefs, marketing plans, and the like guarantees that they will not be 
straightforwardly reducible by conceptual means to the natural kinds of individual 
psychology. 
Any attempt to reduce collective psychological phenomena to individual 
psychological phenomena is going to be faced with the fact that although collective entities 
like a decreased profit margin are well behaved at the level of collective psychology, the 
psychological states that realize the movement of capital and the decisions to act on the 
movement of capital will be wildly disjunctive and completely unprojectable at the level of 
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individual psychology. There is a nearly infinite set of ways in which profit margins can 
fluctuate, and as such, the psychological attitudes directed towards these fluctuations would 
themselves be nearly infinite. The point is a familiar point against the straightforward 
reduction of the laws of one science to the laws of another science. This suggests, however, 
that the initial way of spelling out Mill’s reductive project is likely to fail; yet the claim that 
we should expect the a priori deduction of the laws of the special sciences to something more 
primitive continues to have a great deal of currency. 
 
3.4 Reduction and supervenience:  
While the conceptual reduction of the social sciences to psychology is unlikely, there 
is a weaker reading of Mill’s reductionist claims on which they might succeed. On almost 
anyone’s account of collective behavior, unless there are changes in individual psychological 
states or environmental conditions, there will be no change in the states of the collectivity 
that these individuals compose. However, if Mill is right to claim that the social sciences 
must be reduced to psychology, then every social fact must admit of some sort of reductive 
explanation; a more promising understanding of such reductions is to see them as requiring 
nothing more than each of social fact being explained entirely in terms of simpler entities. 
Perhaps the most promising way of spelling out such reductive explanations in the case of 
mental entities is suggested by David Chalmers (1996; Jackson 1998; Jackson and Chalmers 
2001).57  
Chalmers argues that if you want to reduce B-properties of one type to A-properties 
of another, then it will be a minimal condition on such reductions that B-properties supervene 
                                                 
57 Chalmers argues that if materialism is true every fact will admit of a reductive explanation in physical terms, 
and although he’s not immediately concerned with the reduction of the social to the psychological, his story is 
helpful in spelling out an alternative account of reduction by way of supervenience. 
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on A-properties. Spelling out this notion of supervenience, Chalmers notes that B-properties 
supervene on A-properties just in case no two possible situations are identical with respect to 
their A-properties while differing in their B-properties. There are, however, a number of 
ways in which the relevant notion of possibility can be understood. Suppose someone wanted 
to explain why all worlds that are identical with regard to their physical properties would also 
be identical with regard to their biological properties. In offering an explanation of such 
similarities across worlds, one might begin with a notion of nomological or natural 
possibility that could constrain reductive explanations to all and only worlds that are identical 
to ours as regards the natural laws. Spelling out supervenience according to this notion of 
possibility, entails that any naturally possible situations with the same A-properties will have 
the same B-properties (Chalmers 1996). However, as Chalmers notes, this is a weak notion 
of possibility so it will not entail the sort of reductions that the Mill hoped for. A nomological 
relation between the social facts and the psychological facts cannot assure the deductive 
entailments that Mill requires between collective psychological explanations and individual 
psychological explanations.  
The problem is this. If B-properties (e.g., the facts of the collective psychology) are 
only nomologically supervenient on A-properties (e.g., the facts of individual psychology), 
then it is possible to conceive of a world in which the A-facts hold but the B-facts don’t; and, 
provided conceivability is a good guide to possibility, this suggests that a world in which 
facts about individual psychology are the same and facts about collective psychology are 
different is metaphysically possible. The proponent of Millian deductions must recognize that 
such explanations require a stronger sort of necessity.58 Nomological supervenience is not 
                                                 
58 I am inclined to think that these sorts of deductions are unlikely to be forthcoming in any form. In fact, very 
few people (perhaps only Jackson, Chalmers, and Joe Levine) are convinced that a priori deductions are 
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strong enough to guarantee that the introduction of B-facts into a world doesn’t offer 
something new that requires their own explanation in B-terms.  
What Mill needs is a notion of supervenience that guarantees that if the collective 
psychological facts supervene on the individual psychological facts, any two situations that 
are identical in individual psychological facts will necessarily be identical in their collective 
psychological facts. To put this point another way, if Mill’s argument is to be successful, the 
supervenience relationship between collective psychological facts and individual 
psychological facts must be sufficient to guarantee that the individual psychological facts 
deductively entail the collective psychological facts. But, in order to guarantee this, we have 
to opt for a much stronger interpretation of the supervenience relationship, what Chalmers 
(1996) refers to as logical supervenience. Logical supervenience is the claim that B-
properties supervene on A-properties just in case no two logically possible situations are 
identical with respect to their A-properties but different with respect to their B-properties. If 
this sort of relation obtains, then once God creates a world in which the A-properties are 
fixed, she doesn’t have any more work to do in fixing the B-properties. The B-properties are 
fixed as a matter of logical necessity once the A-properties are fixed and there is no 
conceivable world in which the B-facts differ while the A-facts remain the same. Suppose, 
for a moment, that this sort of relation obtains between the facts of collective psychology and 
the facts of individual psychology. How, then, would explanatory reductions work within this 
framework.  
Jackson and Chalmers argue that there are a posteriori identities that obtain between 
the facts that articulated in macro-scientific explanations and their subvenience bases. This 
                                                                                                                                                       
required for explanation. However, this research project does seem to have some affinities with Mill’s reductive 
project, so I’ll entertain these possibilities. 
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thought seems, at least initially, quite plausible: the explanation of macroscopic phenomena 
takes the form of an analysis of the mechanisms that give rise to a particular sort of 
macroscopic phenomena. Thus, for example, if we want to explain why a car is accelerating 
slower than it typically does, the explanation should not be given at the level of the whole 
car; instead, the phenomena should be explained at a lower explanatory level by appeal to 
facts about clogged fuel injectors, bad spark plugs, or even old spark plug wires.  
Similarly, as Dennett is fond of pointing out, when a person fails to behave rationally, 
for example when a person with Anton’s syndrome is obviously blind but denies being so, 
we explain her behavior not at the level of psychological phenomena but in terms of facts 
about her neurology; this, for example, might occur by way of an appeal to the sort of 
damage that has occurred to her occipital. Finally, if we want to explain why NC State fails 
to defeat UNC at basketball even though they’re playing to sort of offense that should cause 
problems for UNC, we’ll appeal to the athletic abilities of UNC’s players and to the 
breakdown of the Princeton Offense because of the particular mistakes made by the members 
of the NC State team. 
Many explanations clearly do take the form of explanation in terms of simpler 
entities. In fact, this is precisely the sort of explanatory model on which the homuncular 
functionalism that I advanced in Chapter 1 is grounded. However, the truly astonishing claim 
advanced by Jackson and Chalmers, and the claim that is required for Mill’s reductive 
project, is that these sorts of explanations rest on conceptual truths that allow for an upward 
derivation of the macroscopic facts from their microscopic realizers. The reason for such a 
claim is that unless there is some good reason for thinking that the macroscopic facts 
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logically supervene on the physical facts, we will not have fully explained the macroscopic 
facts. Here, in brief, is the sort of argument Jackson and Chalmers typically offer: 
1) If materialism is true, every fact will (eventually) admit of reductive 
explanation in physical terms; 
 
2) Reductive explanation of B-facts in terms of A-facts requires logical 
supervenience of the B-facts on the A-facts; 
 
3) Phenomenal facts don’t logically supervene on the physical facts; 
 
4) So, phenomenal facts don’t admit of reductive explanation in physical terms; 
 
5) So, materialism is false.59 
 
There are, of course, a number of contentious premises in this argument—and I’m not 
going to argue against this position (Bill Lycan (2003) has done a nice job of pointing to a 
number of problems with this argument—so I’ll leave that to him). However, there is a 
version of this argument that captures Mill’s reductive intuition about collective psychology. 
Although Mill would not follow Jackson and Chalmers in their claim that physicalism is 
false, he would be concerned to avoid a similar untoward conclusion about empiricism. 
Mill’s empiricist version of this argument takes something of the following form: 
1) If empiricism is true, then every psychological fact will (eventually) admit of 
reductive explanation in terms of individual psychologies; 
 
2) Reductive explanation of B-facts in terms of A-facts requires logical 
supervenience of the B-facts on the A-facts;  
 
3) But, empiricism is true; 
 
4) So, collective psychological facts admit of reductive explanation in terms of 
individual psychological facts;60 
 
                                                 
59 A version of this reconstruction of this argument occurs in Lycan (2003) 
 
60 This relies on a special case of (2): unless collective psychological facts logically supervene on individual 
psychological facts they won’t admit of reductive explanation in terms of individual psychological facts. 
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5) So, collective psychological facts logically supervene on individual 
psychological facts. 
 
As with the Jackson and Chalmers argument, there are a variety of places at which to resist 
this argument. However, before turning to the ways in which one might resist this argument, 
let me turn briefly to the sorts of arguments that might be marshaled in favor of this reductive 
picture of explanation. 
 
3.5. Some stabs at definitions: 
There are a couple of ways in which the attempt to move upward from the claims of 
individual psychology to the claims of collective psychology can be carried our. First, it 
could be the case that collective psychological phenomena are definable in terms of 
individual psychological states. For example, ascriptions of psychological states to a 
collectivity might be read distributively, or as summative claims about the members of a 
collectivity (cf., Gilbert 1989). According to such an analysis of a collective belief 
attribution,  
A collectivity C believes that P iff all or most of the members of C believe that P.  
This, however, is an insufficient model of collective belief attribution. After all, if every 
individual in a collectivity privately believes that P, but no one ever shares her belief that P 
with any other member of the collectivity, we would be unwilling to say of the collectivity 
that it believed that P on this basis. Consider the case of a hiring decision in a philosophy 
department. If everyone in the department believed that hiring a candidate would be good 
idea, but everyone kept this belief private, we would be unwilling to say of the department 
that it thinks that this hire is a good idea—even though every member of the department 
thinks that it’s a good idea. We might, then, modify this definition to say something like: 
 91 
A collectivity, C, believes that P iff 1) most members of C believe that P, and 2) it’s 
common knowledge in C that most members of C believe that P. 
 
However, this claim has problems as well. The most troubling worry is that information can 
sneak in under the common knowledge condition that is irrelevant to the belief of the 
collectivity qua belief of the collectivity. So, for example, it could be the case that every 
member of a philosophy department hiring committee believes that the fall semester begins 
in late August, and it could also be the case that it’s common knowledge among the members 
of that committee that all of the members of the committee believe that the fall semester 
begins in late August, and this belief could be so utterly irrelevant to any decision that the 
committee makes about hiring that it would seem strange to attribute to the committee a 
belief that the fall semester begins in late August.61 Perhaps this suggests that summative 
models of collective beliefs are too weak to count as viable analyses of collective belief 
attributions.62 
Moreover, there are numerous cases where we claim that a group believes that P 
when none of the individual member of that collectivity believe that P. Again, consider the 
case of a hiring decision in a philosophy department. It could be the case that there is no 
member of the faculty who believes that the present candidate is the best candidate to hire. 
However, it might still be the case that every member of the faculty is willing to assent to the 
claim ‘the philosophy department believes that this is the best candidate for the job’ qua 
                                                 
61 The reasoning here is grounded on the thought that we shouldn’t attribute to the hiring committee qua hiring 
committee any beliefs that are irrelevant to hiring. 
 
62 Moreover, as Bill Lycan (personal correspondence) has pointed out, this analysis ignores all of the relevant 
power relations at play in such a group. It is possible that most of the members of the hiring committee believe 
that person A is the right candidate to hire, and that it is common knowledge that most of the member of the 
committee believes that person A is the right candidate to hire, but that the department chair and the head of the 
hiring committee believe that person A should not be hired. In this case, the fact that the majority believe that 
person A should be hired, even coupled with the common knowledge constraint, is insufficient to tell us 
anything interesting about how the hiring committee is likely to behave. 
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member of the department even if she is unwilling to assent to this claim as a privately held 
belief. This suggests that summative models are too strong (as well as too weak) to count as 
analyses of collective belief attributions. 
One final approach to offering the sort of definitions that are required by the Millian 
begins by noting that the theoretical terms of psychology can be defined as the occupants of a 
particular causal role, or at least in terms of the typical causes and effects of that particular 
sort of mental phenomena (cf., Lewis, 1972; Armstrong, 1980). According to this view, the 
theoretical terms of the ascription of psychological states to collectivities can be implicitly 
defined within the theory in which they occur. As such, these theoretical terms can always be 
replaced in any explanation by their definientia (e.g., by a suitable Ramsification of the 
terms), providing a way of fully explaining the presence of some collective psychological 
phenomena by way of the simpler entities of the psychological sciences. On this approach, 
we begin by supposing that a particular mental state of a collectivity (e.g., the intention to run 
the Princeton Offense) is going to be defined as whatever fills the causal role of getting 
people in the positions that are required in order to run the Princeton Offense and getting 
them to move in the ways that are constitutive of the Princeton Offense. We then suppose 
that empirical investigation into the cases in which the Princeton Offense is run will reveal 
that the occupant of this role is a set of individual beliefs about where each of the individuals 
need to be. It will then follow, straightforwardly, that since the collective intention to run the 
Princeton Offence is whatever fills the role of getting the individual players in the right 
positions, and since what gets the individual players in the right position is their individual 
beliefs, these individual beliefs just are the intention to run the Princeton Offense.  
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There are, however, serious problems with this position as well. First, the mere fact 
that the two levels of explanation pick out the same phenomena does not entail that the 
higher level of explanation should be abandoned. Even if it were true that the psychological 
state of a collectivity and the psychological states of the individuals that composed that 
collectivity were identical, there might still be reasons to retain both sorts of explanatory 
structures (and this is something that even Mill wouldn’t deny!). In fact, offering the sort of 
analysis that is required by this causal model might even provide us with reasons to retain 
collective mental states in our ontology. I agree wholeheartedly that our commonsense 
understanding of mental states is likely be vindicated, though perhaps with substantial 
revision, by the cognitive sciences. However, even if there are token identities between an 
individual’s mental state and the state of her brain, this does not thereby commit us to 
eliminativism about the mental.  
As I’ve already noted, there are substantial counterfactual stabilities both in the case 
of individual and collective psychology, that are not present in the explanations that appeal to 
the realizers of these states. Moreover, commonsense psychology is extremely useful in 
prediction and explanation—and it’s useful precisely because it generalizes across 
individuals and across collectivities. When we want to explain why a person ducks as a 
basketball is thrown at her face, our best bet is to appeal to the psychological state of the 
individual (she didn’t want to get hit in the face with a basketball because she thought it 
would hurt) rather than to her neurological state. In the same way, if I want to explain why 
UNC is likely to struggle in a game against Georgetown in the same way that it struggled in a 
game against NC State, I will be much better off if I explain this prediction by noting that 
UNC plays a transition offense and both NC State and Georgetown play a Princeton Offense. 
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The explanation here will turn on the ways in which a Princeton Offense is used to slow 
down the tempo and keep the score low (which is incredibly detrimental, if executed 
correctly, to a transition offense). Moreover, I can offer this explanation without regard to the 
particular players on either team. However, just as I might appeal to facts about a particular 
person’s neurology in order to explain why the standard psychological explanations fail, I 
will also be able to appeal to particular facts about particular players in order to explain why 
UNC would have no difficulty dispensing with Northwestern even though they too play the 
Princeton Offense. The point here is that the ascription of an intention to run the Princeton 
Offense does a lot of work so far as our predictions about upcoming basketball games are 
concerned, and that it generalizes in a way that appealing to facts about particular players 
psychologies doesn’t. 
Second, it is unlikely that the relevant sorts of identities will have the form required 
by the Millian model. In order for this sort of model to be correct, it will have to be true a 
priori that a particular mental state is identical to whatever has the right sort of causal 
structure. If materialism is true, then it will be true that there are some physical realizers for 
every mental state. However, it would be an interesting discovery that there is some 
reasonably homogeneous class of neurological states that will count as an individual’s 
intention play her role in running the Princeton Offense. In fact, it seems fairly unreasonable 
to assume that there will be such a unified class of occupants for this role. Things get even 
more ugly when we start to consider the heterogeneity of the class of individual states that 
could implement the collective intention to run the Princeton Offense. Though there will 
assuredly be some class of individual mental states that give rise to this collective intention, 
what the relation is between these states at the level of individual psychology is an empirical 
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question in a way that is not allowed by this sort of causal theory of mind. Although it may 
turn out that there is some sort of identity to be found between the mental states of a 
collectivity and the mental states of the individuals that compose that collectivity, there is 
little reason to think that this is something that we can figure out without investigating the 
phenomena in question.  
Finally, as Michael Bratman (1987) and John Searle (1990a) and argued, no set of 
psychological states of the form ‘I believe P’, even when supplemented with some sort of 
common knowledge criteria, can ever be summed up to produce a psychological state of the 
form ‘we believe P’. The problem is that in any case where we find an attribution of a mental 
state to a collectivity, we find that even though there are individual intentions that can be 
used to explain at any point what is happening in a group, these intentions are often derived 
from collective intentions. Thus, when a basketball team tries to run the Princeton Offense, 
the play might start with four players outside the arc and one player inside. The players will 
then keep the ball in constant motion until a player at the post tries to make a backdoor cut 
(hoping for a bounce-pass so that she can take a lay-up) or until a defensive mismatch (for 
example, when the opponent packs the paint to prevent backdoor cuts) allows a for a three-
point shot from the perimeter. Now, while it might be the case that every individual on the 
team has the belief “we should run the Princeton Offense” this individual belief is something 
that has to be derived from the coordination that occurs between these players as a team.63 
An individual cannot run the Princeton Offense by herself. Moreover, even if every 
individual has the belief that she should run the Princeton Offense (and the corresponding 
desire to do so) this will not suffice to produce a Princeton Offense. Finally, even if every 
                                                 
63 NB: there are ways of developing this position into an argument for individualism. I return to this in the next 
section. 
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individual has the belief that they should run the Princeton Offense (and the corresponding 
desire to do so), and every individual has the belief that every other individual has the 
relevant beliefs and desire to run the Princeton offense, this will not suffice for running the 
Princeton Offense unless there has been a coordinating decision by the team as a whole to do 
so. Since, individual beliefs by themselves cannot insure the relevant sort of coordination, 
they’re not going to be sufficient to explain the collective intention.  
At this point, we have good reason to think that there is not a straightforward way in 
which we can define the psychological states of the collectivity in terms of the psychological 
states of individuals. However, the reduction of the collective psychology to individual 
psychology does not require explicit definition of social phenomena in terms of the 
psychological states of individuals. Instead, if there is a reductive story to be told about 
collective psychological phenomena, it may be told in terms of functional analyses or 
functional decompositions of the relevant collective psychological phenomena into facts 
about the individual psychological states that compose the collective state. I turn now to this 
approach. 
 
3.6. Functional analyses: 
Instead of appealing to reductions by way of explicit or implicit definitions of 
collective psychological phenomena in terms of individual psychological states, one might 
turn to the response that is often given to concerns about multiple realizability: some form of 
functional explanation. There is a broad consensus in the philosophy of mind that individual 
psychological states are best understood by attending to the contribution that they make to 
the functioning of a system as a whole, facilitating the flexible engagement with the system’s 
 97 
environment. On this sort of view, mental states are understood as types that are explicable 
only in terms of abstract, functional characterization, though it is often thought that they are 
token-token identical to physical processes. At the level of collective psychological 
phenomena, we might then say that although an intention to run the Princeton Offense must 
be specified functionally, there will be individual psychological realizers for each instance of 
these collective phenomena.  
A crucial feature of a mental state, characterized functionally, is that it has the 
capacity to contribution to the goal-directed behavior (or disposition to behave) of a system. 
Moreover, in explaining the behavior of a system, our best bet is to attribute to it the 
intentional states that are likely to give rise to a particular sort of behavior.64 The difference 
between a belief and a desire, for example, is—at least to a first approximation—spelled out 
in terms of the different roles that each plays in allowing a system to engage in various sorts 
of behaviors. The most promising forms of functionalism start by recognizing some 
intentionally characterized phenomena (e.g., Roy Williams’ belief that repeated shifts in the 
line-up will facilitate an up-tempo game that will wear down the less athletic Georgetown) 
and then breaking it down into simpler components until a purely mechanistic explanation is 
reached (cf., Dennett 1978b, 80). This view takes a cognitive system to be a complex entity 
consisting of a number of subroutines, each of which is capable of carrying out some task or 
other in the service of the person-level phenomena in question. In the case of William’s 
belief, long term and working memory structures (e.g., his memories of past performances of 
the Tarheels and his memories of things that Dean Smith taught him when he was a young 
                                                 
64 This is not, of course, to say that every mental state has large-scale effects on the behavior of a system. There 
are idle and inconsequential thoughts—it’s just that they’re a whole lot harder to track from the outside. 
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assistant coach) and perceptual structures (e.g., his observation of the way that his team is 
moving tonight) among other systems play some role in producing Williams’ behavior.  
While it might be true that the best explanation of Williams’ behavior is that he has a 
belief that repeated shifts in the line-up will facilitate an up-tempo game that will wear down 
the less athletic Georgetown, a robust functional explanation in psychology would attempt to 
offer some characterization of this intentional phenomena in a way that explains it in terms of 
the functioning of simpler entities. Thus, rather than taking Williams’ belief to be a black box 
that’s meant to be left unopened, functional psychology attempts to open this black box and 
offer some account of why this mental state functions in the way that it does. However, at 
this point we need to tread carefully. In the case of a person, or in the case of other biological 
organisms, these decompositions will eventually be resolved into dumb mechanisms such as 
neurons that can only be in a state of firing or not firing. However, this is not the only way 
that things can go. Functionalism is a topic-neutral theory. The functionalist is, thus, able to 
remain completely non-committal about the sorts of entities that fill any particular causal 
role. Provided that there are some intentional phenomena that can be attributed to a 
collectivity, and provided that there is some decomposition into the simpler entities that is 
homologous to the sorts of decompositions that we find in a paradigmatic cognitive system, 
there is no reason to think that functional characterizations of the mind will apply only to 
individuals and not to collectivities. Moreover, the fact that the most promising model of 
functional analysis that we find for mental states is offered in terms of what Marvin Minsky 
calls a ‘society of mind’, it seems unreasonable to assume a priori that there are no collective 
mental states that have functional architectures of the same sort that we find in individual 
mental states.  
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More importantly, suppose that there is some functional state of a collectivity that we 
call a belief, a desire, or intention. Suppose further that this functional state is, at one level of 
analysis, realized on the mental states of the individuals that compose that collectivity. This 
fact would give us no more reason to eliminate the collective psychological phenomena than 
we have to eliminate individual psychological states because, at some level of analysis, they 
are realized on neuronal states. The reason that such functional models of the mind are so 
promising is that they are explanatorily useful without having to make any claims about what 
sorts of entities happen to realize that functional state at some level of analysis. Even if it is 
likely that there will be token-token reductions of collective mental states to individual 
mental states—this just isn’t a problem.  
 
3.7. Reduction and modal intuitions:65 
There is one more route by which the Millian might try to offer a reductive account of 
the relation between individual mental states and collective mental states. This is a strategy 
recently advanced by Frank Jackson and David Chalmers. In spite of the worries that mid-
twentieth century philosophy raised against the a priori, Jackson and Chalmers argue that the 
only way to avoid mystery in our scientific explanations (or at least the only way to justify 
scientific explanations by appeal to something other than an appeal to faith that the 
correlations established in the sciences will secure the identities required for the defense of 
physicalism) is by way of a priori entailments between physical truths and ordinary 
macroscopic truths. According to Jackson and Chalmers, the best way to go about securing 
these a priori entailments is by way of conceptual analysis. 
 The story goes something like this. Suppose we want to establish that ‘water = 
                                                 
65 Thanks to Jacek Brzozowski for help on the development of the argument in this section. 
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H2O’. We begin by noting that when provided with sufficient information and sufficient time 
for reflection, ordinary subjects have the capacity to identify the extensions on their concepts. 
Much of this capability is the result of considering “a concept’s extension within hypothetical 
scenarios, and noting regularities that emerge” (Jackson and Chalmers 2001, 322). Although 
what emerges through this sort of conceptual analysis is unlikely to be anything like an 
explicit definition, it does give us important information about the features of a particular 
kind of thing that allow us to use concept to use a concept to apply to that thing. Through a 
process of reflection on the places in which she uses the concept, the fearless conceptual 
analyzer can come to note that WATER refers to the stuff that we typically find in lakes and 
rivers, the stuff that comes out of the tap at home, and the stuff in the glass from which I am 
currently drinking. It’s just a matter of competent use of the concept that it discriminates the 
things that are water from the things that aren’t. In fact, fearless conceptual analyzers will 
even know that if they were to come across a substance that looked, smelled, tasted and 
behaved in all ways just like water, dripping on her head from the pipes in her favorite bar, 
that this too was water. The important thing about our concepts is that we have the capacity 
to consider where they apply both in actual situations and in counterfactual situations.  
What we see here is that there is at least one characteristic reference fixing property 
for the ‘water’ role. Now, it’s a priori true that ‘water’ is the actual ‘watery stuff of my 
experience’, the stuff that falls from the sky, drips from my tap, and runs through the coffee 
maker. This is just a matter of the meaning of the concept WATER. So, it’s true a priori that 
the actual occupant of the ‘water’ role is water. Next, however, we need to establish that it is 
actually H2O that fills the ‘water’ role. But, this is a contingent fact about our world. 
Fortunately, however, chemical science has the capacity to figure out how it is that all of the 
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stuff that plays the ‘water’ role are one in the same kind of stuff at the level of chemistry—it 
turns out that all of these things are H2O, and that’s a contingent matter of fact about our 
world. The stuff that plays the water role in the actual world is H2O. Now, if we know (by 
way of scientific evidence) that the actual occupant of the ‘water’ role is H2O, and we know 
that the actual occupant of the ‘water’ role is water, then we can infer a priori by the 
transitivity of identity that water is H2O. 
Suppose, then, that we want to establish an analogous case with a collective mental 
state. We would need to show that when provided with sufficient information and sufficient 
time for reflection, ordinary subjects have the capacity to identify the extensions on their 
collective mental concepts in such a way that a fearless conceptual analyzer would come to 
note that ‘collective belief’ refers to the characteristic outputs of deliberations and 
investigations within collectivities, the coordinating force of these decisions, etc. In order to 
establish this, there would need to be at least one characteristic reference fixing property for 
the ‘collective belief’ role. If someone could succeed here, it would be a priori true that 
‘collective beliefs’ are the actual ‘collective belief-ish phenomena of my experience’—
whatever these happen to be. This would just be a matter of the meaning of ‘collective 
belief’. So, it would be true a priori that the actual occupant of the ‘collective belief’ role is 
whatever the natural class of phenomena that underwrite our claims about collective beliefs 
happens to be. Next, we would need to establish that it is actually individual psychological 
states that fill the collective belief role. This, however, would still be a contingent fact about 
our world. The things that play the ‘collective belief’ role in the actual world would be 
individual psychological states. Now, if we know that the actual occupant of the ‘collective 
belief’ role is collective belief, and we know that the actual occupant of the ‘collective belief’ 
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role is individual psychological states, then we can infer a priori by the transitivity of identity 
that collective beliefs are individual psychological states.  
As it turns out, much of the literature of collective intentionality is quite amenable to 
this form of argument. Consider one promising reductive picture of collective intentionality: 
Bratman’s ‘shared intentions’. Bratman begins from a couple of methodological assumptions. 
First, he assumes that intentions are a distinctive sort of attitude that is integral to our 
understanding of ourselves as agents—a sort of attitude that facilitates planning and practical 
reasoning (Bratman 1993, 97). Second, he assumes that although it is clear that we often do 
attribute mental states to collectivities, the only way in which we can make sense of 
intentions is by attributing them to individuals in such a way that they allow for apparently 
collective behaviors. Bratman acknowledges straight away that an individual can’t run the 
Princeton Offense, play a Balinese gamelan, or play Steve Reich’s music for 18 musicians. 
However, Bratman claims that by making sense of the intentional states of each of the 
individuals that compose a collectivity, it is possible to make sense of each of these behaviors 
in a way that doesn’t suppose any sort of collective mental state. Bratman argues that the key 
role of an intention is to coordinate and constrain behaviors in such a way that they lead to 
intentional actions. If I intend to roll a cigarette, I thereby commit to a range of actions that 
will constrain my behaviors in various ways. I commit to taking my tobacco out of my 
pocket, pulling out a rolling paper, pinching out the appropriate amount of tobacco, rolling 
the cigarette, and licking the adhesive strip to close the cigarette. This is how my behaviors 
over the next couple of minutes are coordinated by my intention to roll a cigarette. In the 
same way, if we intend to stage a work stoppage in order to protest pay inequalities, we 
thereby commit to various sorts of constraints on our behavior as well as to ways in which 
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we will coordinate each of our individual behaviors. With this shared intention, we commit to 
leaving our work-stations at the same point, to refusing to return to work until some suitable 
result has been achieved, to not trying to undercut one another, and to preventing scabs from 
entering the work area (just to name a few constraints on behavior). Provided this 
understanding Bratman then asks what it would take for such a shared intention to be 
possible. His account of how we share an intention, then, takes the following form. We 
intend to Φ iff 
1) (a) I intend that we Φ, and (b) you intend that we Φ; 
 
2) I intend that we Φ in accordance with and because of (a) and (b) and we have 
meshing subplans in accordance with (a) and (b),66 and you intend that we Φ in 
accordance with and because of (a) and (b) and we have meshing subplans in 
accordance with (a) and (b); and, 
 
3) (1) and (2) are common knowledge between us (cf., Bratman 1993, 106). 
 
Bratman contends that in any case where there is a collective intention, we will find such 
intentional states in the individual. 
Bratman, thus, agrees that there are collective intentional phenomena that must be 
explained. He concedes that there are collective intentions that are individuated by their 
ability to coordinate the actions of the various individuals that compose a collectivity. In fact, 
Bratman seems to think that it is a conceptual truth that there is such a reference fixing 
property for ‘shared intentions’. But if this is a conceptual truth, then it will be a priori true 
that ‘shared intentions’ are the actual shared intentional phenomena of our experience, and 
this is just a matter of the meaning of ‘shared intention’. So, it will be true a priori that the 
                                                 
66 Bratman (1993, 105-6) claims that this is a condition on ensuring that the coordinating feature of a collective 
intention is met. While it need not be the case that the persons who compose a collectivity have all of the same 
plans underlying a collective intention (I might have the subplan of making a big scene when I stop working 
and you might have the plan to stop working quietly and just sit down for a cup of coffee), it must be the case 
that our plans mesh in the sense of not preventing the intended action from occurring. 
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actual occupant of the ‘shared intention’ role is shared intentional phenomena of our 
experience. Next, Bratman contends that we can establish that it’s actually individual 
psychological states that fill the shared intention role. Having provided the account that 
Bratman offers, we could look to the world and see if there were such individual intentions 
and this would be an empirical matter. If Bratman is right, then the things that play the 
‘shared intention’ role in the actual world will be these sorts of individual intentions. And, if 
the actual occupant of the ‘shared intention’ role is shared intention, and the actual occupant 
of the ‘shared intention’ role is individual intentions, then we can infer a priori by the 
transitivity of identity that shared intentions are a particular individual intentions. This allows 
Bratman to make two claims. First, it allows him to claim that there are shared intentions but 
they are reducible to individual psychological states. Second, it allows him to claim that these 
shared intentions are not properties of a collective mind, but properties of the individuals that 
compose the collectivity. However, it’s not at all clear that Bratman can have everything he 
wants here.  
Although he speaks disparagingly of collective minds and their ilk, noting that “a 
shared intention is not an attitude in the mind of some superagent” (Bratman 1993, 99), it’s 
not at all clear that he gets this claim for free. As David Velleman (1997, 38) notes, the claim 
that there are no collective minds is not as obvious as Bratman seems to think. “Whether 
there are collective minds depends on whether there are collective mental states…Hence we 
cannot rule out the possibility of collective intentions on the grounds that there are no 
collective minds; the direction of logical dependence goes the other way”. However, 
recognizing this makes a huge difference to the way in which we interpret the relevant 
reductions. The mere fact that something is reducible to something else doesn’t, all by itself, 
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rule out the possibility of things existing at both levels of explanation. The fact, if it is a fact, 
that individual mental states are reducible (at least token-token) to neurological states does 
not, all by itself, entail that we should eliminate individual mental states from our ontology.  
The problem is that there is always an extra step required in order to argue from the 
claim that two things are of the same sort to the claim that one of the things ought to be 
eliminated. Consider the case of individual beliefs. Suppose that there is some analogous 
story to be told about the way in which individual beliefs are to be reduced (at least token-
token) to states of a person’s neurology (as they no doubt will if the physicalist is right). The 
fact that there is a reductive story to be told about individual beliefs would not force us 
toward the eliminativist position unless we had some commitment to retaining only the most 
basic, or primitive explanatory structures in our ontology. At this point, we would be left 
with atoms and the void—likely an incredibly unpromising strategy for the practice of 
psychology. To put the point another way, even if at the end of the day all that we find at the 
basement level of physics is atoms and the void, the fact that we find the sorts of entailments 
proposed by this explanatory model is neither necessary nor sufficient for allowing these 
higher-level explanatory structures into our ontology. To put the point another way, there is 
always a question of ‘location’ versus ‘elimination’ from our ontology (Jackson, 1998); 
however, at least on this picture, the fact that we find the a priori entailments they actually 
mandate the retention of such phenomena in our ontology. Just as Jackson (1998) wants to 
retain semantic properties and solidity even though they are not concepts of basement level 
physics, this argument, by itself, would not warrant elimination. Thus, I claim that even if 
someone were to develop such a reductive account of collective mental states, we would 
have no need to be troubled by these reductions. At the end of the day what really matters are 
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the counterfactual stabilities at the level of collective psychology; and no reductive story is 
going to take those away. 
 
3.8 Another reason not to worry about reduction. 
Recall that my reconstruction of Mill’s empiricist argument in favor of reduction 
takes the following form: 
1) If empiricism is true, then every psychological fact will (eventually) admit of 
reductive explanation in terms of individual psychologies; 
 
2) Reductive explanation of B-facts in terms of A-facts requires logical supervenience of 
the B-facts on the A-facts;  
 
3) But, empiricism is true; 
 
4) So, collective psychological facts admit of reductive explanation in terms of 
individual psychological facts;67 
 
5) So, collective psychological facts logically supervene on individual psychological 
facts. 
 
However, there are substantial reasons for resisting both (1) and (2). Premise (2) seems 
crazy! Getting to the point where one thinks that reductive explanation requires anything as 
strong as logical supervenience requires a whole lot of theoretical apparatus that very few 
people have been willing to adopt and against which there are very strong arguments. I’ll not 
offer the arguments here (see Lycan 2003); however, I do find them incredibly compelling 
and sufficient to suggest that such an argument need not bother us in the first place. 
However, even if this argument were supplemented with a much weaker notion of 
supervenience, there is still a lot to say about the adoption of premise (1). 
                                                 
67 This relies on a special case of (2): unless collective psychological facts logically supervene on individual 
psychological facts they won’t admit of reductive explanation in terms of individual psychological facts. 
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As I noted earlier, Millian arguments turn on the claim that we don’t perceive 
anything as a collectivity but only as aggregates of individuals. However, this point is neither 
as clear nor as intuitively obvious as it may seem. As Bloom and Kelemen (1995) have 
demonstrated, young children have the capacity to acquire a novel collective terms (i.e., 
terms referring to a group or collective entity) in a way that facilitates the use the term to 
refer to entities that have permeable physical boundaries. Although there is an overwhelming 
tendency towards the early acquisition of terms that refer to whole objects, we come to learn 
very early on that some ‘objects’ are distributed. The clearest examples of such terms refer to 
things like flocks (of birds), herds (of antelope), and bunches (of grapes). This does not, 
however, demonstrate that we are capable of immediately seeing social groups as individual 
entities. However, Bloom and Veres (1999) have argued that the same system that’s 
dedicated to theory of mind attributions for individuals can be brought on-line in order to 
drive the attribution of mental states to collectivities, and—this is the important point—such 
judgments may be able to underwrite judgments about whether a particular collectivity 
counts as a single entity or not. 
In fact, there is good reason to think that many of the judgments that underwrite a 
prejudice towards experiencing the world in terms of individuals are deeply indebted to the 
particular cultural conditions under which these judgments arise.68 Nisbet et al. (2001) review 
evidence suggesting that although Western subjects typically think in analytic terms that 
readily suggest the reduction of collective phenomena to individual phenomena, this is not a 
culturally universal tendency. East Asians, for example, tend to be more holistic in their 
analysis of human activity, often taking collectivities to be the primary locus of practical 
                                                 
 
68 The following two paragraphs draw, with substantial revision, from Huebner, Bruno, and Sarkissian (under 
review). 
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activity. Following Roger Ames (1994), we might, then, distinguish two senses of 
‘individual’. Given predominantly Western predilections, ‘individual’ is typically taken to 
refer to single, indivisible entities that come to be members of various collectivities in virtue 
of adopting some particular psychological attitude toward that collectivity.  On this 
understanding of ‘individual’, considerations of autonomy, independence, equality, privacy, 
and freedom play the key role in determining which systems are capable of practical action. 
However, ‘individual’ can also be understood as a locus or focal point within a web of social 
relations.  On this conception, ‘individual’ refers to the unique focal points of social relations 
that are both abstractions from collective structures as well as the loci of practical activity 
that collectively determine the properties of collectivities.  On such a view, individuality is 
achieved not in opposition to one’s social relationships but by way of the distinct roles that 
are occupied within a collectivity. 
That such diverse conceptions of individuals exist is further bolstered by a number of 
recent studies. Menon et al. (1999, 702) suggest that “while prevailing American theories 
hold that persons have stable properties that cause social outcomes and groups do not, the 
theories prevailing in Confucian influenced East Asian cultures emphasize that groups have 
stable properties that cause social outcomes”. Moreover, Morris, Menon, and Ames (2001) 
have provided evidence suggesting that East Asian subjects employ conceptions of agency 
that are highly social when reasoning about what gets to count as entity. Building upon this 
foundation of individualism/collectivism research, Kashima et al. (2005) investigated 
differences in the attribution of entativity by East Asian and Western subjects. They found at 
least two sorts of considerations that drive judgments of entativity: psychological 
essentialism and agency. Psychological essentialism includes both perceived internal 
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consistency (i.e. the extent to which perceptions of individuals that belong to a group are 
likely to resemble one another in appearance and behavior) and perceived unalterability (i.e, 
the belief that the properties of a collectivity aren’t changeable because it has some 
underlying essence). Kashima et al (2005) found that insofar as being a single entity is 
understood in terms of psychological essentialism, individuals are perceived to be more 
entity-like than collectivities cross-culturally.  However, when considerations of agency are 
adopted, there is significant reason to think that individuals are perceived as entities more 
often than collectivities are only under the sway of Western ideologies (Kashima et al. 2005, 
162). In other words, East Asian subjects are far more willing to attribute agency to 
collectivities than are Western subjects, and on this basis East Asian subjects are far more 
willing to class collectivities as single entities than are their Western counterparts. 
To put the point more brusquely: it’s only from a uniquely western and liberal 
standpoint that this sort of individualism makes sense. Thinking that individuals are the only 
sort of intentional systems that there are requires a peculiar act of reification of an abstract 
entity, the individual person (cf., Nietzsche 1887/1998).69 The positing of an ‘âme collective’ 
need not require the positing of a new substance that emerges above and beyond the 
individuals that compose that collectivity. That’s just to say, claiming that there must be a 
particular sort of physical substrate underlying every sort of mental act is a presupposition 
that we need not adopt. In fact, the assumption that individual, physically bounded subjects 
                                                 
69 Note that I am not making the claim here that individual human animals are abstractions from collectivities. 
Rather, my claim here is that in tracking something as an intentional system we rely on a particular sort of 
theoretical commitment to claims about which sorts of systems are capable of intentional action. I am inclined 
to think that there are very strong evolutionary pressures (e.g., seeing another critter as a mate or as a threat) 
that would militate in favor of seeing physically bounded entities as intentional actors. However, such pressures 
are likely to be significantly weaker militating in favor of seeing a collectivity as an intentional system. For this 
reason, the primary factors that are operating in this case will be social pressures that will vary across cultures 
and even across a variety of social milieu. I suggest that this gives us very strong reasons to be skeptical of our 
intuition about collective mentality—whether or intuitions are strongly individualist, strongly collectivist, or 
multileveled and layered in some way. 
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always exist as the locus of any sort of practical activity is far from intuitively obvious, 
especially once we come to realize that many of the sorts of actions about which we are 
concerned are defined functionally in a way that doesn’t allow them to be reduced 
straightforwardly or translated without loss into claims about their constituents, and this has 
been the standard criticism of this aspect of Mill’s picture for a long time. 
Maurice Mandelbaum (1955, 307), for example, argues that it’s impossible to 
understand the actions of human beings as social organisms except on the assumption that 
some “concepts which are used to refer to the forms of organization of a society cannot be 
reduced without remainder to concepts which only refer to the thoughts and actions of 
specific individuals.” In defense of his claim, Mandelbaum offers the example of making a 
withdrawal from a bank. Although there are a number of aspects of this procedure that can be 
explained in terms of individual beliefs and behaviors, there are also a number of things that 
beg for an explanation that overruns these psychological states of individuals. For example, 
part of the explanation of the procedure will probably be spelled out in terms of filling out a 
slip of paper and handing it to another person in order to get her to hand me some notes and 
some coins; however, this is far from the whole story. If we are to explain the procedure of 
making a withdrawal from a bank, we will have to make appeal to both the institution of 
banking and to the social roles that are produced within that institution. In order for 
something to count as a withdrawal it has to be a transaction that occurs between a 
‘customer’ and a ‘teller’ within the confines of a ‘bank’ or similar economic institution.  
Mandelbaum advances this as a claim about concepts, but the point of his argument 
cuts deeper. Not only is it true that we can’t engage in these sorts of conceptual reductions, 
it’s also true that we can’t make sense of the occupants of such social roles unless we posit 
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some sorts of institutional structures to which these individuals can belong. Now, while it 
might be true that there is one way to tell the story that starts from the individuals and builds 
up, it’s not at all clear that doing so doesn’t require a particular set of philosophical 
presuppositions that we’re not warranted in adopting. The problem here is that any appeal to 
particular facts about particular people will neglect the fact that there are a number of ways in 
which something can play the right functional role, as specified within the institutional 
structure of banking, that are not specifiable in a way that will facilitate the reduction of these 
terms to the psychological states of particular individuals. More importantly, this suggests 
that there are many cases in which the our experience the world is best understood in terms 
of individuals playing roles within various sorts of collective structures. What it is to be a 
bank-teller is something that can only be spelled out in terms of functional roles that make 
reference to higher-level institutions. Just as we need to make an appeal to a theory of 
combustion engines if we are to develop a theory of carburetors, we must appeal to 
institutions such as banks if we are to develop a theory of bank-tellers, and it is precisely on 
this point that Mill’s theory founders. To put the point briefly, people actually do experience 
the world as consisting of collectivities (though the extent to which they do so is, to a 
significant degree, a matter of cultural convention). 
Here’s how this bears on premise (1). Mill argues that his commitment to empiricism 
require that we perceive only individuals as cognitive systems and that we don’t perceive 
collectivities as cognitive systems. However, it is reasonable, in light of the evidence that 
I’ve adduced in this section, to think that this just isn’t the case. Bloom and Kelemen’s 
(1995) data suggests that even young children have the capacity to track collectivities as 
entities with permeable physical boundaries and Bloom and Veres’ (1999) data suggests that 
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theory of mind attributions are deployed in order to make sense of the behavior of both 
individuals and collectivities. The important thing to notice here is that so long as Mill allows 
psychological states into his empiricist ontology, he will also be forced to allow collective 
psychological states as well. After all, we don’t see psychological states. Instead, we perceive 
such states by way of a low-level, typically nonconscious inference from the behavior of a 
system to its intentional states. However, this data suggests that systems are in place in all of 
us that allow such inferences for both individuals and collectivities. 
Moreover, even if there is a tendency amongst Westerners to take ‘individual’ to refer 
to single, indivisible entities, the data collected by Menon et al. (1999, 702), Morris, Menon, 
and Ames’ (2001), and Kashima et al. (2005) suggests that the individualist frame of 
reference is the result of a cultural tradition that supposes that there must be a particular sort 
of physical substrate underlying every sort of mental act. Fortunately, this supposition is far 
from intuitively obvious, especially once we come to realize that many of the sorts of actions 
about which we are concerned are defined functionally in a way that doesn’t allow them to be 
reduced straightforwardly or translated without loss into claims about their constituents. 
Keeping these facts in mind, it seems far from obvious that a commitment to empiricism 
requires a commitment to individualism. At the end of the day, Mill’s commitment to 
empiricism is thus orthogonal to any claim about collective mentality.  
 
3.9 Superfluity arguments: a first attempt 
Mill’s intuition that collective psychological explanations are not autonomous from 
individual psychological explanations has retained a great deal of currency. In searching for a 
legitimate sociological method, Max Weber followed Mill in arguing for methodological 
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individualism in sociology. Although he acknowledges that we often treat “social 
collectivities, such as states, associations, business corporations, foundations, as if they were 
individual persons”(Weber 1914/1968, 13); however, “in sociological work these 
collectivities must be treated as solely the resultants and modes of organization of the 
particular acts of individual persons, since these alone can be treated as agents in a course of 
subjectively understandable action” (Weber 1914/1968, 13). Floyd Allport voices a similar 
sentiment at the foundation of social psychology when he claims that “there is no psychology 
of groups which is not essentially and entirely a psychology of individuals”; and given that 
this is the case, “Social psychology must not be placed in contradistinction to the psychology 
of the individual; it is a part of the psychology of the individual, whose behavior it studies in 
relation to that sector of his environment comprised by his fellows” (Allport, 1924, p. 4; cited 
in Kashima et al. 2005, 148; emphasis in original).  
Moreover, debates in mid-twentieth century philosophy of social science also 
centered on the possibility of offering reductive explanations for commonsense and scientific 
attributions of mental states to collectivities. Friedrich Hayek (1942), building on the 
arguments offered by Weber, claims: 1) that there are distinctively psychological facts that 
can’t be accounted for in physical terms, and 2) that these psychological facts about 
individuals provide the only foundation on which sociological explanation in terms of human 
practical activity can be grounded. Hayek claims, appealing to such psychological facts 
requires that all attempts at sociological explanation: 
start from what men think and mean to do, from the fact that the individuals which 
compose society are guided in their actions by a classification of things or events in a 
system of sense qualities and concepts which has a common structure and which we 
know because we, too, are men, and that the concrete knowledge which different 
individuals possess will differ in important respects (Hayek 1942, 283).  
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The question, then, is: how might this reductionist argument be spelled out in a way that 
demonstrates sensitivity to the commonsense willingness to attribute mental states to 
collectivities while developing some reason why an adequate cognitive science need not 
allow for such states? 
The important thing to notice, here, is that a strong metaphysical thesis, like logical 
supervenience, is not required in order to impugn collective mentality from the standpoint of 
cognitive science. Even if there could be collective mental states in some far off corner of the 
universe, unless there is some reason to think that collective mentality is a possibility in this 
world, in the world we experience, there is no reason to think that scientific explanations 
ought ever to be couched in terms of collective mentality. Thus, the most troubling sort of 
argument I now face is the argument that there is no good reason to think that we’ll find 
collective psychological phenomena in our world. If the explanatory structures that I’ve been 
attempting to develop thus far are not useful for the cognitive sciences, I might as well throw 
in the towel. And unfortunately, there are a number of cases in which one might initially 
think that collective mentality is the way to go, but in the end, it isn’t going to be 
explanatorily useful in the cognitive sciences 
In line with this sort of worry, Robert Wilson (2001 and 2005) has offered one of the 
most compelling arguments against collective mentality. Wilson argues that the proponent of 
collective mentality must show that some collectivities exhibit at least one paradigmatically 
psychological ability or process (though it’s likely that if a system exhibits one such state it 
will also exhibit more). Wilson (2001, S266) also notes that although a clear definition of 
‘psychological’ is unlikely to be forthcoming; however, he believes that we have a good idea 
what the paradigmatic cases of psychological states are. These include perception, memory, 
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imagination, attention, motivation, consciousness, problem solving, believing, desiring, 
intending, trying, fearing, willing, and hoping. Wilson claims that if we find some 
collectivities that possess some of these states, then we will have good reason to suppose that 
there are collective mental states. Wilson, however, believes that we will find no cases in 
which any of these mental states should be ascribed to collectivities once we are clear about 
the details of the psychologies of the individuals that compose a collectivity. 
Wilson begins by noting that psychological and biological scientists often ascribe 
mental states in a merely figurative sense. This means that we need to be careful not to treat 
ascriptions as literally true unless we have a good reason to suppose that the phenomena in 
question are best understood as states of the collectivities rather than states of individuals. 
Wilson argues that our ascription of mentality to collectivities can be interpreted in two 
ways. First, we might mean that there are properties of collectivities (in this case, mental 
states) that are not merely properties of the individual members of that collectivity. These 
traits will, of course, be multi-level traits.70 However, for any claim about the mental states of 
a collectivity to be theoretically interesting, the proponent of collective mental states has to 
hold that these states are something beyond the states of the individuals that compose the 
collectivity (Wilson 2001, S265). Second, that ascriptions of collective mentality could be 
understood as claims about individual psychological states that are exhibited only when 
individuals are part of a collectivity. Wilson (2004b, 418) calls the latter position the social 
manifestation hypothesis (SMH).  
                                                 
70 By multi-level traits, Wilson intends to pick out those traits that can be possessed both by the collectivity and 
by the individual organism. According to the most promising articulation of the collective mentality hypothesis, 
collectivities will have mental states like beliefs, desires, intentions, perceptions, and the like which are of the 
same sort as the mental states of individuals. 
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SMH is, at minimum, the claim that some psychological states are manifested only 
when individuals are embedded in a social group. SMH also, however, allows for an 
inference from these conditions for the manifestation of these properties to the claim that 
individual psychological states are all that exist, psychologically speaking. Wilson (2004b, 
418) claims that SMH allows us to both recognizes that social situation and cognition are 
linked “in more than an instrumental way or as cause to effect”, as well as allowing us to 
posit “cognition itself as irreducibly social, and so not as supervenient on the intrinsic 
properties of individuals”. SMH is, thus, capable of capturing many of the intuitions that 
have typically underwritten appeals to collective mentality. After all, on this view there 
actually are cognitive phenomena that “arise themselves as social abilities, as ways of 
negotiating aspects of the social world” (Wilson 2004b, 418). Wilson, thus, dodges all of the 
arguments against reductive accounts of collective psychology that I have addressed so far. 
Although he claims that cognitive phenomena will always be explainable in terms of the 
psychological states of individuals, Wilson also recognizes that there will be numerous 
phenomena for which we need to appeal to the particular social structures in which a person 
is embedded in offering psychological explanations. However, in retaining a commitment to 
methodological individualism, Wilson also acknowledges that we arrive at rock-bottom 
explanations of psychological phenomena only when we have an adequate account of the 
psychological states of individuals—as they are embedded in particular social structures—
that give rise to these collective phenomena. There is, then, a new range of phenomena that is 
left to be explained when we turn to the social world in which individuals find themselves. 
It’s just that this social world is best explained in terms of the psychological states of 
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individuals, rules for their aggregation, and facts about the social constraints on individual 
action. 
In developing a defense of SMH, Wilson argues that the phenomena to which 
proponents of collective mentality have typically appealed are best understood as cases of 
SMH rather than as cases of genuine collective mentality. Wilson persuasively argues (see 
Wilson 2004a, Chapter 11) that the collective psychology tradition of the late 19th and early 
20th century failed to distinguish genuine collective mentality from SMH, and because of 
this, their claims about collective mentality typically rested on the claim about shifts in 
individual psychology rather than on appeals to genuinely collective cognitive phenomena. 
Gustav Le Bon (1895/2002), for example, argued that when individuals constitute a crowd, 
they become unconscious automata under the sway of a sort of hypnosis—prey to the 
suggestions of a collective mind over which they have no control.71 Le Bon claims that in 
crowds, sentiments escalate, becoming the sole determinants of the behavior of the 
individuals that constitute the crowd and that the individuals that compose the crowd become 
unresponsive to reason and evidence, and they will follow any leader charismatic enough to 
direct the sentiments of the crowd. To put the point briefly: 
 
“[t]he fact that they have been transformed into a crowd puts them in possession of a 
sort of collective mind which makes them feel, think, and act in a manner quite 
different from that in which each individual of them would feel, think, and act were 
he in a state of isolation” (Le Bon 1895/2002, 4).  
 
However, mere appeals to changes in the psychological states of the individuals that compose 
a collectivity will not, themselves, be sufficient to ground any claim about collective 
                                                 
71 As Le Bon puts the point: “An individual in a crowd is a grain of sand amid other grains of sand, which the 
wind stirs up at will” (Le Bon 1895/2002, 8) 
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mentality. And, at the end of the day, Le Bon actually argued that the explanation of crowd 
behavior would be best spelled out in terms of the dormant, savage desires in every human 
being that were left over from ‘primitive ages’ (Le Bon 1895/2002, 27). 
Turning to a contemporary defense of collective mentality, Wilson (2001 and 2004) 
also demonstrates that the ascription of collective mentality is once again better understood 
in terms of SMH rather than as an appeal to genuinely collective mental states. David Sloan 
Wilson has attempted to argue that the capacity for collective decision-making is evidence 
for the existence of collective mental states. However, collective decision-making, by voting, 
for example, looks to be just another case of a change in the sorts of states that individuals 
can exhibit because of the social situations in which they are embedded. Wilson claims that 
“even if the decision here is viewed as distinct from those of the individual voters—if there is 
a group mind here it is nothing over and above the minds of the individuals” (Wilson 2001, 
S269). Likewise, D.S. Wilson’s arguments that religion is a group-level trait only makes 
sense as a claim about the ways in which individual psychologies are made possible partially 
determined by the collectivities to which they belong. At the end of the day, the propagation 
and practice of religious norms is contingent on the psychological states of the individuals 
who belong to some religious movement or other.  
In the end, Wilson claims that the appeal to collective mentality is superfluous 
because there are no explanations of apparently collective phenomena that are not better 
understood as appeals to the ways in which individual psychology changes when individuals 
find themselves in groups. Although this is not a knock-down argument against collective 
mentality, it does suggest that the explanatory value of collective mentality is null unless 
there is some reason to suppose that there are states of the collectivity that aren’t just states of 
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the individuals that compose a collectivity. The question is: what would it take for there to be 
emergent cognitive states of collectivities that were interestingly distinct from the cognitive 
states of the individuals that compose that collectivity. 
 
3.10. Two sorts of emergent cognitive phenomena:  
I concede that most defenses of collective mentality fail to distinguish between a 
defense of collective mentality and SMH. However, there are tools for distinguishing 
between the two sorts of collective states in a way that makes the defense of collective 
mentality stronger as well as distinguishes between genuinely cognitive collective 
phenomena and phenomena that ought to be understood as only figuratively or derivatively 
cognitive. Let’s start with an example. 
A relatively common case in which one might ascribe a mental state to a collectivity 
might take the form “The Dixiecrats believe that the South will rise again”. In this case, 
although it may be true of many people who identify as Dixiecrats that they believe the South 
will rise again, and although it may be true that there is a platform advanced by this splinter 
wing of the American Democratic Party that constrains the members of the Dixiecrat Party to 
make claims about how the South will rise again (on the heels of racist practices), it doesn’t 
seem as though we gain any explanatory advantage by ascribing a belief to the Dixiecrat 
party rather than ascribing that belief to each of the members of that party. A Martian 
psychologist who knew of all the psychological states of the individuals that compose the 
Dixiecrat party, and who knew all of the relevant rules of behavior for remaining a member 
of the Dixiecrat party, wouldn’t be missing out on anything explanatorily interesting if she 
failed to make a claim about the psychology of the Dixiecrat party per se. While there may 
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be reasons such as relative ease of prediction, or epistemic limitations of human agents, that 
might lead us to attribute such states to collectivities, this is not enough to compel us to think 
that there are interesting mental states of the Dixiecrat party—at least not in this case. 
At least part of what has gone wrong in this case is precisely what went wrong in the 
study of the collective psychology tradition of the late 19th century. Briefly, starting with 
crowd behavior as a paradigmatic case of collective cognition was a mistake! Wilson is right 
to note that crowd behavior is better understood by way of the SMH. It is clearly true that an 
individual cannot riot by herself. She can set things on fire, throw bricks through a window, 
and even attempt to turn a car over. But she will not be rioting unless she finds engages in 
these behaviors under the right social circumstance. Le Bon correctly note that when people 
find themselves in a riot they see things as reasonable that they wouldn’t otherwise, their 
emotions change, and they become less responsive to reason. However, all of this can be 
explained in terms of the psychological states of the individuals as well as rules for the 
aggregation of their behavior. 
This points us to an important sort of lesson. The presence of self-organizing behavior 
in a collectivity is never sufficient, by itself, to demonstrate the existence of collective mental 
states. In fact, the presence of self-organizing systems bolsters Mill’s intuition that there are 
laws of aggregation for social phenomena that take away the mystery of collective behavior. 
Perhaps the most widely known case of emergent collective behavior on the basis of simple 
facts about the individuals that compose a collectivity is the segregation phenomena studied 
by Thomas Schelling (1971). Here’s one way of telling the story. Suppose that we have an 
equal number of philosophers and neuroscientists in a room who are distributed randomly. 
Now suppose that these people have to find comfortable situations for conversation, and 
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suppose that although each of the philosophers is willing to converse with neuroscientists 
(and vice versa) no philosopher wants to end up in a conversation where more than 50% of 
her conversation partners are neuroscientists (and vice versa). Schelling (1971) demonstrates 
that starting from these individual psychological states, using random movements of 
individuals, an eventual state of the collectivity exhibiting between 75-90% segregation is 
likely to occur. Although each of the individuals is willing to integrate, the collectivity will 
end up segregated. The interesting thing about these phenomena is that although they 
demonstrate that there are interesting states of the group that emerge out of the individual 
beliefs and simple algorithms for movement within the constraints of the group, these 
emergent collective phenomena, that are quite interesting in their own right, do not lead us to 
posit anything interestingly cognitive at the level of the collectivity. If we were to assume 
that statistical trends within a collectivity are sufficient for collective mentality, we would 
just be falling prey to another failing of the 19th century tradition of collective psychology. 
In attempting to make sense of which phenomena are genuinely cognitive, it helps to 
recognize that there are at least two ways in which higher-level phenomena can emerge out 
of lower-level phenomena. Following Andy Clark (1997, 73ff), I distinguish between direct 
emergence and indirect emergence. Direct emergence is grounded on the properties of 
individual elements of a system coupled with rules for composition. In cases where we find 
direct emergence, the state of a collectivity, even where it diverges from the states of the 
individuals that compose that collectivity, is determined by the state of the individuals and 
rules for aggregating these individual behaviors. Note that this model of emergence allows us 
to retain the intuition advanced by Wilson in the guise SMH by noting that the psychological 
states of the individuals that compose the collectivity are quite often contingent on the sort of 
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collectivity to which that individual belongs. However, in this case there are no interesting 
feedback relations between the collectivity and the environment. To put the point bluntly: if 
you want to stop a riot, you attack individuals with riot cans of mace, teargas, and 
nightsticks—and that’s because the state of the riot is just an aggregation of the states of 
individuals.  
Indirect emergence, however, requires that the individual systems involved in the 
production of collective phenomena use various aspects of the environment in order to 
coordinate unified, genuinely collective behavior. Clark uses the example of the nest-
building behavior of termites, which is causally mediated by the modification of local 
environments with chemical trace intended to coordinate the goals of the termites as a whole. 
Now, while I’m not at all sure that we should take the termite mound to count as a single 
cognitive system (though that is, of course, an open and empirical question at the end of the 
day), there is a quite important lesson to learn about collective cognition at this point. The 
point that I want to take from Clark (1997) is that cognitive systems, including collective 
cognitive systems must be systems that traffic in internal representations of some sort. The 
stimergetic algorithms used by the termites is one sort of representational structure, however, 
it’s not the only one. Fodor’s LOT is another—but this is not the only option for thought. I 
claim that if we are to take a system to be a genuinely cognitive system, then it must be the 
case that that we will be able to develop some sort of analogue to a psychosemantics for that 
system in order to explain how it is that genuinely mental representations are passed between 
the subsystems within a collectivity.72 To put this point another way, if we are going to 
attribute genuinely cognitive states to a collectivity, it will have to be the case that there is 
                                                 
72 There is, of course, a lot to say about this as a genuine possibility. In fact, the most troubling argument 
against collective mentality is that it won’t be possible to give an adequate psychosemantics for a collectivity. 
But, that’s a topic for Chapter 4. 
 123 
some story to be told about how the intentionally specified behavior of a collectivity is to be 
understood in terms of the contribution that each of the parts make—as parts of that 
system—to the furthering of the goal in question. This leads me to my final remark about 
what we should learn from Wilson’s picture of collective phenomena in terms of SMH.  
To begin with, consider an analog to the Laplacean Martians that troubled Dennett 
(1987a, 1991b). Suppose that there were creatures that didn’t have to appeal to anything over 
and above individuals but that could survey a particular aggregation of individuals and 
determine the psychological state of every member of that aggregate. My contention is that 
even if there were such people, they would be missing something perfectly objective in the 
patterns of collective behavior, behavior that is only describable by way of the attribution of 
mental states to collectivities. Dennett (1987a, 1991b) claims that if his Martians did not see 
that there were indefinitely many physical realizers that could be substituted for the ones that 
give rise to fluctuations in stock prices without perturbing the subsequent operations of the 
market), they will have failed to see a real pattern in the world. I claim, analogously, that if 
there were cognitive scientists who could predict what press release would be produced by a 
corporation just by appeal to individual psychological states, they would be missing a real 
pattern in the world if they failed to realize that this output could be the result of indefinitely 
many psychological states of the individuals that compose that corporation. 
Predicting that a corporation will be secretive about its plan to release a new product 
that will revolutionize the field is easy from the standpoint of commonsense psychology. 
Moreover, to suppose that there must be some particular realizer (e.g., a certain sort of 
neurological machinery or even a system that is physically bounded) or structural just seems 
silly. The most promising explanatory project, both at the individual level and at the 
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collective level, is likely to turn on regularities such as the passing of representations from 
one system to another in a way that’s capable of sustaining commonsense psychological 
regularities. However, to suppose that we need to go all the way to the individual level to 
explain the apparently cognitive properties of collectivities seems an unwarranted 
presupposition. Commonsense psychology is not committed to any theory about realization 
of mental states. Even if commonsense psychology has it that beliefs are information bearing 
states that arise from perceptions (or something quasi-perceptual) and that, together with 
appropriately related desires, lead to intelligent action, there will always be further questions 
as to which critters have beliefs. Unfortunately, there are further arguments waiting in the 
wings to explain why it is that collectivities cannot have genuinely cognitive states. 
 
3.11 Superfluity arguments: a second attempt 
I close this chapter by looking quickly to the range of phenomena that many people 
have taken to be the most promising avenue for the ascription of genuinely cognitive states to 
collectivities: formally organized institutional structures. At first blush, these systems seem 
to be the most likely place to find the sorts of regularities to which I have just appealed. The 
reason for this is that such systems are set up in such a way that the parts are capable of 
working together in a genuinely coordinated way in order to produce some intentionally 
specified behavior. However, focusing on formally organized institutional systems such as 
labor unions, courts, and corporations, Robert Rupert (2005) contends that there is nothing in 
such collectivities that should we should be willing to countenance as genuinely mental 
states. Rupert argues that: 
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It seems explanatorily unnecessary to equate these physical formulations with 
autonomous cognitive states. After all, every step in the construction of such 
representations, as well as every step in the causal sequence alleged to involve the 
effects of those representations, proceeds either by brute physical causation (e.g., 
photons emitted from the surface of the page stimulate the reader’s retinal cells) or by 
causal processes involving the mental states of individuals (Rupert 2005, 5ms). 
 
Rupert’s argument is an attempt to demonstrate that because the semantic properties of such 
purportedly collective representations diverge from the psychosemantics of mental 
representations, the positing of such representations as genuinely mental will cut no 
explanatory ice.  
There is, of course, an easy and immediate response to this argument—and, strangely 
enough, it’s a response that Rupert (2005, 7ms) himself considers and quickly dismisses. The 
response runs as follows. Anyone who adopts some version of physicalism about the mind 
will say that something analogous holds for individual cognition. Every process involved in 
the production of an individual representational state proceeds either by brute physical 
causation or by some other causal processes. Without a story explaining why the realization 
of collective mental states on physical processes is problematic in a way that doesn’t prove to 
be problematic for the realization of individual mental states on physical processes, this 
argument seems to have incredibly untoward consequences. Without some story about the 
difference in the import of the realization relations for collective and individual 
representations, any attempt to deny collective representation on this basis will also be 
sufficient reason to deny the possibility of individual representation. Presumably, denying the 
possibility of individual mental representations is not something that Rupert would be too 
happy about.73 
                                                 
73 In conversation, Rob Rupert has told me that if the cards do fall this way, he is willing to concede that the 
elimination of mental states is a live option. Rupert believes that he has an account of the semantic properties of 
 126 
Rupert (2005, 7ms) sees that someone might offer this response to his argument and 
he responds in kind by claiming that “the two cases differ greatly with respect to our 
understanding of what are sometimes called ‘inter-level relations’.” In defense of this claim, 
Rupert argues that we have little idea how to explain the reduction relationship between 
psychological regularities and neurological regularities, however, we have a rather clear 
understanding of the relationship between the representations that collectivities seem to 
traffic in (e.g., press release and written opinions of a court) and the mental and physical 
states that underwrite them. But Rupert needs to say more here. 
His argument runs as follows. Naturalistic theories of mental representation typically 
rely on nomic relations between perceptual (or quasi-perceptual) processes and properties of 
things in the world. Such relations are supposed to explain how neurological states indicate 
or carry information about properties of things in the world. However, the states of 
collectivities (understood as such rather than as states of individuals) don’t seem to indicate 
or carry information about anything (except as mediated through person-level 
representations). While the content of person-level representations is specified in terms of 
nomic relations between perceptual or otherwise information bearing states of individuals 
and properties of things in the world, the content of public-language structures are specified 
in terms of the person-level representations required for their production and interpretation. 
However, if a collectivity exhibits apparently cognitive activity that is reducible to “the 
cognitive states of individuals (including their construction of rules for combining individual 
activity in a principled way)” (Rupert, personal correspondence), positing collective 
mentality seems superfluous. The content of these public-language structures is reducible to 
                                                                                                                                                       
mental states that will apply to individuals and not to collectivities. I’m not sold on his response; however, I 
leave the discussion of the possibility of collective representation for the next two chapters.  
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the content of individual representational states (including their construction of rules for 
combining individual representations in a principled way), so claiming that they are 
genuinely collective representations seems explanatorily superfluous. Fortunately there are 
problems with this explanatory superfluity argument.  
To begin with, naturalistic theories of mental representation require that every process 
involved in the production of any mental representation proceed by some causal or otherwise 
physical processes. So, unless there are unique difficulties in positing collective 
representations, this argument has the untoward consequence that any denial of collective 
representation on the basis of explanatory superfluity will double as an argument for the 
denial of individual representation. But unless the denial of individual representation is on 
the table as a viable option, something must have gone wrong. 
Perhaps there are difficulties raised by the realization of collective representations on 
causal processes involving the mental states of others that are importantly distinct from 
worries about the realization of individual representations. As Robert Rupert puts the point, 
the reduction of individual representations and collective representations differs with regard 
to our understanding of ‘inter-level relations’. While we have little idea how to reduce 
psychological regularities to neurological regularities, we have a clear understanding of how 
to reduce collective representations to the mental and physical states that underwrite them—
even if this should prove to be a difficult task. 
But this suggests that the current status of our scientific knowledge is all that prevents 
us from eliminating individual representations. In analyzing collective representations, we 
know how to look for the individual representations involved in the production and 
interpretation of collective representations. However, even our best neuroscience isn’t 
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developed enough to identify the physical states on which any individual representation is 
realized. However, it’s not clear that this is a difference that makes a difference. As our 
understanding of neurophysiology and its relation to other physical explanations becomes 
more refined, there’s reason to suppose that a coherent story about the realization of 
individual representations on physical states could become apparent. However, if all we need 
is a clear understanding of how to reduce individual representations to the physical states on 
which they are realized, the explanation of all behavior will eventually be specifiable in 
purely physical terms. When this happens, individual representations will become just as 
superfluous as their collective counterparts—and this result seems fairly unpalatable. 
But, I’ve moved too quickly, there’s a deeper problem here. While individual 
representations are realized on physical processes, collective representations are realized on 
individual representational states. Nothing new in kind is introduced in moving from 
individual representations to collective representations, the relevant states all have semantic 
content. However, in moving from the physical to the intentional, something new in kind is 
introduced. Mental representations have semantic content, the physical states on which 
they’re realized don’t. The crossing of explanatory levels is significant in the case of 
individual mental representations precisely because intentional states have semantic content. 
So, individual representations can’t be made superfluous by scientific discovery—we need 
them to explain semantically evaluable states of the world. However, every theory of 
individual representation allows for an explanation of how to move from individual 
representations to other sorts of derivative representations—even by way of rules of 
aggregation—all from within the realm of intentional explanations. It’s this possibility that 
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underwrites the most serious argument for the superfluity of collective mental 
representation—and it’s this possibility to which I turn in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER IV: 
COLLECTIVE REPRESENTATION? 
At the end of the 18th century, Wolfgang von Kempelen constructed a chess-playing 
automaton that he called The Turk. The Turk consisted of human-sized mannequin (with a 
black beard, gray eyes, Turkish robes and a turban) and a large wooden cabinet housing an 
incredibly complex set of gears that operated this mannequin. In order to show that the 
system was completely mechanical, the cabinet doors could be opened, revealing a complex 
mechanical structure in such a way that you could look straight through the machine. Now, 
despite being a completely mechanical structure, The Turk was a pretty good chess player—
though it did lose some games. It played and won numerous matches against proficient chess 
players; it even beat Napoleon Bonaparte and Benjamin Franklin. But The Turk was no Deep 
Blue. The clockwork mechanisms housed inside the cabinet didn’t produce the moves on the 
chessboard. Instead, a person hidden inside the machine operated these mechanisms. The 
Turk was a complex hoax designed to appear to all inspection to be an automata, but it was 
nothing but a tool to be used by a person hiding inside the cabinet. 
In The Turk, we find a system that (at least on initial inspection) was behaviorally 
indistinguishable from a chess player. However, the states of the Turk that appear to be 
psychological states were, one and all, derived from the psychological states of the individual 
inside the machine. The machine itself had no mental states. The individual inside the Turk 
had mental states and that individual’s intentions fully determined the behavior of the system. 
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Now, unless we include both the person who is operating the clockwork and the clockwork 
itself as part of a single cognitive system, it seems unreasonable to say that The Turk has 
mental states. The task of this chapter is to figure out what distinguishes apparently cognitive 
systems from genuinely cognitive systems. 
 
4.1 Intentionality as the mark of the Mental 
Perhaps the right way to approach this question is by determining what feature of a 
system marks it as a cognitive system.74 According to many philosophers these days, a 
plausible mark of the mental is intentionality. Mental states are purportedly internal states of 
a system that are meaningful because of their intrinsic representational or contentful 
structure. I agree that it’s at least a minimal condition on a state counting as a mental state 
that it is about something, that it is able to represent the world as being some way or another, 
or that it refers to something.75  I have beliefs that are about the taste of my coffee, they 
represent my coffee as being delicious, and they refer to my cup of coffee. However, my cup 
of coffee is not about anything. It’s just a cup of coffee! 
However, as Dennett (1978a, 1987a) puts the point, commonsense ascriptions of 
intentionality are a motley assortment of genuine intentional attributions, metaphors, façons 
de parler, and countless varieties of clearly dubious intentional attributions. Commonsense 
                                                 
74 Some philosophers (e.g., D. Rosenthal 1986; Block 1986, 1995) have argued that there are different marks for 
different sorts of mental states. You might think, for example, that things like beliefs and desires are mental 
insofar as they exhibit intentionality, but that qualitative states are mental only insofar as they exhibit 
phenomenal character. I don’t want to get into these debates here. So, while I find representationalism (cf., 
Lycan 1987, 1996; Tye 1997) about qualitative character compelling, If you’re unwilling to accept that 
qualitative states are intentional, you can feel free to take the subsequent discussion to be only about those states 
that lack qualitative character. 
 
75 I agree with Lycan and Tye that all of our mental states are representational—even states that refer to the 
whole person like elation and depression. With these sorts of states, the representations just represent the whole 
world as being a particular way rather than representing some feature of the world as being that way. I’ll not go 
into the arguments for this position here, but cf., Lycan 2001. 
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psychology uses ascribes intentionality in describing systems even where we immediately 
recognize that the system doesn’t have cognitive states. We talk as though a computer could 
try to prevent me from finishing my thesis even though it doesn’t have any states that are 
directed at me at all. We also talk as-if vehicles think that it’s too cold outside, or as-if the 
trees believe that it’s spring. Keeping this in mind, it is necessary to distinguish between 
genuine intentionality and as-if intentionality; that is, we need an account of intentionality 
that distinguishes between cases where a system actually has representational capacities and 
cases where we merely speak as-if it has these capabilities. But, even this isn’t enough. 
Some representations are not representational in the right way to count as mental 
states. Kalitozov’s Ya Kuba represents Batista Cuba and both Pontecorvo’s La Battaglia di 
Algeri and Fanon’s Wretched of the earth contain representations of the bloodiest revolution 
in contemporary history, but films and books do not represent things in the same way that 
mental states do. Thus, a distinction is typically drawn between derived intentional content 
(i.e., intentional content that is assigned by and is dependent on the contentful states of 
another system) and the underived intentional content of genuinely cognitive states (i.e., 
intentional content that arises from conditions that are themselves free of intentional content). 
Keeping this distinction in mind, a rich tradition in the philosophy of mind and psychology 
has suggested that mental states can be picked out as the only sorts of states that have 
underived intentionality.76  
                                                 
76 Dennett (1990) has argued that there is no such thing as underived intentional content. He claims that it’s 
interpretation all the way down. On this view of content, mental states of collectivities come far too easily. For 
Dennett, so long as we need to adopt the intentional stance in order to interpret and explain the behavior of a 
collectivity, we would be warranted in taking it to have contentful states. Now, although taking this option is 
tempting and would make my life much easier, the case for collective mentality shouldn’t come so easily—it 
seems to strange to too many people to rest on so feeble a foundation. 
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At the foundations of this tradition, Franz Brentano argued that all mental states, and 
indeed only mental states, exhibit the capacity for being directed upon an object in an 
unmediated way.77 Moreover, Brentano argues,  
intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No 
physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can, therefore, define mental 
phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object 
intentionally within themselves. (Brentano 1995, 89) 
 
Following Brentano, Roderick Chisholm (1957) argues that an intentional state neither 
implies nor denies the existence of the object that it represents.78 Chisholm argues that the 
capacity for exhibiting intentional inexistence plays the prominent role in psychological 
explanation. We explain the behavior of intentional systems in terms of the intentional 
content of their representations; and because these explanations are intentional, they take on a 
very different character than run-of-the-mill physical explanations. Psychological 
explanations need to be spelled out in terms that acknowledge these states opacity—or to put 
the point another way, psychological generalizations exhibit failures of substitution of 
identicals.79  
                                                 
77 Brentano puts the point as follows: “Every mental phenomenon is characterised by what the Scholastics of 
the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not 
wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here 
as meaning a thing) or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within 
itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation, something is presented, in judgement 
something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. (Brentano 1874/1995, 
88)  
 
78 Thus, Diogenes the Cynic carried around a lantern searching for an honest man—and he was able to do so 
even thought there were no honest men for him to find. Moreover, Ponce de Leon searched for the Fountain of 
Youth even though it doesn’t exist. The reason that this is possible is that the beliefs and desires that underwrite 
these intentional states have the same content whether they represent some feature of the world, misrepresent 
that feature of the world, or represent something that doesn’t exist. 
 
79 In offering a psychological explanation of Susanne’s recent purchase of Willie Nelson CDs, we advert to her 
belief that Willie Nelson is a great songwriter. In offering such a psychological explanation we ascribe to her a 
representation with the intentional content Willie Nelson (i.e., a representation that is directed at, or refers to 
Willie Nelson). However, the important thing to notice is that she does not thereby possess all possible 
representations that are directed at, or refer to Willie Nelson. After all, unless she has been obsessing about 
Willie Nelson lately, or unless she has been doing research on country music for a thesis, she probably doesn’t 
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To put the point succinctly, things other than mental states can be intentional; 
however, things other than mental states can only have derived intentionality. Granny can 
have intentional states, particularly beliefs about the three ‘Xs’ and the ‘skull-and-
crossbones’ that she’s printed on the labels for the moonshine she’s been distilling this 
month, but the three ‘Xs’ and the ‘skull-and-crossbones’ only get their meaning (perhaps that 
this is some potent moonshine that’ll go down rough but be good for your dime) by way of 
what Granny (or a suitably situated interpreter) takes them to mean. But the question is: what 
does all of this mean for collective mentality? 
 
4.2 Weber’s objection to collective mentality: 
At the end of the 19th century, Emile Durkheim argued by way of a methodology of 
functional analysis that there were irreducibly collective representations that would remain 
stable across variations in the individuals composing a collectivity.80 Durkheim claimed that 
collective representations consisted “of manners of acting, thinking, and feeling external to 
the individual, which are invested with a coercive power by virtue of which they exercise 
                                                                                                                                                       
have the belief that THE PERSON WHO WON THE GRAMMY FOR THE BEST MALE COUNTRY 
VOCAL PERFORMANCE IN 1975 IS A GREAT SONGWRITER. Whereas facts about her WILLIE 
NELSON beliefs can explain her purchase of Willie Nelson CDs, facts about her PERSON WHO WON THE 
GRAMMY FOR THE BEST MALE COUNTRY VOCAL PERFORMANCE IN 1975 beliefs are explanatorily 
impotent. She doesn’t have any such belief; so appealing to such a representation is completely misguided 
insofar as psychological explanation is concerned. Though such dubious attributions are hard to detect, 
appealing to a representation that Susanne doesn’t possess is just as problematic as attributing to the trees the 
belief that it is spring on the basis of the appearance of blossoms in early January. Things are, however, quite 
different with physical explanation. If Susanne gets aggravated and throws a beer bottle at Willie Nelson, she 
thereby throws a beer bottle at the person who won the Grammy for the Best Male Country Vocal Performance 
in 1975—regardless of what she knows about the person at whom she’s throwing the beer bottle.   
 
80 Consider the analogy with functional biology. As a quick look through the phylogenetic tree shows, there are 
many ways to build a wing (genetically speaking). But, for many purposes, the underlying genetic properties of 
each of the particular sorts wings are practically irrelevant. If we want to do functional biology, we look to the 
generalizations we can make on the basis of the functional properties of being a wing. For example, if a critter 
has wings it will, ceteris paribus, have the capacity to fly. Moreover, if something is a wing, it will probably act 
as a cooling system for the critter in question—but that’s another point for another thesis. 
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control over him” (Durkheim 1895/1982, 52). With these representations in mind, he 
suggested that sociological analysis should focus on the collection of data about the 
prominent habits, legal and moral rules, popular sayings, and facts about social structure for 
various groups (Durkheim 1895/1982, 82); however, he realized that there are serious 
difficulties with collecting such data. After all, if you start with the observation of 
individuals, you find heterogeneity in the subjective interpretation of rules as well as 
heterogeneity in behavior. Fortunately, however, the emerging science of statistics provided 
Durkheim the tools he needed to analyze collective behavior.  
Durkheim found historical trends in some collective behaviors that appeared to 
underwrite statistical regularities over birth rates, marriage trends, and suicide rates 
(Durkheim 1895/1982, 55). He took these statistical regularities to indicate social facts about 
the mental health of collectivities: higher suicide rates and lower birth rates in France as 
compared to England suggested that France was more depressed than England. Durkheim 
then noted that the statistical regularities he was finding were capable of withstanding 
numerous changes in the members of these collectivities. Even though people die, emigrate, 
immigrate, etc., the relevant statistical regularities remain relatively stable, Durkheim 
claimed that this was, at least in part, a result of the fact that when happy people from 
England and Germany move to France, they are constrained by the statistical regularities 
over birth rates, marriage trends, and suicide rates. If they were not, there should be wide 
fluctuations in statistical trends, and there are not. However, Durkheim himself recognized 
that the methodology of statistical analysis implied “no metaphysical conception, no 
speculation about the innermost depths of being” (Durkheim 1895/1982, 37). Statistical 
analysis merely tracks instrumentally useful claims about collective mental states, and it is on 
 136 
this point that problems begin to arise. If Durkheim is right, then there may be collective 
psychological regularities; but these might not be enough to yield genuine collective 
mentality.  
On one understanding, the task of psychology is the collection of descriptive data 
about the overt and covert behavioral dispositions of psychological systems, the 
systematization of this data, and finally the predictions and explanations of the behavior of 
psychological systems on the basis of this data. This view of psychology is, and I don’t 
intend to use the term derisively, a behaviorist project; as a behaviorist project, psychology is 
not in the business of explaining the cognitive mechanisms that produce behavior.81 The 
proposal that psychology should not attempt to explain the mechanisms that give rise to 
behavior seems to modern eyes to be a radically misguided project. Behaviorist psychology 
is useful for making predictions about a wide range of behaviors in humans and other 
animals; however, there is more to say about mentality—both the mentality of individuals 
and the mentality of collectivities.  
The failings of the behaviorist project have lead contemporary psychologists and 
cognitive scientists to adopt a different sort of explanatory project.82 We’ve come to realize 
that even the most mundane behavioral dispositions rest on attributions of intentional states. 
As Dennett (1978ba) notes, we’ve got reason to believe that even the mouse in the Skinner 
box has the desire for the food and the belief that if she pushes the bar she’ll get the food. 
                                                 
81 Unless, of course, you’re inclined to think (cf., Skinner’s radical behaviorism) that cognitive concepts are 
short hand for complicated behavioral analyses or something of the sort. One could go this way, but I see little 
reason to go in for either analyticities or behaviorism.  
 
82 Perhaps the most damning criticism of behaviorism was offered by Noam Chomsky (1959) in his review of 
Skinner’s Verbal behavior. Chomsky argued that young children’s verbal behavior is always underdetermined 
by the stimuli that they encounter prior to the lexical explosion that occurs between the ages of two and four. 
Chomsky claimed that without positing some sorts of internal representations, linguistic competence that 
outstrips linguistic performance would be inexplicable. 
 
 137 
The mouse’s overt behavior seems to be good (in fact, the best) evidence for the presence of 
such states, but these states don’t seem to be identical to the behaviors. Moreover, numerous 
organisms utilize internal representations of various sorts and of various degrees of 
complexity in order to model non-present situations. Human organisms, for example, have 
the capacity to make choices on the basis of internal models of what’s likely to happen if 
they make that choice. Perhaps more importantly, I can engage in revolutionary action on the 
basis of my representation of my society as founded on corrupt political principles. I can also 
consider the possibility of a genuinely democratic society. But, neither of these seems to be 
easily accounted for within the behaviorist project (though some fancy footwork might be 
suggested in defense of behaviorism). To put the point bluntly, hardly anyone wants to be a 
behaviorist these days, and I don’t either. 
I assume that everyone concerned with my project will be willing to accept the claim 
that individuals can be in at least some representational states that are not captured by the 
behaviorist project. On this assumption, the explanatory project that must be adopted by the 
psychological sciences has to be radically different from this a project of the behaviorist sort. 
On a cognitivist theory of mental states, the goal of psychology is to offer an explanation of 
the underlying causal mechanisms that produce behavior rather than merely cataloging a 
system’s behavior. This project, however, opens up a series of questions about what sorts of 
mechanisms could possibly be in place to generate genuine cognitive processes. Durkheim’s 
methods failed to give him any account of the mechanisms that give rise to genuinely 
intentional actions in collectivities—and it is on this point that Max Weber mounted his 
attack on Durkheim’s collective psychology. 
In Economy and society, Weber argues that the Durkheimian approach to social 
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science rests content with descriptive analyses of human behavior when it should be an 
attempt to provide an “interpretive understanding of social action and thereby with a causal 
explanation of its course and consequences” (Weber 1914/1968, 4). His arguments are 
grounded on a verstehen model for the methodology of the social sciences.83 According to 
this model, we form an understanding of an action by ascribing to an agent the internal states 
that would make her behavior rational.84 Weber argues that understanding subjective 
meaning only comes about in two ways. In some cases, we directly observe the agent’s 
subjective meaning by attending to her linguistic behavior (cf., Weber 1914/1968, 8). As 
Elizabeth Anscombe (1957, 18) puts the point, the mental cause of an action is “what 
someone would describe if he were asked the particular question: what produced this action, 
thought, or feeling on your part.” Unfortunately, looking to linguistic behavior isn’t always 
an option. In cases where it’s not, Weber argues, we gain an understanding of subjective 
meanings by engaging the beliefs and desires of an agent on her own terms. This requires an 
empathetic understanding of the most severe sort.85 We have to be able to understand a 
                                                 
83 I am grateful to Lindsey King for a social scientists view on the Weberian conception of verstehen models of 
sociological method. 
 
84 Suppose we come across a person, poised above a piece of paper with a pencil and ask: what is she doing? In 
one sense, merely describing her motions would be a perfectly adequate answer to the question. However, if we 
want to make sense of her behavior as an intentional action, we’ll only have an explanation when we know that 
she is “engaged in balancing a ledger or in making a scientific demonstration, or is engaged in some other task 
of which this particular act would be an appropriate part” (Weber 1914/1968, 8). Unfortunately, the ways in 
which individuals makes sense their own behavior varies wildly—so just looking at physical descriptions of a 
behavior will always to underdetermine what she’s doing. As Elizabeth Anscombe (1957, 37-41) famously 
pointed out, a single set of behaviors such as moving one’s arm up and down while holding the handle of a 
water pump can variously be understood as the activity of pumping water to a house, poisoning communists, 
and making the world safe for democracy. On the basis of his concerns about the systematic underdetermination 
of intentional explanation by descriptions of behavior, Weber argued that we must discern the subjective 
meaning of an action for an agent if we are to offer an account of the underlying psychological cause of that 
action. 
 
85 Empathy here comes to English as a translation of the German einfühlen, which literally translated means ‘to 
feel into’; in this case it means feeling your way into another’s perspective. I claim that Weber requires a severe 
sort of empathy because he requires that you abandon your own perspective and adopt a strategy that allows you 
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person’s mental states in terms of what she would take it as rational to believe or desire given 
the way her other beliefs and desires hang together for her. Weber holds that these two 
options are exhaustive for attributing subjective meaning to an agent, and thus that it is only 
by way of adopting one of these strategies that we can determine whether someone is acting 
rationally rather than merely behaving as though she were. On the basis of these 
considerations, Weber developed an objection to Durkheim’s claims about collective 
representations. 
Weber begins by noting that collectivities do not offer linguistic utterances that can 
justify or explain their behavior—so we can’t opt for the first route. Moreover, he claims that 
it’s impossible to empathetically engage the circumstances in which a collectivity finds itself. 
His worries here were grounded on something like Block’s (1980a) worries about the 
possibility of there being anything that it’s like to be a collectivity: there’s just nothing it’s 
like to be a collectivity and there’s nothing that it’s like for a collectivity to understand it’s 
own mental states. So, the second route was closed off as well. Weber thus argues that 
“action in the sense of subjectively understandable orientation of behavior exists only as the 
behavior of one or more individual human beings” (Weber 1914/1968, 13 emphasis in the 
original). He conceded that for some purposes it might be convenient to treat collectivities 
as-if they had cognitive states (Weber 1914/1968, 13); however, such claims cannot be 
construed as literally true. Here’s the rub: the only systems that have the capacity for rational 
action are those whose behavior can be explained in terms of internal mental states; but the 
only systems whose behavior can be explained in terms of internal mental states are 
individuals—hence, there is no such thing as collective mentality. 
                                                                                                                                                       
to interpret an action from the agent’s standpoint. I have my doubts as to whether this is even possible, but this 
is not the place for a discussion of these reservations. 
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Although few philosophers these days are committed to the details of Weber’s 
explanatory project, Weber is at least right to argue that any account of collective mentality 
will have to explain how a collectivity can possess genuinely representational states. And 
there are responses to Weber’s worry that seem immediately appealing. The best option for 
responding to Weber’s worries is to adopt Weber’s fundamental commitment to continuity 
between the sort of explanation that is viable for individual mental states and the sort of 
explanation that is viable for collective mental states. In order to maintain this sort of 
continuity, I need to demonstrate that an adequate theory of individual representational states 
allows for representational states at the collective level as well. However, although this task 
is easily suggested, it’s incredibly difficult to carry out. The adoption of any theory of 
representational content will prove contentious within the philosophy of mind. However, 
there are reasons for thinking that none of the comparatively viable theories of individual 
representational states will allow for representational states at the level of collectivity.  
 
4.3 Rupert’s contemporary Weberian argument 
Robert Rupert (2005) argues that there is no plausible naturalistic theory of mental 
content that can serve as a legitimate foundation for collective mentality. I am inclined to 
believe that Rupert’s (2005) arguments are the most troubling objection to collective 
mentality, and his arguments are all the more troubling given that he and I shares a number of 
important methodological assumptions about what it takes for something to count as a 
collective mental state. Rupert agrees that it is unacceptable to “simply assert the existence of 
genuinely autonomous group mental states—because, for example, that is what our everyday 
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talk presupposes—while claiming that they are not states of minds” (Rupert 2005, 2ms).86 
With Rupert, I agree that assuming radical discontinuity between individual and group 
mental states is the point on which many accounts of collective intentionality fail. After all, if 
you introduce enough discontinuity, the states of collectivities will fail to count as genuinely 
mental. Rupert (2005, 2ms) also contends that if something is going to count as a collective 
mental state, it must “instantiate the central features of minds as we know them best”; I also 
endorse a version of this claim. Rupert’s position is an attempt to endorse our best 
philosophical and psychological theories of what a mind is. Finally, Rupert (2005, 2ms) 
argues that collective mentality requires distinctive causal-explanatory work for collective 
mental states; in the absence of such causal-explanatory work, attributions of collective 
mentality begin to look like mere instrumental shorthand for claims about individual 
psychological states in aggregation. With these assumptions in hand, Rupert argues that 
without some account of collective representations, we ought not read attributions of 
collective mentality as literally true of the collectivity itself. On this point, I’m also in 
agreement with Rupert. But this is where the trouble begins.  
Focusing on the case of formally organized institutional systems such as labor unions, 
courts, and corporations, Rupert contends that there are no viable theories of individual 
representational states than can be applied “in a natural or convincing way to group states” 
(Rupert 2005, 8ms). In the remainder of this section, I’ll briefly survey the naturalistic 
theories of mental representation that are on the table and the sorts of worries that Rupert 
thinks will arise in adopting each of them. The first theory that Rupert considers is indicator 
semantics. Proponents of indicator semantics (e.g., Dretske 1988) hold that:  
                                                 
86 I’ve not yet considered this position as a possibility. However, in my discussion of Ron Giere’s work on 
distributed cognition I’ll return to offering some arguments against this claim. 
 142 
 
A mental representation MR represents a property P iff MR has an acquired 
function of indicating P for a system S, and it acquired this function because MR 
indicates P to S.  
 
Rupert (2005, 10ms) argues that there are no states of a group that can stand in an indication 
relation to the properties that would have to be tracked by a mental representation. After all, 
indicator semantics typically rely on a relationship between internal perceptual states (which 
are later decoupled from immediate perceptual stimuli) and properties of the world; however, 
Rupert claims that there are no states of collectivities that seem to fill the relevant perceptual 
roles to allow for this sort of content fixing. If public language structures such as a press 
release or a court’s opinion are supposed to play the role of representations, it’s unclear how 
such representations could indicate anything on their own. In fact, such representations seem 
to be a paradigmatic case of a representation with non-natural meaning (Grice 1957): the 
meaning of these representations depends completely on the intentional states of the 
cognitive system that produces them. 
Having argued that indicator semantics is unworkable as a theory of collective 
representation, Rupert considers the possibility of adopting a pure-informational theory of 
content in defense of collective mentality.87 According to the most prominent pure-
informational theory of mental representation (cf., Fodor 1990): 
A mental representation MR represents a property P iff 1) it’s a law that ‘P causes 
MR’, 2) some P actually does cause MR, and 3) if something other than P causes 
MR doing so is asymmetrically dependent on ‘P causing R’.  
 
                                                 
87 Note that the term ‘pure-informational’ here is Rupert’s choice and not mine. Using this term seems to 
suggest a view more like Dretske’s (1988) since Dretske specifically spells out his theory in terms of the 
Shannon-Weaver theory of information.  
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However, Rupert (2005, 11) argues that “it is difficult to see why the proper causal relations 
would hold independently (or independently enough) of the asymmetric dependencies into 
which individuals’ mental representations enter”. If an informational theory of content is 
going to be adopted in defending collective mentality, a story will have to be told about how 
it is that some states of the collectivity qua states of the collectivity stand in the right sort of 
informational relation to some property. However, if public language structures such as a 
press release or a court’s opinion are supposed to play the role of representations, it seems 
clear that informational relations only obtain between the individuals that produce these 
public language structures and the property that is supposed to be tracked by the relevant 
representation. In the absence of an account of how some property of the group qua property 
of the group that stands in the right sort of informational relation, it seems reasonable to think 
that the “group cognitive systems, qua group systems, contain no representations whose 
content is not derived from the content of representations in some other system—not what we 
should want in a genuine cognitive system (or mind)” (Rupert 2005, 11-12).  
Rupert also argues that teleological theories of mental representation are insufficient 
to underwrite a theory of collective representation. Though there are a number of teleological 
theories of mental representation on the table, they all seem to hold that: 
A mental representation MR represents a property P iff some privileged relation 
between MR and P accounts for the continued reproduction of MR (cf., Rupert 
2005, 12ms).88 
 
There are, however, a couple of ways of spelling out the relevant relation, and Rupert 
contends that on any interpretation this theory is problematic as a theory of collective 
representation. If we adopt the evolutionary interpretation (cf., Millikan 1984), Rupert claims 
                                                 
88 As Bill Lycan has pointed out in conversation, this understanding of teleological theories of representation 
rests on a standard misinterpretation of teleological theories of representation. As such, teleological theories of 
mental representation make no mention of reproduction, etiology, or anything of the sort. 
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that there is no straightforward way to make sense of the application of evolutionary theory 
to the most promising cases of collective mentality. After all, it doesn’t seem as though the 
public language structures such as a press release or a court’s opinion that are supposed to 
play the role of representations have much of any selectionist story to be told of them—there 
is “(1) nothing that varies in such a way that its differences might then be inherited by the 
group and (2) nothing to encode successful variations in fitness, so that they may be passed 
on to descendants” (Rupert 2005, 12ms). The proponent of collective representations might 
adopt a non-evolutionary theory of function. However, on these accounts, Rupert (2005, 
13ms) argues that there is no account of the relevant causal mechanism for the sustenance of 
a function that don’t simply appeal to the causal relations between the mental representations 
of individual and the properties in the world that they are supposed to represent. 
Another option is to adopt a causal-historical semantics (cf., Prinz 2002). On this 
view, the content of a mental representation is specified partly in terms of cause and partly in 
terms of etiology, such that: 
A mental representation MR represents a property P iff MR is disposed to be 
reliably activated by encounters with P, and encounters with P played a role in the 
acquisition of MR. 
 
Rupert (1998, 1999, and 2001) advances a similar view according to which the neural 
structures that realize a mental representation are shaped developmentally, by interaction 
with the environment.  On his view, “this shaping involves a certain statistical pattern of 
interaction with the very things that thereby come to be represented” (Rupert 2005, 13ms). 
Here again, the proponent of collective representations faces the worry that collectivities 
possess no perceptual faculties to ground this sort of representational capacity. Moreover, on 
Prinz’s view, mental representations are, to a large extent, best understood in terms of their 
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capacity to facilitate categorization, and although words in public languages have the 
capacity to represent, they must be interpreted in order to facilitate categorization because 
they are arbitrary symbols (cf., Prinz 2005) If there is nowhere to locate interactions between 
the mental representations and properties, and if the most promising sorts of collective 
representations don’t seem to facilitate categorization, it looks like this theory is out as well.  
Finally, Rupert (2005, 14ms) turns to what he calls ‘teleo-isomorphic’ theories that 
ground mental representation in an isomorphism between the structural properties of the 
representation and the thing represented (cf., Cummins 1996). On this view: 
A mental representation MR represents a property P iff the structure of MR is 
isomorphic to the structure of P and it is the function of the portion of the 
cognitive system in which MR occurs to represent P. 
 
Again, according to Rupert, the most promising way to utilize this theory in defending 
collective representation would be to look of the relevant sort of isomorphism between public 
language structures such as a press release or a court’s opinion that are supposed to play the 
role of representations and the things that are meant to be represented. However, although  
The ink marks that constitute a court’s decision are, taken as an entire structure, 
isomorphic to some other structures, but we have no reason to think that the 
abstract structures the decision is about—abstract conceptual structures, 
typically—will be among those things structurally mirrored by the arrangement of 
ink on page. (Rupert 2005, 15), 3)  
 
Moreover, the sorts of worries that arise in the case of teleological theories of mental 
representation once again arise in this case. After all, even if we find the right sorts of 
functions in place in a collectivity, it seems as though “our best account of why those parts 
have those functions adverts in a straightforward way to the mental states of individuals” 
(Rupert 2005, 15-16ms). 
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Having canvassed all of the most promising accounts of mental representation, and 
having argued that none of these are applicable in the case of collective representation, 
Rupert claims that there is a significant hurdle faced by any proponent of collective 
mentality. If there is to be a viable account of collective mentality, then there will have to be 
some account of how a collectivity could have the right sorts of representational states. 
Rupert, much like Weber, contends that there is no obvious way to apply the tools of 
individual psychology to collective states; Rupert thus voices his skepticism about collective 
mentality.  
 
4.4 Rethinking Individual representation 
There are at least two ways in which one could respond to this criticism of collective 
representation. First, it could be argued that one of the standard theories of mental 
representation can be extended, with little or no modification, to apply to collectivities.89 
Second, it could be argued that parity of reasoning requires that whichever theory of 
representation one happens to adopt, if Rupert’s arguments rule out collective representation 
they will also rule out individual representations. I adopt the latter strategy, because adopting 
a particular theory of mental representation would suggest far too strong of a link between 
the truth of that theory and the possibility of collective mentality—and the plausibility of 
collective mentality is not contingent on the adoption of any particular theory of 
psychosemantics.90 Given that Rupert discusses three main types of relations between 
                                                 
89 I am inclined to think that adopting this sort of strategy is completely viable. After all, I think that there is 
room within each of these dominant theories for developing a theory of collective representation. However, I 
think that the second strategy is a better option. 
 
90 Some theories do, however, make it much easier. If Dennettian interpretivism is true, then we get group 
minds almost automatically. I don’t want to prejudice the case here in favor of this, or any other, theory of 
psychosemantics. 
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representations and the things that they represent—perceptual relations, informational 
relations, and teleological relations—I’ll address each of these considerations in turn. 
 
4.4.1 Perceptually based theories of mental representation: 
Rupert claims that some theories of mental representation fail to apply to groups 
because groups lack of collective perceptual faculties. Indicator based theories typically rely 
on internal perceptual states which can later be decoupled from immediate perceptual stimuli. 
Causal-historical views also rely on perceptual capacities in order to sustain the causal 
relations that give rise to mental representations. However, there are many ways in which this 
reliance can be spelled out. As Prinz (2005, 686) puts the point: 
To say that concepts are perceptually based is to say that they are made up from 
representations that are indigenous to the senses.  Concepts are not couched in an 
amodal code. Their features are visual, auditory, olfactory, motoric, and so on.  
They are multimedia presentations. 
 
In order to make sense of the reliance on perceptual states, it will help to start with a familiar 
paradigm case of a representation. However, by looking carefully at something that clearly 
counts as mental representation, a number of interesting things that typically remain 
unnoticed about this reliance become more obvious. I think that it’s fair to say that a 
perceptual representation of one’s mother relies on a number of important perceptual 
capabilities, and I’m inclined to think that most of our other mental representations rely on 
perceptual states in the same way. 
Suppose Amanda sees her mother standing in the doorway of the bar having a 
conversation with the bouncer, and turns to the person sitting next to her and says, “That’s 
my mother”. In this case, Amanda has a perceptual representation of the person standing in 
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the doorway, and, supposing that the lighting conditions are fairly decent and that Amanda 
can is capable of seeing that this is her mother, we’ll have good reason to take this verbal 
behavior as evidence that she is mentally representing this person as her mother. However, 
merely noting that there is such a representation is insufficient to explain what is going on in 
Amanda’s cognitive architecture.  
We need to begin by noting that Amanda has looked across the room and perceived 
someone that she is capable of categorizing as her mother. That is, when she is presented 
with some sorts of perceptual input, she categorizes this thing as her mother. Thus, whatever 
else we want to say about Amanda’s representational state, we have to note that it has the 
function of categorization. Moreover, given that she has this capacity to categorize the thing 
she perceives as her mother, we find that there are typical behavioral responses that are 
evoked by this thought. Her verbal behavior, the change in her heart rate, and the tendency to 
run across the room and hug this person, are all characteristic outputs of her representation of 
this person as her mother. The thing to notice here is that our explanation of Amanda’s 
behavior in terms of her belief that this is her mother relies on the use of a theoretical posit 
about her internal state. The question, now, is what sort of internal state is this. This is where 
things start to get a little bit tricky.  
When we think about familiar sorts of representational states like this perceptual 
representation, it’s hard to see them as more than simple, homogenous lexical items—
perhaps linguistic representations in a language of thought. For this reason, there’s been a 
tendency among philosophers to take a representation like Amanda’s representation of her 
mother and claim that this is just a state built up from a MOTHER concept, some sort of 
demonstrative concept (to get the ‘that is’ into the picture), and some sort of possessive 
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concept. And, at one level of analysis, this is the right way of thinking about things. 
However, in cases where things seem so familiar and so obvious, it often helps to think about 
what a breakdown of such a representational capacity would look like. Consider a person 
with Capgras syndrome. When a person suffers from this delusion, “they are mentally lucid, 
their memory is normal, and [most] aspects of their visual perception are completely 
unaffected” (Ramachandran 1998b, 1856). They seem fairly intact. Aside, that is, from the 
fact that they have an unshakable commitment to the claim that someone to whom they are 
quite close (typically a parent, a spouse, or even a pet) has been replaced by an imposter, a 
robot, or an evil twin. 
Suppose that Amanda has stroke or a drug overdose and awakens in the hospital 
seeming perfectly normal—until her mother walks in. At this point, suppose that she exhibits 
the behavior characteristic of a person suffering from Capgras delusion and reports that the 
person standing in the doorway is not her mother, but a cleverly disguised CIA agent who 
has been sent to monitor her. Now, it is no longer true that Amanda believes that this is her 
mother, and the fact that her representation has changed suggests that there is something 
different in her representational capacities. The most widely accepted theory of the 
mechanism underwriting Capgras delusion suggests a failure in the binding of visual 
representations and the affective representations that drive a feeling of familiarity.91 This sort 
of breakdown suggests that the mental representation “That’s my mother” is actually quite a 
                                                 
91 There is some dispute over the precise nature of the mechanism here. V.S. Ramachandran (1998, 2004) 
argues that the relevant damage is to the structures linking the amygdalla and the inferotemporal cortex 
preventing the processing of affective information. Young et al. (1993) propose a similar sort of mechanism, at 
least in so far as they are concerned to demonstrate that this is a localized breakdown in binding affective 
information to face perception. However, they claim that the breakdown should be understood as a 
disconnection between the dorsal and ventral streams in the visual system. Regardless of what the relevant 
neurological mechanism happens to be, however, what matters for my case is that the representation of someone 
as a person’s mother rests on information that is not exhaustively specified in terms of the mechanisms that 
represent linguistic structure. 
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bit more complicated that one might have assumed prior to examining this sort of case. In 
order to have a perceptual representation of a person as one’s mother, it needs to be the case 
not just that the visual system is functioning properly, but it also has to be the case that the 
affective response is correct. 
Alternatively, suppose that Amanda awakens with localized damage to her fusiform 
gyrus. In this case, Amanda might continue to represent someone as her mother, but she 
might be incapable of doing so by representing her face. She might continue to track her 
mother by the sound of her voice despite the fact that she has become prosopagnosic and can 
no longer perceive faces as such. The interesting thing about this case, however, is that the 
affective response may continue even though she is failing, on any sort of conscious level, to 
represent this person as her mother (cf., Bauer 1984). In this case, the feeling of familiarity 
may persist even though the she might no longer have the visual representation of this person 
as her mother. 
The important thing to notice, however, is that the representation of a person as one’s 
mother relies on a number of component processes. Many of the representations we deploy in 
navigating our world are composed out of the outputs of the various subroutines that are 
operative in that individual. To put the point another way, many of the representations that 
we take to be genuinely mental representations, representations with primary intentionality, 
supervene on component structures that are themselves already intentional. This, I take it, is 
the primary insight of the homuncular functionalism that underwrites my account of both 
individual and collective mentality. 
Many naturalistically plausible theories of mental representation have focused on the 
causal cum perceptual relations that obtain between a mental representation and a property of 
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the world. This makes it appear as though mental representations, such as a MOTHER 
representation, ought to be understood as simple tokens in the language of thought. Now, 
although there are likely to be some perceptual states of a cognitive system that will stand in 
the right sorts of causal relations, it’s not clear that all of the relevant states of a system have 
to stand in these relations unmediated. Rupert (2005) argues that “many of our best 
explanations of how mental representations get their content assign a privileged role to 
perceptual or quasi-perceptual processing, thereby requiring a cognitive architecture that 
group systems typically do not possess.” However, this claim relies on too simplistic a view 
of the inter-level relations in individual cognition. Something like the following is likely true.  
In order to a mental representation MR to represent a property P: 1) encounters 
with P have to play some causal role in the acquisition of MR, and 2) MR has to 
have the function of representing P to the system in which it is a mental 
representation.  
 
However, while some nomic relations certainly obtain between perceptual states and 
properties of the world (e.g., in edge detection, color detection, phoneme detection), most 
person level representations derive their representational content from lower-level states that 
are themselves already semantically contentful.  
This fact suggests a powerful argument from parity against Rupert. If the explanation 
of Capgras syndrome discussed above is approximately correct, a visual representation of 
one’s mother can be fully explained in terms of 1) the properties of discrete and static 
representations in the visual system (construed rather broadly), 2) affective responses to this 
stimuli that are feelings of similarity, and 3) rules for the association of visual and affective 
representations. However, Rupert’s superfluity argument would suggest that there’s no need 
to posit a person-level representation of MOTHER since every step in the construction of a 
representation of MOTHER proceeds either by physical causation (e.g., the stimulation of 
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retinal cells by photons reflected from the stimuli) or by causal processes involving the 
intentional states of the subcomponents of the visual system and rules for the association 
thereof. Here the states are all representational, as they are in the reduction of collective to 
individual representations. So, if superfluity arguments preclude collective representations 
they preclude individual representations of mothers, and as Fodor would put it, if a theory 
can’t allow for the representation of one’s mother, it’s the end of the world! 
 
4.4.2 Informational theories of mental representation 
What, then, of theories of mental representation that rest on informational relations 
that do not rely on perceptual states as such, but instead rely on counterfactually stable causal 
relations between a cognitive system and its environment? Rupert contends that it’s hard to 
see why the relevant sorts of causal relations would obtain in virtue of states of the 
collectivity qua states of the collectivity rather than in virtue of states of the member of the 
collectivities qua members of the collectivities. At least initially it seems as though 
responding by way of an informational theory like Fodor’s should be easy. After all, 
according to Fodor there would only need to be some state of a group that could stand in the 
right sort of actual and counterfactual causal relations to some state of the world. As Fodor 
understands mental representation, in order for some mental representation “X” to be a 
representation of a property X it must meet three conditions: 
1) It has to be a law that X causes “X”; 
 
2)  Some “X”s have to be caused by X; and 
 
3) If anything other than X causes “X”, it’s causing “X” must be asymmetrically 
dependent on Xs causing “X” 
 
So, all that would need to be the case in order for there to be a collective mental 
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representation is that there would have to be some state of a collectivity that stood in these 
sorts of causal relations to some property of the world. Fortunately, there are cases of 
collective representation that meet all of these conditions in the actual world. Consider the 
case of Naval vessel navigation discussed by Edwin Hutchins (1995). 
Hutchins takes as his primary example of a collective representation the navigational 
fix cycle. The fix cycle is used to establish the location of a ship in relation to various sorts of 
landmarks in order to facilitate a computation of the trajectory of the ship (Hutchins 1995, 
117). The interesting thing about the fix cycle is that it is the implementation of a 
computation that contains a number of processes, some of which are internal to persons and 
some of which are external to persons. As Hutchins (1995, 117 emphasis in the original) puts 
the point, “the fix cycle is accomplished by the propagation of representational state across a 
series of representational media”. Briefly, the representation of the ship’s location is 
produced through the interaction and association of a number of different lower level 
processes—each of which is already in the business of producing representations. Although 
the media that are produced by each of the relevant subroutines vary wildly, they are 
nonetheless capable of being brought into coordination with one another in order to give rise 
to a representation that can direct the behavior of the ship.  
The navigation system of a ship consists of a number of systems that are designed to 
be sensitive to a variety of one-dimensional constraints in the world (Hutchins 1995, 118). 
The output of each of these systems is propagated across a number of media until the fix 
cycle produces a representation of the location of the ship on a chart. None of these various 
sub-systems (e.g., neither the alidade user, the hoey, the chart, nor the fathometer) is capable 
of producing an authoritative representation of the location of the ship. Instead, it is only by 
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bringing these various representations into coordination—often by way of taking repeated 
measurements—that a representation of a ships location is produced by the navigation 
system. That is, it is only by way of the coordinated activity of a variety of systems that the 
location of the ship can be determined and a representation of this location can be produced 
in such a way that it is usable for setting a course for the ship. Moreover, because of the way 
in which training occurs in the US Navy, the representations produced by the various 
individuals in the crew are typically only capable of being understood by those who are 
trained to take measurements using a particular device. The persons working on a particular 
task take as inputs the information (here we have the production of an analog representation) 
produced by some technology or the information they receive in a visual representation of the 
ships location from the bow. They then engage in some sort of computation in order to 
produce a representation that can be read by someone else. They then output a digital 
representation that can be read by another system and that will eventually be capable of being 
coordinated with other sorts of information. Notice, none of the individuals in the navigation 
crew represents the position of the ship. It’s only the navigation crew as a whole that 
represents the location of the ship.  
Here is how this sort of system can be used to demonstrate the possibility of an 
informational theory of collective representation. The fix cycle is capable of varying lawfully 
with the location of the ship in the same way that person-level representations are supposed 
to vary with features of the world.92 If this were not the case, then there would be a whole lot 
                                                 
92 Human operators in association with their machines produce the constitutive representations, and it is no law 
of nature that people don’t make mistakes; so, it’s quite hard to see how nomic relations between representation 
and representatum could be established. However, it’s not at all clear that you get anything like strong nomic 
relations between neural states and features of the world. That said, my inclination is to take the relevant 
relations to hold ceteris paribus, and I would probably fill in the ceteris paribus clause with some functional 
claim concerning the proper operating of the system. This might be to abandon such theories of content. 
However, if that’s the case, it’s going to be true both for individuals and collectivities. And I say: So be it! 
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more chaos on the sea, more ships would be lost, and there would be a lot more ships running 
aground. This allows the fix cycle to meet the first of Fodor’s criteria. Moreover, the fix 
cycle of a given ship must at least some times be a representation that’s caused by the actual 
location of the ship—for exactly the same reasons. This allows the fix cycle to meet the 
second of Fodor’s criteria. Finally, it is very likely that, on at least one occasions, a fix cycle 
might produce a representation that fails to accurately map the location of a ship. However, 
its doing so will have to depend asymmetrically on accurate representations of location. Were 
it not the case that the deliverance of the fix cycle was the sort of system that delivered 
accurate representations except where there was some failure of the informational channels in 
the system, it would not be a representational structure that was capable of representing the 
location of the ship rather than just recording it in a way that accidentally happened to covary 
with some state of the world. The fix cycle thus meets the third of Fodor’s criteria. It looks, 
then, as though the fix cycle can represent the location of the ship. Why, then, would anyone 
be worried about the capacity of a collectivity to stand in the right sorts of causal 
relationships to things in the world? 
Perhaps the fact that collective systems are widely distributed systems should itself be 
seen as a problem. Although collectivities are interconnected in important ways, they are also 
spatially distributed. Since there’s no unified consciousness that controls individual bodies 
through telepathic mind-control (as the Overmind does in Arthur C. Clarke’s (1953/2001) 
Childhood’s end), the distributed computations which would have to take place in collective 
cognition will require information to be passed between distributed component systems. 
However, if the information from such systems will be useable to form unified intentions in a 
way that will allow for genuinely intentional action that’s responsive to the ever-changing 
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world in which we find ourselves, it seems that it will have to be the case that there is some 
person who, in the end, produces the final representation on the basis of her beliefs about the 
location of the ship. If this is true, it looks like she is doing the representation of the location 
of the ship rather than the navigation crew as a whole. Or so the objection goes. 
There are, however, a number of things to be said in response to this objection. First, 
there are numerous cases in which a thing whose constituent parts are spatially (and even 
temporally) distributed seems to count as a single entity with stable behavioral dispositions 
(e.g., flocks of seagulls, the New Zealand All Blacks, Bank of America, the Black Panthers, 
and the British Navy (cf., Bloom and Kelemen 1995)). As Dennett (1989) puts the point, 
what is particularly striking about termite colonies, is that they are examples of complex 
systems that are capable of functioning in a "purposeful and integrated" way simply in virtue 
of having lots of subsystems doing their own thing without any central supervision. And, as 
Mitchel Resnick (1997) suggests, many systems that appear to have central controllers (and 
are usefully described as having them) do not. Moreover, as we’ve already seen, a person’s 
visual system is spatially distributed throughout her brain and across a number of different 
systems (e.g., the eye, the optic nerve, the lateral geniculate nucleus, primary visual cortex, 
the prefrontal cortex, the fusiform gyrus, etc.) yet we are not concerned about calling the 
visual system a single system. On the whole, individual cognitive systems aren’t all that 
different in this regard from collectivities. While the individual neurons of any particular 
cognitive system will be interconnected in important ways, they will also be spatially 
distributed. Moreover, if homuncular functionalism is the right view of the mind, individual 
mentality will be distributed across different systems because the computations that are 
required in order to give rise to intentional action are far too complex for any of the 
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individual systems to execute on their own. 
Does this mean that there is no objection to be made on the basis of distribution? Of 
course not. However, if you are willing to throw out spatially distributed systems merely on 
the basis of their spatial distribution, many other things are going to have to go as well. I am 
inclined to think, however, that at the point where an individuals visual system becomes 
problematic as a case of a cognitive system, something has gone radically wrong. If all of 
human mentality falls away because of spatial distribution, we’ll have far bigger worries 
about the possibility of doing cognitive science than worrying about whether collectivities 
can have mental states. Unfortunately, however, there is a further objection lurking in the 
wings.  
This more promising objection is grounded on worries about the limitations on the 
flow of information through a distributed system. The most promising version of this 
argument is based on an objection to centralized decision making in large-scale economic 
systems offered by Friedrich Hayek in “The use of knowledge in society”. Hayek (1945) 
recognized that one of the key problems facing any economic order is a worry about how to 
utilize the highly dispersed, incomplete, and often contradictory ‘data’ possessed by various 
individuals in a society in order to produce rational economic activity. In considering 
answers to this worry, Hayek (1945) argues that decision-making is possible only in cases 
where there is some single individual that actually makes a decision.  
Here is one way in which this objection might be developed. In any society where 
people are engaging in collaborative activities, planning will rest, at least to a large extent, on 
information that has not been gathered by the person who will in the end make the decision 
to execute the plan. Instead information will be collected by a number of individuals, each of 
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whom will have a unique perspective on the information that she’s collecting. The problem is 
that when information is passed to the planner, it will take a variety of different forms 
depending on the context in which the information was gathered as well as facts about the 
psychology of the person who is gathering the information. In some cases, this even leads to 
contradictory information being gathered by the planner. Furthermore, the more distributed 
the system is, the more likely it will be that there will be huge differences in the information 
that is collected since much of the information that will necessary for collective action will 
be highly dependent on the immediate circumstances at hand and the more distributed the 
system is the more differences there will be in immediate circumstances. The problem is that 
the planner will now either have to make a decision about which of this information she will 
pay attention to, or she will have to make a decision of her own about what to do—in which 
case the decision will be based exclusively on her preferences and not on the preferences of 
the people who have collected the information. This seems to suggest that the decision-
making that underwrites a collective action is really just individual decision making of a 
planner embedded in complex social circumstances. 
In the case of the economic decisions, the continuous flow of goods and services that 
is required to maintain a functioning economy requires continuous deliberative adjustment. 
However, in cases where quick action is required because of changing circumstances, as in 
the case of response to economic problems of various sorts, the filtering of information by a 
central planner will be far too slow to effectively respond to changes in circumstance.93 Note, 
however, that the problem is not merely a problem with the distribution of the informational 
                                                 
93 This sort of argument is far and away the most compelling argument against the centralized socialism of the 
former Soviet Socialist Republics as well as the Eastern European countries that adopted, or were forced to 
adopt, Soviet economic policies. The argument also, however, cuts against any form of centralized economy 
including state capitalism. If Hayek is right, the only option is a radically decentralized political apparatus. 
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content across a large system, but a worry that the sort of informational content that will be 
relevant to making a particular decision will change as the circumstances with which the 
system is faced change. So, if there is a centralized decision making system, it will have to be 
able not only to monitor the diversity of information coming into the central system, but it 
will also have to send out requests for the right sort of information at the right time—but this 
won’t be possible without interpreting the information coming in from the various sources, 
which will always be out of date and incomplete. As Hayek puts the key point: 
The problem which we meet here is by no means peculiar to economics but arises 
in connection with nearly all truly social phenomena, with language and with 
most of our cultural inheritance, and constitutes really the central theoretical 
problem of all social science. 
 
For any highly distributed system to which we might want to attribute collective mentality, 
there will be a difficulty with the diversity of information that will be prohibitive of rapid 
action in response to changes in circumstances for the system in question. So, if there has to 
be a central control system for collective decision-making, this will lead in the end either to 
an individual decision made by one member of the collectivity (in which case, it would not 
be a collective mental act), or it will lead no deliberative activity at all on the part of the 
collectivity (since the circumstances in which the system finds itself will change much too 
quickly for the system to respond). Neither alternative looks to be a good result for the 
mentality of collectivities. 
This objection is quite compelling. However, rather than pushing us away from 
collective mentality, this argument actually suggests a key point for the defense of collective 
mentality. To begin to answer the objection, we must note that it presupposes that cognition 
takes place in some sort of centralized processing system. However, we have very good 
reasons to think that even human cognition isn’t centralized in this way. In order to make 
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sense of the sort of architecture that we should expect for a collectivity, then, we need to stop 
and think briefly about the way in which human cognitive architecture happens to be 
organized. However, Daniel Dennett and Marcel Kinsbourne (1991) have offered compelling 
arguments for the claim that the human capacity for consciousness requires nothing like a 
central observer. While it is true that the brain has to be able to bind things together in some 
way, there is no need to suppose that this must happen in one place. In place of a centralized 
Cartesian subject that experiences things from inside a Cartesian theater, Dennett and 
Kinsbourne (1991) propose the multiple drafts model according to which conscious thought 
is accomplished by using multiple processes of interpretation and elaboration. On this view, 
each of the subsystems in the brain make localized and specialized observations that fix 
informational content. Each of these observations, then, reflects the state of the brain at the 
time of the observation. The question, however, is whether or not there must be a single 
process that unifies these informational states into a single narrative.  
Dennett and Kinsbourne argue that localized discriminations should not be 
understood as states that are meant to be fed-forward for consideration by a central 
discriminator. Instead, they argue for an account of consciousness as content sensitive 
settling (Dennett and Kinsbourne 1991). Using the analogy of synching sound tracks to films, 
Dennett and Kinsbourne argue that temporal inferences, for example, are drawn by 
comparing the content of several data arrays. Moreover, they argue that once such a temporal 
ordering is drawn, it need not be drawn again by a higher-level discrimination. Supposing 
that something like this view of human consciousness is plausible, we see an immediate 
parallel to the sort of discriminations that give rise to a fix cycle in the navigation of a naval 
vessel. In a fix cycle, the location of a ship is determined by the synchronizing of a number 
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of low-level observations and the representation that is produced by the fix cycle does not 
need to be re-checked by a centralized observer. Instead, the captain is merely the sort of 
system that is capable of consuming this representation in order to fulfill his function of 
driving the ship. The important thing to notice here is that there is a big difference between 
taking the representation that is produced as an input for the production of further 
representations or behaviors, and having to make a set of new discriminations about this 
information. On the view I am advancing, the captain is merely another subroutine rather 
than a central system that is making the decisions. 
There are, of course, those who would be unwilling to adopt the sort of model of 
consciousness advanced by Dennett and Kinsbourne. However we need not turn to conscious 
phenomena in order to make the point that I am suggesting here. Consider the development 
of distributed representational structures in behavior-based and autonomous robotics. Randall 
Beer (2000; Beer and Chiel1993) and his colleagues have developed autonomous robots that 
are capable of locomotion on a hexapodic platform. Instead of producing a robot with a 
centralized system for the production of particular sorts of behavior, Beer and his colleagues 
have built robots that consist of a number of localized discriminatory systems that rely on 
localized sensory feedback in order to determine what the next movement of the system will 
be. Although the various different systems have the capacity to receive information from one 
another as well as from each other, they do not have to wait on a decision to move from a 
centralized system. Instead, motion emerges from the complex interaction and coordination 
of the representations produced by various low level systems. But, there are further problems 
here.  
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It seems as though these sorts of structures, since they are merely detectors of various 
sorts, are going to be able to produce actions that only appear to be (or are as-if) intentional. 
We might think, for example that it is only by the introduction of already minded subroutines 
into a collectivity that we see the emergence of genuinely intentional action in collectivities. 
Once we realize that the sorts of data that will be pertinent to action of the system will be 
localized, as well as already intentional, a worry starts to emerge that the representations that 
happen to get used by a system are going to be under the control of the particular people that 
happen to be playing the relevant role in the collectivity. However, if this is the case, then we 
have to ask why we should think that there’s any sort of determining role from the 
collectivity that will do the relevant work to constrain people in the right way. 
On this point, however, it is important to note that there are commitments that one 
adopts when one joins collectivity. While it is true that a person within a collectivity will 
always have the capacity to reflect on each and every one of her actions, “an initial decision 
to identify with a collectivity will render it inappropriate, and perhaps even incoherent, 
thereafter to engage in deliberation over whether to identify on every occasion” (Graham 
2002, 127). Part of what it means to play a role within a collectivity is to have at least some 
of your practical reasoning—in particular, your reasoning about whatever it is that the 
collectivity is meant to be doing—constrained by the commitment to act in accordance with 
the interests of the collectivity.94 As Keith Graham puts the point, “collective identification 
involves on appropriate occasions attempting to think and act as if for the collectivity itself” 
(Graham 2002, 128). Now, this is not to say that each and every decision that a person makes 
                                                 
94 Here’s one way of putting the point. “To act as a member of the team is to act as a component of the team. It 
is to act on a concerted plan, doing one’s allotted part in that plan without asking whether, taking other 
members’ actions as given, one’s own action is contributing toward the teams objective…It must be sufficient 
for each member of the team that the plan itself is designed to achieve the team’s objective: the objective will be 
achieved if everyone follows the plan” (Sugden 1993, 86 cited in Graham 2002, 129). 
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in her role as a member of a collectivity will be perfectly consonant with the ends toward 
which that collectivity is directed. However, if a person fails to fulfill her role in a 
collectivity and instead decides to do as she would prefer to do, the intentional capacities of 
the collectivity will likely founder.95 
Consider a case in which a member of a navigation crew decides to write things down 
as she wants to rather than as her training dictates. Or, even more problematically, suppose 
that she decides to take a nap instead of doing her job of producing a particular 
representation. In this case, there are a number of things that might happen. Given that there 
is a bit of redundancy in a navigation crew, and given that it will be possible to coordinate 
other representations in order to successfully produce a representation of the location of the 
ship, perhaps things will be fine. Alternatively, perhaps her failure to do the job will result in 
a misrepresentation of the location of the vessel—which might lead to a nasty run-in with an 
iceberg. Whichever way things go, the parity with individual mental states remains. When a 
subsystem begins to produce representations that are not consonant with what is expected, 
other systems have to compensate in order to successfully continue to represent the world. 
When this fails to occur, misrepresentations are often produced where we would find 
                                                 
 
95 There are a number of points that need to be distinguished here. However, exactly how they are distinguished 
varies between collectivities. The relatively weak claim that an individual’s deliberation will be constrained in a 
collectivity is always true. However, the degree of constraint varies. In small collectivities, deliberation often 
continues until every individual’s decision is consonant with the decision that is adopted by the group: in a 
small society every decisions can be made while sitting around the fire. However, this is not always the case. 
Often, whether any particular individual does what she prefers (even where that is not consonant with the goals 
of the group) will be irrelevant to the practical activity of the collectivity. Provided sufficient redundancy within 
the functional organization of a group, the practical activity of a collectivity (much like the practical activity of 
a connectionist network) will exhibit a sort of graceful degradation when an individual fails to play her role. 
However, in cases where the failure of a collective action would result in extraordinarily bad consequences, and 
where success is dependent on every member of a collectivity doing her job (as with the case of pilotage 
discussed by Hutchins 1995) it’s likely that structures of reward and punishment will ensure that each and every 
member of the group does exactly what she is supposed to be doing. After all, in such cases, individual failures 
could result in disaster, and that’s enough to put serious normative constraints on the behavior of the each of the 
individuals that compose a collectivity.  
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successful representations in a fully functioning system. This seems to suggest that 
breakdowns in collective identification will have ramifications that are quite similar to the 
ramifications of breakdowns in individual cognitive systems.  
There is, however, a deeper worry. Each of the representations that are produced by 
an individual will be produced in accordance with the way that she happens to understand the 
world. That is to say, her representations won’t necessarily be veridical representations of the 
way that the world is. Instead, they will be intimately linked to whatever esoteric system of 
beliefs the producer happens to possess. This would be a serious problem, were in not also 
the case that our own sensory systems are not nearly so concerned with what’s good for the 
whole organism as one might initially think.  
Consider our own sensory systems. As Kathleen Akins (1996, 342) has put the point, 
the traditional view of the senses, in its strongest guise, takes a very solipsistic view of the 
brain. The brain is like a control center of the body, the place where all of the planning and 
thinking goes on. It learns about the world through the deliverances of the senses and it sends 
out motor commands so that the organism in which it is housed can respond to the various 
sorts of stimuli it encounters. The brain (or some part of it) thus becomes the centralized 
decision maker that is operating on the more or less veridical deliverances of the senses. 
However, when we consider the case of thermoception, Akins (1996, 345ff) argues an 
adequate model of perception is better understood in terms of narcissistic sensory systems, 
concerned only with how particular sorts of stimuli affect them. The question, then, is why is 
this not a problem for individual level cognition? 
Suppose that you have hiked to the bottom of the Grand Canyon. It’s 118 degrees 
Fahrenheit, it’s hotter than hell, and all you can think to do is put your head under the lowly 
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patch of sagebrush that’s providing the only shade around. Then you remember this is a 
canyon with a cool river at the bottom. You can jump into that river and cool off! 
Unfortunately, what you don’t know is that the average water temperature of the Colorado 
River is 42 degrees Fahrenheit. You hurry to the river and jump in, only to find that it is 
miserably cold—every thermoceptor on your body is firing like crazy, especially the ones on 
your scalp! But after a few minutes, you adjust to the temperature of the river and it becomes 
quite pleasant.  
The first thing to notice about this case is that the function of the thermoceptive 
system is best understood in terms of its ability to detect changes in temperature that will be 
relevant to the well-being of a particular organism. In order to carry out this function, cold 
receptors are integrated with various motor subroutines, and when these start firing they will 
make you shiver and bring your limbs in closer to your body (among other things) in order to 
preserve body heat. Moreover, the information that is passed to the motor subroutines needs 
to be quickly accessible in order to guarantee that the relevant behaviors occur. However, 
pace Hayek, this doesn’t require that the information that is being passed along be veridical. 
In order for an organism to get along in the world, its behaviors don’t even need to 
correspond in any direct way with to the actual state of things in the world. For biological 
systems like us, satisficing is good enough—and perhaps the best that we can do. All that 
needs to be the case for a sensory system to be adaptive is that in the majority of the cases 
where something (e.g., extreme changes in temperature) is a potential threat to the well-being 
of an organism, the perceptual system will pass on information to the motor subroutines that 
will protect the critter—and this requires far less than veridical information being passed to 
motor subroutines. Thermoception at least does this.  
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I, thus, claim that facts about our own cognitive architecture should lead us to expect 
that the sorts of problems with the flow of information predicted by Hayek’s argument will 
not necessarily be any more problematic in the collective case than the individual case. There 
are, of course, real worries about how distributive systems are able to respond quickly and 
efficiently to rapidly changing stimuli. However, these worries are not insurmountable and 
they are no different at the level of the individual than they are at the level of the collectivity. 
These are just worries about how particular systems happen to be put together. I would 
contend that given this parity between individual level cognition and group level cognition, 
this objection shouldn’t worry us too much. 
We started with the datum that human organisms are able to respond to dangerous 
stimuli in a way that is consonant with quick intentional action. We find that there is good 
reason to think that the architecture of the human mind is widely distributed but it is still able 
to maintain the right sorts of lawful covariations with things in world in order to sustain a 
sort of informational theory on the basis of these distributed systems. We are able to get 
around in the world, and this give us good reason to think that we are able to utilize 
intentional representations in order to facilitate action guidance. The fact that collective 
systems such as the navigation crew of a large naval vessel suggest that the representational 
state that are being propagated across representational media in order to respond to ever 
changing, and often dangerous stimuli gives us good reason to think that these sorts of 
representational states are being used to guide action in relation to these stimuli. On the basis 
of such considerations, we should think that there are collectivities that can instantiate the 
right sorts of lawful relations required for mental representations if individuals are. Thus, 
informational theories are not impugned as theories of collective representation. 
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4.4.3 Teleological theories of mental representation 
Rupert also argues that teleological theories of mental representation cannot be 
extended to collectivities. If we adopt an evolutionary interpretation of teleosemantics, 
Rupert claims that public language structures such a court decisions and memos, which seem 
to him to be the most promising place to look for collective representation, won’t have a 
selectionist story to be told of them. Moreover, if we adopt a non-evolutionary interpretation 
of language, the relevant causal mechanisms for sustaining a function will rely on the causal 
relations between the mental representations of individual and the properties in the world that 
they are supposed to represent. I agree with both of these claims. However, the recognition 
that many of the collectivities with which we might be concerned have not themselves 
evolved in a way that will sustain the relevant sorts of representational architecture does not 
impugn the possibility of collective representation. Moreover, non-evolutionary theories of 
function allow for collective representation even though they rely on the representational 
capacities of individuals.  
To begin with, note that there’s a difference between recording and representing. As 
John Haugeland (1998, 180) puts the point “recording is a process of a certain sort; and to be 
a record is to be the result of such a process. By contrast, representing is a functional status 
or role of a certain sort; and to be a representation is to have that status or role”. Were we to 
find a system that merely mechanically and witlessly translated inputs into a system of 
internal symbols, we would have no reason to take that system to be a system with mental 
representations. My keystrokes on the keyboard of my computer are taken as inputs into the 
word processor and they are then recorded in the document on which I am working. 
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However, these recordings are not then used in any interesting way by the word processor. 
The important thing to notice at this point is that it’s not just the production of a 
representation that matters, but it’s also the way in which the representation is consumed that 
gives it a genuine functional role to play. Without playing this role, the recording does not 
count as representational in the sense that relevant for the intentionally if mental states. 
Building on an intuition much like this, Ruth Millikan (1989) argues that although 
relations of indication are either produced by a system or not (because of the way that the 
system is put together), the success at representing is always dependent on the proper 
consumption of that indicative structure. Now, according to Millikan, any phenomenon that 
counts as intentional does so because the semantic relations obtaining between producers and 
consumers are sustained by the fact that the information is so produced and interpreted; 
However, Millikan is also quick to note that  
‘Producers’ and ‘interpreters’ are cooperating devices that produce and use the 
intentional device and that sometimes are and sometimes are not contained within 
the same individual organism (1984, 90). 
 
Contrary to Rupert’s worry, Millikan allows for intentional representations that are not 
bounded by the skull.  
Consider a favorite example of Millikan’s. Bee dances indicate the location of nectar 
by using variation in tempo and angle to indicate different locations of nectar. In this case, 
the interpreting mechanism of the watching bees serves its function just when these 
representations correspond to the location of the nectar, where the representation is of a 
dance-at-a-time-at-a-place-at-a-tempo-with-an-orientation. The thing to notice here is that the 
representations that are relevant for the behavior of the consuming system are not 
exhaustively specifiable at the level of the individual producer or the individual consumer. 
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The relevant representations take place at the interface of the two critters. So, while nothing 
is going to count as a representation unless there is a consumer for that representation, the 
sort of evolutionary history that ensures that the production and coordination of 
representations is sufficient to insure propagation of that representation is often distributed 
across individuals. And this seems to suggest that at least some representations have been 
selected for between individuals. Why, then, does Rupert think that it is so difficult to tell a 
teleological story about the production and consumption of representations in a collectivity?  
Here is on way in which Rupert’s worry can be developed. Jesse Prinz (2002, 4) 
argues that organisms like us, by which he means organisms that have beliefs and other 
paradigmatic mental states, “act with flexibility and forethought, choosing between different 
courses of action and anticipating future consequences. These abilities seem to demand 
representations that stand in for external objects”. Millikan agrees, and claims that merely 
having representational structure is not sufficient for something to count as a mental state. In 
order for a system to be a believer in the fullest sense of the term, not only must there be 
internal, representational states, but there must also be, within that system, some interpreting 
structures that have the capacity to draw inferences (Millikan 1984, 338n2). Moreover, at 
least the most interesting cases of human representational capacities are decouplable from 
immediate stimuli, separate the indicative from the imperative aspects of a representation, 
and allow for disagreement about the cause of a representation (cf., Millikan 1989). Rupert’s 
concern is to find richly representational structures like these in collectivities—and in fact 
these will be the most interesting cases for demonstrating the capacity for collective 
representation. If I can demonstrate that collectivities can possess these richly 
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representational states in the same way that people do, then I will succeed in demonstrating 
the possibility of defending a teleological theory of mental representation for collectivities. 
To begin with, Millikan argues that human thought does not always take the form of 
inner sentences. It does, however, require that there be some intentional structures that are 
capable of coordinating the behavior of person in accordance with her representations of the 
world. In the case of belief (cf., Millikan 1984, 138), there is likely to be some 
correspondence between these representations and the physiological features of a human 
organism. These physiological structures, however, each have their own jobs to do, and the 
performance of each of these jobs—coupled with all of the other systems doing their jobs—
contributes to the proliferation or survival of the organism (Millikan 1984, 138). Take for 
example the fight-or-flight response that typically occurs when a person is threatened. In this 
case, a number of subsystems need to be coordinated in order for the initial stimuli to 
eventuate in the relevant sort of organism-level behavior (cf., Millikan 1984, 117). The 
immediate fear response needs to be able to trigger the release of adrenaline, and this release 
of adrenaline needs to be interpreted by a number of different organs in the body as well as 
ready the organism, cognitively, for action.  
However, Millikan also acknowledges that having this particular physiological 
structure is not type-identical to having a particular mental state, it is merely the way that 
beliefs happen to be implemented in humans. What is important here is that there be a 
number of structures that are coordinated in order to give rise to person-level behavior. So, in 
order for something to count as a representation, it has to be a representation for some 
system. The system for which something counts as a representation need not, however, be a 
whole organism. Now, the key insight of Millikan’s teleofunctional theory of mental 
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representation is that in order for the output of the visual system to count as a representation, 
it has to be interpretable by some other system (or by some subcomponent of the system 
itself). Because of the way in which the human mind is organized, information that is passed 
from the early visual system to the affective centers associated with the release of adrenaline 
these stimuli can be interpreted by the affective system as dangerous stimuli. Now, in order 
to achieve full-blown belief, there must also be a system in the individual that can make 
inferences about the information contained in the release of adrenaline and decide whether to 
fight, flee, or calm down because the stimuli in question is not really dangerous.  
This, then, leads once again to an argument from parity against Rupert. First there 
must be no difference in kind between the representations that are passed between the various 
subsystems in an individual and the public language and iconic structures that we see passed 
between persons within a collectivity. Second, the organization of a collectivity with genuine 
mental representations will have to be such that the states of the individuals that compose the 
collectivity, as well as the linguistic and iconic representations that they produce, facilitate 
intentional action at the collective level. Third, it will have to be the case that the collectivity 
is capable of reflecting on the information contained in these representations in a way that’s 
similar to a human believer’s reflective capabilities. 
Suppose that the research wing of the public relations department of Wide Awake 
Coffee runs a series of phone surveys and collects the information that, overwhelmingly, 
people view Wide Awake Coffee as overpriced and cluttered with hipsters (i.e., as 
customers). There will, of course, be a wide degree of variation in the actual responses to the 
surveys. However, in order to package this information in a form that is usable by the 
planning wing of the PR department, the research wing will produce graphs and memos that 
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can be consumed by the planning wing in order to facilitate the development of a new 
marketing plan to both increase business (perhaps by lowering prices) and decrease the 
hipster quotient. Suppose further that a number of possible marketing plans are produced and 
that there must be some sort of collective decision made about which marketing plan would 
best suit the needs of Wide Awake Coffee. A plan will have to be decided on and then passed 
on to the board of directors, who will then have the option of accepting the marketing plan, 
or rejecting it (perhaps on the grounds that Wide Awake Coffee has recently signed a 
contract with Bright Eyes that is projected to increase the revenue from hipsters by 74 
percent). In this case, we will have precisely the sorts of structures that are necessary to 
underwrite representational states that will allow a corporation to count as having mental 
representations. This is just a case where the producing system is one person (or perhaps a 
group of persons) and the interpreting system is also a person (or perhaps another group of 
persons). Once we see two person systems that are capable of using sentences as 
representations, it’s not at all clear that these systems can’t aggregate to form more 
complicated collective cognitive systems. So Millikan’s semantic theory does not seem to be 
ruled out by Rupert’s argument. 
There are, however, still two lingering worries. First, I have yet to establish that 
public language structures should count as representations. Second, there probably isn’t 
much of an interesting evolutionary history for Wide Awake Coffee—and without such a 
story, evolutionary history, teleofunctional theories will rule out the possibility of 
representation. As Millikan (1984, 91) puts it, even though the right sorts of structures are at 
play in Swampman, he has no contentful states because he has no evolutionary history. 
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Fortunately, teleofunctional theories do have the recourses for answering both of these 
worries. 
First, evolution has designed humans to be incredibly flexible in their use of 
representations. As Millikan rightly notes, if a system is designed to be a learning system, 
then changing its structures through learning is precisely a part of its proper functioning! 
Unlike bee dances, human language is not evolved but learned (Millikan 1984, 98). Thus, the 
structures at play in a person are flexible and adaptive structures that allow for producing 
systems to be coupled to various different interpreting systems that happen to speak the same 
language. As Millikan puts the point, “each individual human must develop his or her own 
programs by a process probably involving trial and error. But these programs must govern 
the production of inner terms at least many or most of which match terms in the public 
language of the community in which the individual lives” (Millikan 1984, 140). However, 
once these programs are developed, the same representational state can be used for a variety 
of purposes (e.g., in an individual agent it might be used in both theoretical and practical 
reasoning). Why not think that these representational capacities can be extended to facilitate 
the coordination of collective action. After all, if there is a story to be told about the 
evolution of language, it’s likely to rely, at least in part, on its capacity to facilitate 
coordination. 
However, as Rupert will be quick to note, all of the relations that would underwrite 
the propagation of representations within a collectivity will already be in place outside of the 
collectivity, and for this reason it seems superfluous to posit the representations as 
interestingly collective representations. But this objection cannot serve the required function. 
In order for the exaptation of a representational capacity to be possible, the only thing that 
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needs to stay the same is that the representation must correspond to environmental 
configurations in accordance with the same correspondence rules for each of these activities. 
That is to say, the evolutionary considerations that confer meaning on a particular sort of 
representational structure must remain the same so long as the representation is to be usable 
as the sort of representation that it is. Now, given that human language has developed as a 
method of representing that sits half way between two people, humans are precisely the sorts 
of organisms that can learn to redeploy these public language structures in order to produce 
behaviors that will regulate the behavior of collectivities. The content of the representations 
is indeed fixed by the evolutionary history of the organisms that make up the collectivity. 
However, these representations are being used for a different end—even though the content 
remains stable. To put the point a different way, the structures that regulate the continued 
production of a particular sort of representation are outside of the collectivity in question; 
however, these representations are redeployed in order to direct the behavior of a collectivity 
in a way that allows the collectivity to respond to changing features of its environment. 
Corporate entities, for example, use already existent representational capacities in humans in 
order to facilitate and coordinate social actions and in a way that allows for the sort of 
reflection that is required for collective mentality.  
 
4.5 Representation and action guidance 
There are, however, further worries about the capacity of the subsystems in a 
collectivity to actually give rise to collective behavior; and, at this point we can return to the 
claim that collective representations are superfluous in explaining the behavior of a 
collectivity. In order to be successful, proponents of superfluity arguments must change their 
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attack. Even though there are no differences in the inter-level relations as regards the 
production of representations, there seems to be a difference in the causal sequences of 
effects produced by the visual representation of motion and the visual representation of 
discrete and static representations of objects. If someone throws a beer bottle at my head, and 
I perceive it moving rapidly toward me, I’ll try to get out of the way. But, my avoidance 
behavior is a response to the perceived motion of the bottle, not a response to a sequence of 
static representations that underlie the state of the collectivity. In order to explain my 
behavior, person level representations are required. Put briefly, commonsense psychology is 
an effective tool for prediction and explanation for a wide range of behavior, and this 
predictive and explanatory advantage give us good reason to retain individual level 
representations. I agree; however, if we take cognitive science to be directed at the 
explanation of behavior, this also provides good reason for retaining collective 
representations as explanatorily valuable structures.  
I have suggested that a theory of individual representation must allow for causal 
mediation by lower-level representational states; but it would be nice to know why we should 
expect such representational mediation. Taking representation to be a relation of indication or 
bearing information obtaining between neurophysiological states and properties of the world 
has led to theories of mental representation focusing on static and unchanging states of the 
world. However, if cognitive science is really an attempt to explain behavior, these static 
representations are the wrong place to focus. Presumably, any theory of representation that’s 
sensitive to the evolutionary and developmental origins of our capacity to represent must 
note that the reason for having representational capacities is that they allow us to cope with a 
rapidly changing and dangerous world. 
 176 
The capacity for sensory representation is the most primitive representational capacity 
in biological organisms, and attending to the operation of sensory systems, rather than high-
level conceptual structures, suggests that representational capacities often have the function 
of informing action. A visual system can alert me to the fact that something is moving 
rapidly towards my head, and the production of a visual representation is, in many cases, 
sufficient for me to engage in avoidance behavior. This behavior, however, is produced by a 
variety of simple systems working in parallel in order to produce this behavior. Perceiving a 
beer bottle that is being thrown at my head requires that my retina be irradiated and that the 
information about the stimulation of retinal cells be propagated toward the LGN (the visual 
systems relay center) as a digital representation (in Dretske’s sense) of the stimulation the 
retina. Upon arrival at LGN, the information is dispersed to various regions of the visual 
system where some information is processed by systems dedicated to capacities such as 
detecting edges and color while other information is processed by systems dedicated to 
capacities such as spatial awareness and the guidance of action. However, as becomes 
painfully obvious in the case of blindsight, the visual representation of a beer bottle being 
thrown at your head is dependent on the proper functioning of all of these areas working in 
coordination and passing relevant information to each other. The blindsight patient might, 
when prompted to make a guess, be able to determine whether a beer bottle is being held 
sideways or upright with a relatively high probability of being right. She might be able to tell 
you what color the bottle is. However, she’s not going to move out of the way if you throw it 
at her because she’s not going to represent the dangerous stimuli. The only way for her to 
represent an oncoming beer bottle is by having a number of representational systems working 
together for the production of such a representation. 
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Now, if we attend to the practice of cognitive science, we see that it rests on the 
assumption that representation occurs much earlier than the level of individual 
representation. In order to make sense of the behavior of individuals, cognitive science 
assumes cognitive specialization and differential processing occurring throughout the brain—
and it is on this point that the methods for collecting data (e.g., fMRI, EEG, PET, etc) in 
cognitive neuroscience turn. However, it’s also clear that at no point during the production of 
the visual state prior to the final output in conscious monitoring do we have an adequate 
account all visual representations. Some sorts of visual representations can only be specified 
at the level of a whole person, but these visual representations themselves must be seen as 
having a rich representational structure.  
In much the same way that accounts of individual representation have typically gone 
astray, the defense of collective representation has typically taken static representations (e.g., 
court decisions and press releases) to be the only collective representations. However, these 
states aren’t the most promising avenue for developing an account of collective 
representation either. These states are the result of computations over lower-level 
representations. Taking these public language structures to exhaust the representational states 
of collectivities is analogous to taking an individual’s utterances to exhaust her mental 
representations; and from there it’s a short step to behaviorism! So, while it is clearly right to 
acknowledge that public language structures facilitate the propagation of many collective 
representations, a far more promising strategy for establishing collective representational 
capacities is to begin by considering the ways in which various representations within a 
collectivity are “propagated from one representational medium to another by bringing the 
states of the media into coordination” (Hutchins 1995, 117) in order to guide behavior.  
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Consider the case of crime scene investigation (CSI).  In CSI, “evidence is likely to 
be collected by one group of people, analyzed by another, and interpreted and presented to 
Court by another group” (Barber et al. 2006, 358). The collection of data may begin with the 
data collected at an emergency call center where a call-handler codes the caller’s analog 
representation of the crime scene, in real time, as a digital representation what the caller says. 
This representation is sent to a dispatch operator who interprets it, gating off information 
that’s irrelevant to dispatching officers. The dispatch operator thus converts this information 
into a digital representation that can be consumed by the investigating officers.  
On the basis of this representation, investigators proceed to the scene and collect data. 
They dust for fingerprints, examine footprints, and collect stray hair follicles and discarded 
clothing. Investigators take the entire scene and distil it into evidential representations such 
as photographs, clothing, and fingerprint dustings; however, these representations must be 
made digital in order to be consumed by those not trained in CSI—noise must be 
distinguished from data in a way that’s consonant with what investigators take to be relevant 
to prosecuting someone in this case. Once these data are collected, it must be analyzed (to 
determine whether there’s sufficient evidence to prosecute) and converted into a narrative 
structure in order to facilitate prosecution. This narrative structure, however, is just the end 
result of a complex interaction of various low-level representations produced during data 
acquisition. At this point we could appeal to the representational states of the individual who 
pens the narrative and the representational states of the investigators who collect the data as 
the cause of this narrative representation. However, this leaves too much out. 
The propagation of information through these sorts of collectivities does not depend 
exclusively on the architecture of the system, nor does it depend exclusively on the 
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intentional states of the individuals that compose the collectivity. Which representations are 
passed between individuals also depends on shared background assumptions, which features 
of the environment happen to be salient, global considerations about what sorts of 
information will be useful in achieving the goal of the collectivity, and facts about how data 
was interpreted in the past (Heylighen et al. 2004, 8). Each investigator “only needs to know 
what to do when certain conditions are produced in the environment” (Hutchins 1995, 199), 
but through their interaction, the narrative emerges, and it’s only through the production of 
this narrative that goal of prosecuting becomes a possibility.  
We could, of course, abandon the level of analysis at which the narrative is produced, 
or we could merely attribute the narrative structure to the last person implicated in its 
production. However, if we do this, we must make a parallel move in the case of the 
individual, for the account of specialization at play in the collective case parallels the sort of 
specialization that we find in human psychology. But, if this argument succeeds, retaining 
individual representations warrants retaining collective representations. 
 
4.6 Conclusions and looks forward 
If all has gone well up to this point, I have shown that the most promising 
philosophical objections to the possibility of collective mentality miss their mark. In Chapter 
2, I suggested that arguments against collective mentality on the basis of considerations about 
consciousness were unlikely to impugn the possibility of collective mentality. In Chapter 3, I 
suggested that the same sorts of considerations that allow us to understand individual 
psychological states as autonomous from neurological states could also be used to defend the 
autonomy of collective psychological states. And in this chapter, I have suggested that there 
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is no reason to rule out the possibility of collective representation on philosophical and 
conceptual grounds. At this point, the possibility of collective mentality seems to be well 
established. However, there is more work to be done. 
My claim is not merely that collective mentality is possible. Rather, my claim is that 
there are cases of collective mentality in our world—cases that ought to be studied by the 
cognitive sciences. Having responded to the objections that have occupied me for the last 
three chapters, I now have the tools to develop a theoretical framework in which to ground 
the study of collective mentality. In the remaining chapter, I take my task to be as follows. I 
address a number of research projects that have attempted to establish the existence of 
genuinely cognitive collective systems. The dominant strains in this sort of research tradition 
have focused on collective decision making, collective memory and distributed cognition. In 
Chapter 5, I, thus, begin by rehearsing a series of desiderata for what it will take to suppose 
that a collectivity has genuine cognitive states. Having laid out these desiderata, I then 
address a number of overtly cognitive phenomena that appear in collectivities. 
CHAPTER V:  
COLLECTIVE MENTALITY REVIVED! 
 
In the previous chapters, I have argued for the possibility of collective mentality. 
Within philosophy I have a few allies;96 however, the dominant trend in defending collective 
mentality attempts construct collective mentality out of individual mental states. If my theory 
of collective mentality is correct, we should start by looking at the behavior of collectivities, 
and then look at the computational architecture of these systems to see if they are sufficient 
to produce genuinely cognitive states. Given that my project is a piece of theoretical 
cognitive science, I now must attempt to establish the actuality of collective mentality in 
accordance with the model that I have thus far developed. In this final chapter, I demonstrate 
that a number of collectivities in the actual world ought to be counted as genuinely cognitive 
systems. However, before moving to an analysis of these collectivities, I’ll make some brief 
preliminary remarks about what it will take to establish my case. 
 
5.1 A few preliminary remarks on collective representation: 
In the previous chapter, I argued that intentional states are typically layered in 
individuals—that is, person-level representations are typically constructed out of lower-level 
                                                 
96 Bill Lycan (1981) gestures towards such a theory and D.H.M. Brooks (1986) makes a similar move in “Group 
minds”. However, although these theories are sketches of the sort of project that I have here been developing, 
neither is fully elaborated in a way that suggests itself as plausible theory to be extended to research programs 
within the cognitive sciences. At this point, I can now demonstrate the ways in which my account of collective 
mentality can be developed into a research strategy for a non-individualist cognitive science. 
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representational states. On the basis of this consideration, I argued that the fact that collective 
mental states are composed out of lower-level intentional states does not preclude the 
possibility of collective mentality. I then claimed that wherever we find a purportedly 
cognitive system that possesses a system of identifiable internal states or processes that are 1) 
capable of bearing information about some state of affairs in the world, and 2) that are 
capable of directing the immediate behavior of that system, we have good reason to suppose 
that we’ve discovered a sort of intentional state. However, more needs to be said on this 
point. 
First, the fact that a system can be in a state that is capable of bearing information 
about the world, and is capable of directing the immediate behavior of that system, even 
where this state is composed out of lower-level intentional states, is by itself insufficient to 
insure the presence of genuinely cognitive states.97 In order to count as a genuinely cognitive 
state, these internal states need to be representations rather than mere reportings (cf., 
Haugeland 1998). As John Haugeland (1998, 180) puts the point, while something needs 
only be the result of a particular processes in order to count as a recording, “representing is a 
                                                 
97 Consider the way in which the fuel injection system of a modern automobile works. The fuel injection system 
is constituted by a number of functionally organized components, each of which is designed in such a way that 
it detects changes in its environment in order to facilitate acceleration. In a modern automobile, when the gas 
pedal is depressed the throttle valve is opened in order to increase the amount of air in the system. When the air 
increases, the engine control unit detects the open throttle valve and increases the rate at which fuel is flowing 
into the engine in order to ensure that the fuel-air ratio remains constant. This is achieved by using a magnet to 
force open the fuel injector—causing a highly pressurized stream of fuel to be released into the engine 
manifold. However, this isn’t the whole story. In order to ensure that the right amount of fuel is being released 
into the engine manifold, a series of sensors, including the mass airflow sensor (which monitors the amount of 
air entering the engine), oxygen sensors (which monitor the amount of oxygen in the exhaust system), and the 
throttle sensor (which monitors the position of the throttle valve) have to produce representations that can be 
coordinated in the engine control unit in order to determine the amount of fuel that must be released into the 
engine manifold. The state of the fuel injection system bears information about the state of the fuel-air ratio in 
an engine and it is capable of directing the behavior of the engine on the basis of such information. Moreover, 
each of the subcomponents of the fuel injection system are capable of bearing some sort of information about 
some state of the engine and in virtue of this information, they are capable of directing the immediate behavior 
of some component of that system. Unless my account of collective mentality is capable of distinguishing 
between a genuinely cognitive system and the fuel injection system of a modern automobile, something has 
clearly gone wrong. 
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functional status or role of a certain sort, and to be a representation is to have that status or 
role.” The question, then, is: what sort of functional role has to be filled if something is to 
count as a representation. In what follows, I’ll follow Haugland (1998, 172; see also Clark 
1998) in his rough and ready desiderata on the sort of functional organization required for 
something to count as a representation. I suggest that if we’re going to appeal to 
representational states of a collectivity in offering genuinely psychological explanations of a 
collectivities behavior,  
1) The system must possess internal states that have the function of adjusting the 
system’s behavior in ways that allow it to cope with features of its environment in 
ways that are not fully determined by the design of the system; 
 
2) Such states must be capable of standing-in for various features of the environment 
that are important to the system, even in the absence of immediate environmental 
stimuli;98 
 
3) Such stand-ins will have to be part of a larger representational scheme that allows a 
variety of possible contents to be represented (in a systematic way) by a 
corresponding variety of possible representations, and 
 
4) There must be “proper (and improper) ways of producing, maintaining, modifying, 
and/or using the various representations under various environmental and other 
conditions” (Clark 1998, 147).99 
 
Since functionalism is a topic-neutral theory, I remain noncommittal about the occupants of 
this functional role. However, because the representational states to which I appeal take the 
                                                 
98 There are, of course, deep questions about the diachronic question here. It seems as though we can do pretty 
well at representing some things that we’ve never come into contact with (e.g., unicorns, griffins, Harry Potter, 
and radical democracy). There is much to say about these sorts of representations, but I’ll not get into those 
disputes here.  
 
99 Note that this does not require genuine misrepresentation. Scorpion can be tricked into responding as though 
there were prey in front of it by introducing something into its environment that creates the same sorts of 
vibrations that would be created by something that the scorpion would eat in an untainted environment. More 
familiarly, you can fill a frog with buckshot by shooting BBs past it in the lab. In each of these cases there is a 
representational failure. However, these systems are not genuinely misrepresenting their environment—they 
just have detection systems that are too impoverished to discriminate food from near-non-food. To put the point 
briefly, representational failures, like the disjunctive kind Flies-or-BBs, come in different flavors. 
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form of images, icons, maps, graphs, and honeybee dances, some philosophers might worry 
that such states can’t be anything more than mere recordings. The important thing to notice, 
however, is that the intuition that some vehicles are incapable of representing rests on the 
though that the analog information conveyed by an imagistic representation (for example) 
can be consumed by a computational system only after it is converted into a digital 
representation such a ‘word’ in a language of though. Within the philosophy of psychology it 
is often taken as given that images record information but only concepts represent.  
In contrast to this trend in philosophy, however, a substantial tradition has developed 
around the claim that there’s not much that one can do with an arbitrary symbol. Provided a 
system is built in such a way that it can interpret some sorts of symbols as standing-in for 
some feature of the environment, there’s a lot that a system can do with such structures.100 In 
his analysis of the popular media, Marshal McLuhan claimed that ‘the medium is the 
message’ and oftentimes there is much truth in this claim. Some systems are designed to 
interpret only a particular sort of media as a representation. These systems have translation 
rules built into them for converting one representation into another by appeal to a system of 
background rules for interpreting that are designed right into the system. For such systems, 
the medium is all-important! If, for example, the human visual system is organized in such a 
way that the detection of stable geometric properties are immediately converted into 
representations that can be consume by higher-cognitive systems anterior to the visual cortex, 
then there will likely be structures in the visual cortex that immediately and witlessly convert 
representations of geometric properties into whatever sort of representation is capable of 
being consumed by higher-cognitive systems. However, even in this case it’s not the medium 
                                                 
100 I am thinking here of philosophers as diverse as Martin Heidegger (1927/1996) Ludwig Wittgenstein 
(1953/2001), Wilfrid Sellars (1963/1991), Ruth Millikan (1984), Andy Clark (1997), and Jesse Prinz (2002). 
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but the message that makes these outputs of the visual system representations. The important 
point is that these visual outputs have a representational structure that facilitates coping with 
the environment. It doesn’t matter whether these representations are logical symbols, iconic 
representations, cognitive maps or anything else for that matter—provided that they can be 
consumed by a system as a representation that allows the system to engage in intentional 
action of some sort. What does the work of helping a system to navigate its ever-changing 
environment is not necessarily a fact about the vehicle of the representing, but the content of 
the representation.  
Keeping these theoretical commitments about collective representation in mind, I am 
faced with one further problem in defending the actuality of collective mentality. Because the 
cognitive and social sciences have developed primarily (though not completely) in North 
America and Western Europe, there is a strong bias in favor of research programs focusing 
on individual’s mental states (cf., Huebner et al, under review). This makes it difficult to find 
evidence that bears directly on the existence of collective cognitive system. However, this 
commitment to individualism has started to falter in recent years. Dynamical systems theory 
and theories of self-organizing systems in biology provides some promising evidence for 
collective mentality. Moreover, biologists such as David Sloan Wilson, who are committed 
to multi-level selection, have also provided some evidence for the existence of collective 
cognitive properties of groups. From another perspective, social scientists (e.g., David Sloan 
Wilson and Daniel Wegner) have self-consciously attempted to resuscitate the idea of a 
“group mind” on the basis of experimental evidence about the behavior of small groups on 
cognitive tasks. Finally, on the basis of arguments initially offered by Rumelhardt, 
McClelland and the PDP research group (1987), an anti-individualist cognitive science 
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collecting data from academic fields as diverse as informatics, robotics and cognitive 
anthropology has attempted to locate numerous cognitive states outside of the skin and has 
recently began to produce interesting results about a range of phenomena called ‘Distributed 
Cognition’. In the remainder of this chapter, I review each of these traditions to see if they 
succeed in providing evidence for the existence of collective mentality. 
  
5.2 Cognition and self-organizing systems 
In their groundbreaking book, Self-organization in non-equilibrium systems, Gregoire 
Nicolis and Illya Prigogine (1977) utilized the tools of nonlinear fluid dynamics to model the 
behavior of large and transient populations of animals. Though the mathematics is incredibly 
complex, the basic idea is simple. The behavior of macroscopic biological systems (e.g., the 
movement of water buffalo in search of new pastures, the construction of termite mounds, 
and the milling of fish) can be tracked as regular and observably stable patterns. By treating 
the individuals in these collectivities as ‘black boxes’ with relatively simple desires and 
computational capabilities, it is possible to mathematically model the behavior of animal 
collectives in a way that demonstrates a formal correspondence between these systems and 
the simple chemical reactions of non-linear fluid dynamics (cf., Sumpter 2006, 6). The key 
insight of this non-linear modeling is that the aggregation of relatively simple states of the 
individuals that compose a collectivity is sufficient to produce emergent collective behavior 
that is not exhibit by the component systems. The desires and mechanisms required to 
explain these collective phenomena is often so simple that the models can be constructed by 
children in elementary school armed with some simple yet cleverly designed computer 
software (Cf. Resnick 1994). However these models are also explanatorily powerful. The 
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question, however, is whether these models are capable of explaining anything that should 
count as genuinely cognitive. 
At the end of chapter three, I argued that an appeal to self-organizing systems is never 
by itself sufficient to justify claims to collective mentality. Although the segregation 
phenomena modeled by Thomas Schelling (1971) is incredibly interesting as an emergent 
phenomena, there is nothing in Schelling’s model to suggest that the segregation behavior 
rests on a cognitive state of the collectivity. However, the fact that these phenomena are not 
cognitive does not give us reason to dismiss self-organization as capable of producing 
cognitive states. After all, brains are self-organizing systems whose constituent parts, 
neurons, obey relatively simple rules (cf., Kelso 1995); and it had better be the case that 
brains are capable of producing genuinely cognitive states if anything is. The question thus 
arises: are there collectivities in which genuine cognition will emerge from the interaction of 
relatively simple algorithms?  
There are three plausible places to look for cases of self-organization that produce 
cognition in collectivities: 1) aggregative phenomena in large groups of humans such as 
crowds, 2) flocking, schooling, and herding behavior, and 3) the behavior of social insects. 
I’ll take each of these phenomena in turn to see whether there is any interesting sense in 
which they give rise to collective cognitive phenomena. 
5.2.1 Tipping points and rioting mobs: Adam Smith (1776/1996) famously argue that 
that economic trends emerge from the aggregation of individual desires, and John Stuart Mill 
(1843/1988) claims that on the basis of a few psychological platitudes we can explain the 
presence of market trends. A radically individualistic industry of game theory and rational 
choice theory has been constructed on the basis of these assumptions, and this industry has 
 188 
had some success. While I don’t find such explanation appealing or promising, there is a very 
important insight to be had in attending to these models. As those philosophers and 
economists that defend methodological individualism have always noted, there are numerous 
phenomena for which we will not have reached a ‘rock-bottom’ cognitive explanation until 
we have explained the cognitive states of the individuals that compose a collectivity 
(Watkins 1952). The reason for this is that the phenomena that occur at the level of 
economies, for example, are emergent phenomena but not emergent cognitive phenomena. 
The behavior of markets emerges from the interaction of individuals, and they are even 
directed at states of affairs in the world (often, with bringing about states of the world that are 
completely hostile to the interests of the individuals that compose these markets); however, 
these markets are not, themselves, thinking things.  
Similar cases abound with what one might call, following the sociologist Morton 
Grodzins, ‘tipping point’ phenomena. Grodzins used the term ‘tipping point’ to refer to the 
point at which ‘white flight’ occurs in inner city neighborhoods. Grodzins (1958) collected 
data on the emigration from metropolitan areas and argued that the flight of white working 
and middle-class people to the suburbs was not explicable on the basis of a linear model, but 
required recognizing that neighborhoods had ‘tolerance’ for the number of minorities that 
they could allow before the white members of the community left. This phenomenon of 
white flight, as with the segregation phenomena modeled by Schelling (1971), is produced by 
the complex interaction of the psychological states of the individuals in a particular 
neighborhood. But as Schelling notes, by positing a relatively small in-group bias, we can 
explain the emergence of a high degree of racial segregation. Schelling also noted that once 
movement started within a particular area, it would be self-sustaining, because of the way in 
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which in-group biases force individuals to resist living in a neighborhood where they are 
becoming outnumbered by members of an out-group. 
Phenomena such as ‘white flight’ should not lead us to suppose that there is collective 
mentality underwriting racial segregation. After all, the explanation of the phenomena is 
straightforwardly explicable in terms of the psychological states of the individuals that 
compose the collectivities in question, provided, that is, that we attend to the way in which 
these psychological states are embedded in their social environment. However, this does not 
mean that there are not emergent phenomena here that are worth studying. It is, after all, only 
by recognizing that there are significant effects of living in a social world that we can even 
begin to study the way in which individual psychological states are modulated by their 
external environment. 
Malcolm Gladwell (2000) has recently adopted the term ‘tipping point’ in an attempt 
to explain a wide range of social issues. Gladwell (2000) argues that phenomena such as the 
popularity of a shoe, the decrease of crime in Manhattan, and the prevalence of smoking 
amongst teenagers are best explained according to sets of simple, aggregative rules. He 
argues that a few people who act in a particular way are capable of causing large-scale social 
changes. One or two people behaving in a particular way are not likely to produce large-scale 
social changes. However, there is a propensity toward imitation in our species that is capable 
of producing large-scale phenomena as people ‘catch-on’ to behaving in a particular way. 
The interesting thing about such phenomena is that the best way to intervene in them is not 
by modifying the collective as a whole, but by modifying the psychological states of a few 
individuals within a collectivity in such a way that an idea will spread throughout the rest of 
the collectivity. 
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These mechanisms appear to be variants on those suggested by R.A. Wilson in his 
discussion of the social manifestation hypothesis (SMH). Segregation is a collective 
property; however, our best explanation of the mechanisms that give rise to this phenomena 
are not collective cognitive mechanisms but individual psychological mechanisms embedded 
in a social world. Analogously, there is much to be learned from the study of situationist 
psychology about the ways in which an individual’s world modulates her social states. 
However, merely recognizing that these forces are at play in the social world is not sufficient 
to generate collective mentality. Merely causal relations between the mental states of 
individuals are not enough to produce collective mental states. What we need is a story about 
how it is that the states of the components of a collectivity are organized in such a way that 
they constitute a single unified cognitive system—and these tipping point phenomena are 
unlikely to be sufficient to achieve constitution rather than mere causation. However, there is 
one more incredibly important lesson to be learned from attending to the sorts of phenomena 
that I think ought to count as genuinely collective phenomena but not as collective cognitive 
phenomena.  
Numerous social psychologists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were 
concerned to account for the behavior of crowds in terms of collective psychological states. 
For example, Gustav Le Bon (1895/2002) argues that individuals in a crowd become 
unconscious automata controlled by the suggestions of a collective mind over which they 
have no control. He also argues that crowds possess a sort of mental unity, producing a sort 
of sui generis entity distinct from the individuals that compose a crowd (Le Bon 1895/2002, 
4). In developing his account of the group mind, Le Bon claims that individualistic 
psychology ignores the lawful generalizations occurring at the level of crowds; although 
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there are numerous significant differences in individual intellectual capabilities and desires, 
such facts are irrelevant to the behavior of many crowds and there are numerous things that 
we can know about crowds without reflecting on these beliefs and desires of the individuals 
that happen to compose those crowds. My analysis of collective mentality would be 
conspicuously lacking were I not to address this issue of crowd mentality.  
To begin with, I must note that there are many things that can be accomplished by 
crowds that cannot be accomplished by isolated individuals. Flipping over a car, tearing 
down a statue of a deposed leader, succeeding in a coup d’etat, or shutting down an 
intersection are things that groups can do but that individuals cannot do by themselves. 
However, the mere fact that there are activities that require collective action does not require 
collective mentality, and this is the important point in considering the mentality of crowds. 
Although it is indeed possible that some crowds might have mental states, it is not always the 
case that a crowd has sufficient functional organization to produce anything like a unified 
cognitive state. 
Consider the case of the race riots that followed in the wake of the Rodney King 
decision. On April 29, 1992, three of the white officers who had brutally attacked King a 
little over a year earlier were found innocent of all charges. That evening, following the 
verdict, riots erupted throughout Los Angeles and continued for several days until the 
National Guard and the Marines intervened. In understanding this riot, there are significant 
psychological phenomena that we must understand.  
The collective action that became a riot began as a peaceful protest outside the 
courthouse where the verdict had been passed down. A number of people gathered to 
peacefully register their disagreement with the decision. But the crowd grew rapidly, and as 
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the police withdrew, fearing their own safety, things made a rapid turn for the worse. To put 
the point succinctly, the crowd became angrier throughout the day. A significant contributing 
factor in the change of the valence of the emotional state of the crowd was the widely shared 
belief among members of the African American community that the court decision was the 
result of a racially biased system that had targeted African American residents through racial 
profiling, police harassment, and unfair treatment in the courtroom. This belief produced a 
legitimate feeling of anger in a number of people in the crowd. This anger spread rapidly, and 
it is at this point that a number of the insights suggested by Le Bon (1895/2002) become 
quite important. The question is: Do we need to explain the anger of the crowd or can 
everything be explained by appeal to the states of the individuals within the crowd? 
There was a broad consensus within the collective psychology tradition of the late 
19th Century that the emotional states of individuals can be brought under the control of the 
sui generis mental states of a continually maddening crowd (cf., Le Bon 1895/2002, 
McDougall 1920, and Freud 1921/1975). Le Bon (1895/2002) even went so far as to argue 
that understanding the behavior of crowds requires us to recognize that “the sentiments and 
ideas of all of the persons in the gathering take one and the same direction, and their 
conscious personality vanishes” (Le Bon 1895/2002, 2); to put it another way, crowds are 
completely irrational and driven by exuberant emotion (cf., Le Bon 1895/2002, 101). Now, 
although this turns out not to be true of all crowds (cf., McPhail 1991), there is good reason 
to think that the emotional states of people in a crowd will, at least in some cases, tend to 
converge.  
As I’ve just noted, in the riots following the Rodney King decision, a legitimate 
feeling of anger among a number of people in the crowd at the courthouse spread rapidly and 
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was enlivened. Both Le Bon and Freud were unaware of the mechanisms at play in giving 
rise to the mental unity of crowds; however, when this thought is coupled with an insight 
from Charles Darwin (1872/1965) that there is a tendency toward imitation, that acts 
independently of the conscious will, we can begin to construct an account of the mechanism 
that gives rise to the mental unity of crowds.  
To begin with, it is a familiar phenomenon that all of the babies in a nursery will 
begin to cry when any other baby does—and this happens within hours of birth. Moreover, 
we are all quite familiar with the fact that when we see another person smiling or laughing, 
we are likely to do the same. More to the current point, it is quite hard to remain happy or 
emotionally neutral when someone who is a real downer walks into the room. These facts 
about human psychology suggest that humans possess some mechanisms for producing a sort 
of emotional contagion. As David Hume (1739/2000, 365) puts the point, “the minds of men 
are mirrors to one another, not only because they reflect each others emotions, but also 
because those rays of passions, sentiments and opinions may often be reverberated”. 
Now, this capacity is not merely an artifact of commonsense psychology. The claim 
that emotional contagion is a psychologically robust fact about the world is supported by a 
wide variety of results from the cognitive sciences. Preston and DeWaal (2002), for example, 
review data that suggests that animals that see a conspecific in a threatening situation are also 
likely to experience a behaviorally and biophysically noticeable fear response. This imitative 
response also seems to be underwritten by neurological mechanisms dedicated to motor 
mimicry. In 1996, Giacomo Rizzolatti and his colleagues (1996) found a population of 
neurons in F5 of the macaque premotor cortex that were active both when the monkey 
performed an action and when the monkey observed the same action being preformed by a 
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conspecific or an experimenter.  These ‘mirror-neurons’ respond to actions that are purposive 
or goal oriented such as grasping movements and others that respond selectively to various 
sorts of gestures (cf., Gallese 2001, 2003a, 2003b; Rizzolatti et al. 1996).101 It seems 
reasonable to think that emotional states are likely to be perceived as goal oriented, and as 
Ralph Adophs (2002) has shown, the perception of an emotion activates the neural 
mechanisms responsible for the production of emotions in much the same way that these 
‘mirror neurons’ are supposed to operate.  
Now, to return to the race riots following the Rodney King verdict, we can now see 
how the distributed activity of the members of a crowd can appear to be unified, can even 
appear to possess a sort of mental unity even in the absence of any collective cognition. 
There is good reason to think that crowd behavior is much more like the behavior of a herd of 
antelope fleeing from a predator (which I discuss below) than it is like genuine cognitive 
activity. We should begin by recognizing that some of the people who showed up at the 
courthouse were angry about the decision and about the racially biased practices of the 
LAPD. Because of the way that emotional contagion works in human individuals, this anger 
rapidly spread through the rest of the crowd. As this emotional state spread to each of the 
members of the crowd, the crowd began to exhibit a unified state of anger. At this point, we 
must consider the truth of the claim that the rioting mob was becoming angrier was the day 
wore on. 
As the mental states of the members of the collectivity become more and more 
unified, the tendency to speak as-if the collectivity has a mental life of its own will become 
more pronounced. As Bloom and Veres (1999) demonstrate, commonsense psychology 
                                                 
101 Jean Decety and her colleagues (2002) have argued for the existence of a similar system in humans based on 
PET data on imitation. Converging evidence has been offered by Kevin Pelphrey (2003) with fMRI data on the 
perception of biological motion. 
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allows for the description of the behavior of a collectivity using intentional idioms in cases 
where the behavior of a collectivity appears to be unified. In the case at hand, the emotional 
mirroring that occurs in a rioting crowd produces an apparent mental unity (as was aptly 
noticed by Le Bon and Freud). However, although this behavior is apparently unified, it is 
underwritten not by anything that produces genuinely collective mental states but by the 
aggregation of increasingly similar individual mental states. Furthermore, in this case we 
begin to see behaviors that cannot be accomplished by individuals on their own; and in a 
number of cases, the aggressive and violent behaviors of the members of the crowd will only 
be exhibited from within a crowd. For these reasons, it is thus true to say of the mob that it 
was becoming angrier as the day went on. However, this claim has to be read distributively. 
As the day wore on, more and more individuals became angry.  
Although it may prove useful to describe the behavior of the collectivity in terms of 
the increasing aggravation, this is only because the behavior produced by the aggregation of 
individual mental states is a self-organizing and emergent behavior. Presumably, although 
the modeling of such phenomena is likely to prove incredibly difficult (especially given that 
there will be a wide variety of initial starting states, variations in susceptibility to emotional 
contagion, and variations in the willingness to commit violent acts when angry) modeling the 
behavior of a rioting crowd will be possible without positing mental states for that crowd. 
This is not, of course to say that there is no such thing as mob mentality. However, unless 
there is good reason to assume that there is sufficient functional specialization to insure that 
collective representations are being produced in the way that is required for genuine 
mentality. Although I am unaware of any cases such as this, I am unwilling to foreclose the 
possibility of mob mentality in the actual world—it is just likely to be incredibly rare. 
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If the picture of collective mentality that I’ve been developing is correct, focusing on 
the psychology of the crowd turns out to be a radically misguided project. Contrary to the 
views advanced by Freud and Le Bon, I argue that an adequate theory of collective mentality 
must focus on the way in which the specialization of function in a collectivity facilitates the 
propagation of representational states across a variety of representational media. I also argue 
that this functional specialization must be integrated enough that the collectivity ought to be 
seen as possessing goals and projects that are not specifiable as states of the individuals that 
compose that collectivity. This sort of functional specialization is analogous to the way in 
which the various subroutines in human cognitive architecture are organized and that the way 
in which representations are propagated in some collectivities is analogous to the way in 
which this occurs in subroutines in individuals. And, I claim that once we realize that a 
homunctional theory is the best explanation of individual mentality, there is no reason to bar 
the possibility of collective mentality grounded on functionally similar homunctional 
architectures. 
5.2.2 Herd mentality: Building on the research on self-organizing systems, the next 
place that it seems plausible to look for collective mentality is in flocks, herds and shoals. 
These collectivities are specialized for dealing with a particular range of phenomena in the 
world, and they are capable of acting in ways that the individuals that compose those 
collectivities are not capable of acting. Consider the way in which flocks of birds, herds of 
land animals, and schools of fish form in response to looming predators. Although a flock of 
birds is made up of multiple unconnected birds, flocks seem to move fluidly as unified 
systems. The question, however, is whether these complex systems themselves possess 
distributed mental states that produce in these behaviors. 
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As Craig Reynolds (1987) demonstrates (using a computational simulation of flock 
behavior), the behavior of the flock can be modeled by providing each of the birds in the 
simulation with just a few simple rules for in-flock behavior. First, given the benefits of 
being inside rather than outside of a flock,102 each of the birds must have the desire to match 
the velocity of other birds. Second, given that the benefits of being in a flock are optimized at 
the center of the flock rather than on the periphery, the birds must each have a desire to stay 
as close to the center of the collective as possible. Finally, to keep the flock airborne, the 
individual birds that compose the flock must also have the desire not to crash into one 
another. Similarly, Iain Couzin et al (2002) have provided a model that adequately simulates 
a wide variety of schooling behaviors in fish on the basis of three simple rules. Taking the 
center of the school as the origin, they posit a zone of repulsion, a zone of alignment, and a 
zone of attraction. The zone of repulsion (ZOR) excerpts a great deal of force over a small 
area (such that fish in ZOR always move away from one another. The zone of attraction 
(ZOA) excerpts less force on an individual fish, but excerpts a force over a much larger area. 
Couzin et al found that by modulating the size of the zone of alignment (ZOO) while 
maintaining the ratio between ZOR and ZOA they could create a variety of different 
schooling phenomena that are perceived in nature. When ZOO was small, the ‘fish’ had the 
character of a loosely packed stationary form. As the size of ZOO increased they began to 
circle around the center of mass of the school, and then began to move together as a unified 
school in a single direction. Thus, by positing a few simple rules for behaving within a 
                                                 
 
102 Research on the reasons for joining a flock, herd, or school suggests a number of reasons why doing so can 
be beneficial to an individual animal. However, as Reynolds (1987, 28), notes, “The basic urge to join a flock 
seems to be the result of evolutionary pressure from several factors: protection from predators, statistically 
improving survival of the (shared) gene pool from attacks from predators, profiting from a larger effective 
search pattern in the quest for food, and advantages for social and mating activities”. 
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school, Couzin et al were thus able to adequately model many common behaviors of schools 
of fish. 
Each of these cases of self-organizing behavior is grounded on the ‘selfish herd’ 
model that is often posited in order to account for emergent behavior in herds of land animals 
(Hamilton 1971). The key posit of such models is that animals will always struggle to gain 
access to the center of the herd because at the center of the herd, animals are more cable of 
avoiding predation without standing guard. After all, if there are other animals around you 
who have to watch for predators, all you need is a simple rule that says: if the animal next to 
me is running, I should run too. While some animals (the unlucky ones who end up at the 
edge of the herd) are forced to watch for predators, those near the middle are capable of 
grazing and sleeping without having to attend to the highly dangerous world in which they 
live. In this way herd gain an important benefit from being in the herd that they would not 
have outside of the herd. Here again we have an important sort of emergent behavior—the 
question, however, is how well do these systems fair as cognitive systems according to the 
desiderata that I’ve laid out for collective mentality.  
The important question, for my purposes, however, is whether the specialization of 
function in a herd is capable of propagating representational states in a way that will yield 
genuinely collective mentality. Consider the case of a herd of antelope grazing on the 
savannah. The animals at the edge of a herd have to be able to detect a looming predator, and 
I think it is fair to say that an adequate theory of representation will attribute to this antelope 
the representation of a predator. This representation of something as a predator will then 
trigger an immediate flight response. Now, the antelope who have not seen the predator don’t 
need to represent much of anything other than that there are a number of conspecifics 
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running. More stupid evolved mechanisms for retaining herd integrity will then kick in and 
cause the antelope at the center of he herd to flee as well. We can look at the behavior of the 
herd and (by adopting the intentional stance) we can explain the behavior of the herd as the 
intentional phenomena of fleeing from the predator or perhaps even trying to confuse the 
predator. However, here’s the important point. The things that appear to be cognitive states 
of a herd of antelope are nothing more than simple aggregations of individual cognitive states 
of individual antelope. 
If we want to explain why the herd turns left at a particular point, this behavior will 
be explained in terms of the behavior of the antelope at the edge of the herd turning in 
response to an obstacle. This will, of course have a rippling effect, causing many of the 
members of the herd to respond in such a way that the herd appears to move as a unified 
system. However, there are no states of the collectivity here that are doing any interesting 
cognitive work. This is not, of course, to say that there are not any interesting emergent 
phenomena here. In fact, the modeling of complex self-organizing systems has given us a 
great deal of insight into the sorts of mechanisms at play in producing collective behaviors in 
animals. However, there is just insufficient functional specialization within a herd to produce 
anything that looks interestingly cognitive. Sure enough, the states of the individuals within 
the herd are determined (if not fully, then) to a large extent by the state of their local 
environment. However, we gain neither predictive nor explanatory advantage by appealing to 
the cognitive states of the collectivity above and beyond the cognitive states of the 
individuals that compose that collectivity.  
In fact, this is built right into the model of explanation here. By positing a set of 
beliefs and desires that are sensitive to the local environment, these self-organizing systems 
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models are capable of explaining the emergence of large-scale herd phenomena without 
having to posit any cognitive state of the collectivity itself. Clearly there are emergent social 
phenomena to be explained here. However, they are best understood in terms of Wilson’s 
(2004) SMH. Herding behaviors are likely to emerge in groups because there are dumb 
mechanisms that are triggered only when these organisms find themselves in certain sorts of 
situations. ‘Herd mentality’ fails to be cognitive in precisely the same way that the behavior 
of crowds fails to be cognitive. What, then, are we to say of even simpler systems such as 
eusocial insects? 
5.2.3 Hive mentality: Philosophers have often seen eusocial insects, such as bees, as 
an interesting test case for the viability of collective mentality. Perhaps the most famous use 
of bees comes from the scathing satire 18th Century English politics in Bernard de 
Mandeville’s (1728/1962) The grumbling hive, or Knaves turn’d honest. Mandeville takes 
political society to be analogous to a beehive in which the selfish interests of the individual 
bees are aggregated in such a way that they tend towards the ‘common good’ of the hive. 
While I’m not concerned with the details of Mandeville’s argument, I am inclined to think 
that there is much to be learned by thinking about bees. In a series of recent papers (many of 
which are reviewed in Seeley 1995), Thomas Seeley has argued that colonies of honeybees 
should be seen as a unified system with a rich functional organization. He claims that this 
functional organization allows for the propagation of representations between bees in a way 
that allows the hive to respond to changing environmental stimuli. There is thus, some reason 
to think that colonies of bees might be genuinely cognitive systems.  
Seeley begins by noting that there is a growing consensus among biologists that 
colonies of eusocial insects can legitimately be treated as systems for the purposes of 
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biological research. Even Richard Dawkins (1989), who is a rabid ‘smallist’ about 
explanation, concedes that honeybees possess sufficient functional organization to qualify as 
vehicles for natural selection. Building on this suggestion, Seeley and his colleagues argue 
that colonies of honeybees have a cognitive life much richer than that of the individual bees 
that constitute a colony. They focus on three sorts collective states in defending the view that 
colonies of bees have mental states: foraging behavior (as a sort of collective sensation), the 
coordination of pollen processing and foraging, and the process of nest selection. I’ll briefly 
canvas Seeley’s data regarding each of these phenomena before turning to an analysis of 
whether Seeley (1995) is right to claim that honeybees possess a ‘hive mind’. 
Seeley (1993) first turns his attention to the functional specialization of a sub-group 
of foragers that seem to function as a sensory apparatus for the colony. Seeley (1986, 1992, 
1997) monitors the behavior of foraging bees, and finds a wealth of data suggesting that 
colonies of bees are able to monitor their environment in order to track the location and 
richness of food sources. Briefly, the process works as follows. A colony of honeybees sends 
out foragers that act as a diffuse sensory extension of the hive into the environment, 
extending in numerous directions simultaneously in order to locate food sources.103 Each of 
                                                 
103 One might attempt to object at this point that sensation is something that has to be localized to some area 
internal to the system that is sensing. However, while it may seem initially strange to think of a sensory system 
that extends into the environment, this strangeness is likely to be an artifact of a misplaced generalization from 
the senses with which we are most familiar (and even on this point, there is reason to think that we might just be 
wrong about how our own sensations happen to work—but that’s another project). Consider, for example, the 
echolocation systems used by some species of bats, dolphins, and whales. These organisms are capable of using 
sounds that extend into the environment in order to assist with navigation and foraging. Perhaps more 
intriguingly, some species of fish posses the capacity for electroception. Weakly electric fish and duck-billed 
platypi, for example, actively generate an electric field that extends into the water and they detect distortions in 
these fields using elecroreceptor organs. This ability allows them to navigate murky waters in which sight and 
smell are relatively ineffective. To put the point briefly, although human senses are typically understood as 
passive receivers, there are cases of active sensory apparatus in other species that extended beyond the bounds 
of the organism into the environment. Given that this is the case, sensation through forager bees to detect the 
location of food, water, and nesting cites should be no more shocking than the use of electroception to navigate 
murky waters. 
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these bees is sent out in a random direction. However, once this first group of ‘sensory’ 
foragers maps the surrounding environment, further foragers are allocated to various nectar 
sources in such a way that the collection of pollen is optimized within the hive. Using this 
capacity, the colony is able to search for patches of food as far as 10 km away (Seeley 1997, 
S23), and it is able to accurately find the richest foraging sites within 2 km. 
The interesting thing about this process is that the allocation of bees to a particular 
resource is not determined by any centralized decision making system, but instead, is the 
result of limited information being consumed by unemployed foragers within the hive (cf., 
Seeley 1983, 1986, 1997, and Thom et al 2000). As employed foragers return to the hive, 
they advertise the distance, direction, and quality of a foraging site by way of ‘waggle 
dances’. Rather than attending to all of the bees that happen to be on the dance floor at a 
particular time, each unemployed forager typically follows only one bees dance (cf., Seeley 
et al 1991, Seeley and Towne 1992); whether or not an unemployed bee will be recruited to a 
foraging site is determined by the duration and vivacity of a foragers waggle dance. Those 
foragers that have visited desirable worksite dance for a longer period of time as well as with 
more vivacity than those bees that have visited less desirable foraging sites—and in some 
cases, bees who have visited less desirable sites will fail to dance at all or will stop working 
all together. This organization, then, allows for a huge amount of sensory information to be 
distributed across the employed foragers in a way that does not require a centralized decision 
making structure to allocate unemployed foragers to new foraging sites. 
The second sort of phenomena to which Seeley and his colleagues turn is the capacity 
of a colony to modify its foraging behavior to suit the quantity and quality of food sources 
                                                                                                                                                       
Thanks to Rob Wilson for alerting me to the phenomena of electroception in weakly electric fish, as well as for 
an intriguing discussion about electroception as sensation. 
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within the range of foraging bees. By modulating the quality and quantity of a pair of 
artificial food sources, Seeley (1997, S28ff) has shown that honeybee colonies become more 
selective when food sources are abundant, but in times of scarcity it will allocate foragers to 
lower profitability nectar sources in order ensure that they will continue to acquire nectar 
even when resources are scarce. The mechanism by which selectivity occurs is best 
understood in terms of the threshold level of food quality at which waggle dances occur. 
When foragers return to the hive, they have to search for a receiver bee that will accept their 
nectar for storage. When the food sources are sparse and the colony's nectar influx is 
relatively low, returning foragers find receiver bees quickly and thus have a low dance 
threshold. In this case, food sources that are less profitable will be exploited. However, when 
food is abundant in the hive, the search time required to find a receiver bee is longer, and in 
this case the dance threshold rises. In this case, only highly profitable food sources are 
exploited. This allows the hive as a whole to allocate resources for the collection of food on 
the basis of changing facts about the environment, even in the absence of a central processing 
system dedicated to monitoring the abundance or scarcity of food. To put the point briefly, 
the colony as a whole is capable of monitoring the relative prevalence of food sources even 
though none of the individual foragers or receivers is capable of representing this.104 
Further complications occur, however, when nectar collection and nectar processing 
are out of synch in a colony. In such cases, foragers returning to a hive will engage in a 
behavior known as the tremble dance. When a forager finds an incredibly rich food supply, a 
                                                 
104 Künholz and Seeley (1998) tell a similar story about the control of the collection of water in honeybee 
colonies. In this case, however, the amount of water than needs to be taken into a hive is at least partially a 
function of the relative temperature within the hive as well as the number of infant larvae that have recently 
hatched. When the temperature of the hive increases, or when there are more young to care for, those foragers 
returning with water have an easier time finding a receiver so will continue to collect water. In times of 
dangerously high temperatures, foragers dedicated to searching for water will recruit other bees to deal with the 
dangerous situation. 
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colony has to be able to boost its nectar collection rate in response to a high quality foraging 
site, but it also has to increase the rate at which nectar is being processed in order to allow 
those bees returning from a high quality foraging site to find receivers for their pollen. Thus, 
when a forager returns from a high quality foraging site and finds that it has an extensive 
search time for finding a receiver, it engages in a ‘tremble dance’. In the presence of tremble 
dances, unemployed bees working inside the hive, the tremble dance carries the information 
that they should begin processing nectar; for bees who have been foraging, it carries the 
information that they should refrain from recruiting additional foragers (hence inhibiting the 
waggle dances of other bees). The tremble dance is thus used in order to insure that the rate 
at which pollen is being processed is adequate to the quantity and quality of pollen within 
range of the colony. 
The final range of phenomena to which Seeley and his colleagues (Seeley 2003, 
Seeley and Buhrman 2001, Seeley and Visscher 2003, Passino and Seeley 2006, and 
Beekman et al 2006) turn is to the process by which the selection of new nest sites occurs. 
When a colony of honeybees outgrows its hive (typically in the spring or early summer), the 
colony will split and half of the bees will swarm and begin to search for a new nest. Initially, 
the new colony will swarm around a number of tree branches and then send out scouts 
(approximately five percent of the swarm) to look for a new nesting site (Beekman et al 
2006, 162). In the initial phases of searching for a nest, the scouts will typically find a dozen 
or so potential nest sites—each of which will be evaluated by the scout according to six 
desiderata: cavity volume; entrance size, height, direction, and proximity to the cavity floor; 
and presence of combs in the cavity (Seeley and Burkham 2001). As the scout bees return to 
the hive, they begin to dance in a way that indicates to the swarm these features of the 
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potential site. The interesting thing to note, however, is that each scout will only dance for 
one site, and they almost never dance for another site once they have made their initial 
choice. Here’s where things get really interesting. 
Although there is no shifting in choices, there will eventually emerge a consensus on 
one site, and it the swarm reliably chooses the site that best satisfies the six desiderata listed 
above (rather than the first adequate site, for example). The swarm will only move however, 
when there is complete consensus on a single site. The question, then, is how is a decision 
reached if no bees are switching their allegiances. Seeley and his colleagues (Seeley 2003, 
Seeley and Buhrman 1999, Seeley and Visscher 2003, and Passino and Seeley 2006) have 
shown that this consensus occurs as follows. First, the initial scouting bees return to the 
swarm and dance for the site that they have found. Those bees that have found a merely 
mediocre or passable nest site will dance less vigorously than those bees that have found a 
high-quality site. This then leads to heavier recruitment for higher-quality nest sites and, 
eventually, to a cessation of dancing for lower-quality nest sites. To put the point briefly, 
lower-quality sites lose support until only the highest quality site is being danced for. This 
then leads to the reliable selection of the highest quality nest site without requiring any of the 
individual bees to have a broad knowledge of all of the alternative possible nest sites that are 
under consideration by the swarm. 
These phenomena are quite interesting. However, the question is: should these 
behaviors of honeybee colonies be understood as genuinely cognitive phenomena? Seeley’s 
data gives us very good reason to think that the specialization of function in a honeybee 
colony facilitates the propagation of representational states (e.g., states that represent the 
location of nectar, the quality of a foraging site, and the location of a nest site) between bees 
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with very different functionally specified tasks. Moreover, the ways in which these 
representations are propagated through a honeybee colony produces a range of emergent 
states that are more complex than the cognitive states of the individual bees that compose the 
collectivity. Although none of the bees are capable of comparing the quality of foraging or 
nesting sites, there are mechanisms at place in the collectivity as a whole that allow for these 
comparisons. Thus, it is reasonable to say that comparative judgments are realized in the hive 
as a whole and not just in the aggregation of the individual states.105 
At this point, it also seems fair to say that honeybee colonies are capable of 
representing a variety of facts about their umwelten in a way that allows them to deal with the 
pressing problems of a hostile world. More importantly, by positing cognitive states of 
honeybee colonies, Seeley has been able to explain such diverse phenomena as the decision 
to build a nest in one site rather than another and the decision to allocate more resources to 
collecting or storing nectar. These predictions are only possible when the cognitive states are 
ascribed to the collectivity rather than the individual bees. The choice of a nest site is a 
striking demonstration of this fact. After all, the colony chooses the best nest site possible 
even though none of the individuals has the capacity to chose or even represent any of the 
nest sites as better or worse than any other. It is only through the coordinated activity of a 
number of bees, and only through the representation of particular facts about particular nest 
sites across various bees that this capacity can emerge. This gives us good reason to think 
                                                 
105 One might object that there is nothing more than the aggregation of representations by individual bees plus a 
mechanism for settling on one option or another. To make this move, however, is problematic when we 
consider the states of an individual’s brain. At one level of explanation, neurons are designed in such a way that 
they mechanically fire when they are presented with a certain sort of stimulation, and there are mechanisms at 
play in the human brain for taking the activity of particular neurons and aggregating them so that they produce a 
certain sort of behavior. However, we need to be careful to note that neurons and populations are the vehicles 
for particular sorts of representation, and it is only by continually checking outside of the system to see whether 
these patterns of activity have the function of representing that we can take them to be genuine representations 
rather than mere recordings. I am inclined to think that if patterns of activity across neurons can mean 
something, then so can patterns of activity in honeybees. 
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that there is a sufficient amount of emergent phenomena here to give the collectivity a rich 
life of its own. However, there are still a couple of lingering questions about whether these 
emergent phenomena should be seen as genuinely cognitive. 
I have claimed that the appeal to cognitive representations in offering a psychological 
explanation of collective behavior require four things. First, I claimed that a genuinely 
cognitive system must possess internal states that have the function of adjusting the system’s 
behavior in ways that allows it to cope with features of its environment in ways that are not 
fully determined by the design of the system. Consider the representations that require a 
decrease in foraging when too much food is coming into a hive too quickly. None of the 
individual bees represents a need for a decrease in foraging. However, the system is designed 
to be sensitive to the relation between incoming nectar and nectar storage. When the rate at 
which nectar is being returned to the hive exceeds the rate at which it is stored, the system is 
designed to decrease the amount of nectar that is coming into the system. The important thing 
to notice, however, is that it is not a matter of the absolute quantity of the input or output that 
is relevant to the decrease in foraging, but a relation between the current state of a honeybee 
colony and the current state of the foraging sites in the area that modulates the collection of 
nectar. It is only by way of these internal states that behavior that is sensitive to changes in 
the environment is produced. However, the way in which the honeybee colony behaves is 
fully a function of the evolutionary design of a honeybee colony.  
Recall the distinction that I borrowed from Dennett (1996) between four sorts of 
cognitive systems. Although I don’t think that we have enough data to decide whether the 
systems at play in a honeybee colonies will classify them as Darwinian systems (whose 
behavior is unreflective and static) or Skinnerian systems (that modify their behavior in 
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response to stimuli by way of some sort of dumb feedback mechanism), what is clear is that 
the states of the honeybee colonies do not possess the sort of representations that could be 
used in order to preselect behaviors on the basis of internal models—that is, honeybee 
colonies are neither Poperian nor Gregorian systems.. 
Consider the mechanisms by which a honeybee colony represents its environment. 
Waggle dances record the location and quality of food sources that can and ought to be 
consumed by unemployed foragers; search time for a receiver indicates the rate at which 
nectar is being stored in relation to the rate at which it is being collected; and the tremble 
dances of foragers indicate the presence of a high-quality food source that is not being 
adequately foraged. While these dances and search times are capable of standing-in for 
features of the environment (specifically the location of a pollen source and the rate or 
consumption by the system), they do so only when the system is immediately presented with 
raw data about the natural environment. The dance times as well as the vigorousness of an 
individual bees dance are fully determined by features of the world, and the behavior of 
unemployed bees and collectors are fully determined by the dances of the returning forager 
bees. It thus seems reasonable to claim that honeybee colonies are incapable of engaging in 
behavior that is as rich as our own cognitive behavior. But this just raises a question about 
whether or not decouplability should be seen as a necessary for genuine mentality. 
Andy Clark (1997, 144ff) argues that we should not rule out states that are not 
decouplable from their immediate causes as genuinely representational. He argues that if we 
do rule such states out, we will also be forced to rule out the population of neurons in the 
rat’s parietal cortex that indicates the direction in which the rat’s head is facing. After all, this 
population of neurons is active just when it is actually detecting the direction in which the 
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rat’s head is facing (which is, incidentally, most of the time). Now, while Clark (1997, 145) 
is surely right to note that we gain a great deal of explanatory power by treating this 
population of neurons as representing the position of the rat’s head, and that it helps us to 
understand the flow of information through the rat’s cognitive system as a whole, it is not 
clear to me that we gain the right sort of explanatory power in order to count this as a 
genuinely cognitive states. We should clearly count these states of the rat’s parietal lobe as 
the sorts of states that are to be studied by cognitive science. However, they don’t give us 
much of anything like the central cognitive systems that are at play in things like belief and 
desire.  
I suggest that although there is no immediate reason to rule out collective mentality in 
the case of honeybee colonies, it is important to note that the mental life of a honeybee 
colony is far more impoverished than the mental life of a human. Honeybees engage in 
cognitive activities directed towards strategic interactions with their environment, however, 
these states are at best minimally cognitive states.106 The emergent phenomena in honeybee 
colonies suggest an interesting range of phenomena to be studied at the level of honeybee 
                                                 
106 Similarly cognitive phenomena is suggested by the mound building behavior of termites (Bonabeau et al 
1998) and in the familiar case of the use of pheromones by ants to mark the trail used in returning from a food 
source. Here’s the way the story goes. When ants forage for food, they typically utilize a random search pattern. 
However, the collection of food produces behavior that is organized in such a way to make food collection 
efficient. This efficient behavior, however, emerges from the random search patterns and a pair of simple rules: 
1) if you food, deposit a pheromone trail on your way back to the nest, and 2) if you encounter a pheromone 
trail, follow it to the food source. As should be immediately obvious, these two rules are mutually reinforcing—
the ants that are recruited to a food source will also lay down a pheromone trail, this then makes the trail 
stronger and recruits more ants to the food source. Sumpter (2006, 7) reviews evidence that suggests that ants 
can use these simple rules to solve the problem of find the shortest route from a food source to the nest. In an 
experiment (Beckers et al 1992) where ants were provided with a food source and two bridges of differing 
lengths that provided paths for returning to the nest, a majority of ants chose the shorter bridge in the majority 
of cases. Here’s the reason: the length of the bridge modulates the strength of the pheromone trail. The 
pheromones are continually evaporating on both trails; however, the longer trip time means that the it will take 
more time to get to the food source and so the reinforcement of the trail will be a slower process and “when trail 
following ants make the choice between two bridges they detect a higher concentration of pheromone on” the 
shorter bridge, thus reinforcing the shorter trail even more strongly (Sumpter 2006, 7). Similar results explain 
the production of trail networks by army ants engaged in a raid (cf., Deneubourg et al. 1989). 
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colonies. Moreover, it’s an interesting range of phenomena to be explained from within the 
cognitive sciences. However, these states are cognitive states only to the extent that the states 
of the neurons in the rat’s parietal cortex are cognitive states. That is, there is a range of 
explanatory projects within the cognitive sciences that should focus on such states; however, 
psychology is better served by dissociating such states from the core cases of cognition. They 
are clearly states that are important for explaining behavior, but we need to be sure not to get 
carried away in ascribing such things as beliefs and desires to honeybee colonies. I am thus 
inclined to count such states as cognitive states but only with the recognition that they are 
more like the states of a rat’s parietal lobe of the states of my visual cortex than they are like 
core cases of intentional phenomena like beliefs, desires, hopes, wishes, and dreams.  
 
5.3 Multi-level selection theory and cognition in human groups 
As I have argued, genuinely cognitive systems possess homuncular decompositions 
into functionally specialized subroutines that propagate representational states across a 
variety of representational media. Thus far I have focused on self-organizing systems. 
However, I now turn to another plausible model for establishing the actuality of collective 
mentality: multi-level selection.  
In the previous section, I noted that many people think of eusocial insects as vehicles 
of natural selection. However, even biologists who are willing to allow for multi-level 
selection with eusocial insects are typically unwilling to apply such a model to more complex 
organisms. As Eliot Sober and David Sloan Wilson (1998, 338) put the point, whatever it 
might be convenient to say about bees, the existence of superorganisms is typically seen as a 
dead issue and its death is seen as one of the greatest achievements of mid-twentieth century 
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biology. There are, however, holdouts against this claim. D.S. Wilson has been the most 
visible of these defenders of multi-level selection within biology. Wilson has spent most of 
his career arguing for a version of multi-level selection theory and in a series of recent 
papers, he argues that once we have an adequate understanding of multi-level selection, and 
once we adequately understand the role of evolutionary mechanisms in explaining cognitive 
capabilities, it will become clear that these mechanisms can underwrite the sort of functional 
specialization required for collective mentality. 
Wilson’s argument runs as follows. Any traits for which an evolutionary story is 
adequate will be best understood as an adaptation to a biological system’s environment, and a 
trait is adaptive just in case it has the function, within the overall structure of the biological 
system, of increasing the relative fitness of this system (i.e., of increasing its capacity to cope 
with some significant feature of its environment relative to other systems with which it is 
competing). What this means for multi-level selection is that if there are group traits that are 
best understood as adaptations, they will have to have the function of increasing the fitness of 
that collectivity relative to the other collectivities with which it is competing. Now, biologists 
have typically averaged relative fitness across groups, focusing exclusively on the genotypic 
traits that are common across populations. However, Wilson claims that in order to give a 
complete and adequate explanation of many biological traits, it is necessary to explain not 
only relative fitness within a group but also the relative fitness of groups relative to one 
another. Although some traits are disadvantageous to particular members of a group, they are 
adaptive when considered in terms of the functional role that they play within a group.  
The clearest example of a trait that is adaptive for groups but not for all of the 
individuals that compose that group is a trait that results in biological altruism. For example, 
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when a vervet monkey offers an alarm call after seeing an eagle or a leopard, it is putting 
itself in danger in order to warn its troop of the impending danger. If individual selection 
offered an exhaustive explanation of vervet monkey behavior, then such warning behavior 
would be anomalous. Because warning behavior is dangerous for the monkey uttering the 
call, and because hiding from the eagle or leopard would provide more selective advantage 
than making a call, we should expect alarm calls to be weeded out of a population relatively 
rapidly. In accounting for behavior such as the alarm call of vervet monkeys, D.S. Wilson 
introduces the idea of a trait group. D.S. Wilson claims that for the purposes of evolution by 
natural selection, it is not the boundaries of a body that proves significant but sharing a 
common fate that determines the unit of selection (D.S. Wilson and Sober 1989). In the case 
of warning behavior, a troop of monkeys shares a common fate for purposes of avoiding 
predators, and a troop of monkeys that has some monkeys that are fill the functional role of 
sentinels will fare better at avoiding predators than will a troop of monkeys that lacks such 
monkeys. 
To make sense of this idea of sharing a common fate, D.S. Wilson (1975) introduces 
the idea of a trait-group. Trait-groups are defined in terms of individuals that interact in order 
to achieve a particular goal (D.S. Wilson 2002, 15). Rather than categorically rejection group 
selection by starting with the capacities of single individuals and trying to explain why a 
particular collective behavior would emerge on the basis of the interactions of individuals, 
D.S. Wilson claims that evolutionary theory requires the units of selection to be evaluated on 
a case-by-case basis. In some cases, a particular behavior is advantageous at the level of 
between-group selection even though it is disadvantageous at the level of within-group 
selection. The primary claim behind multi-level selection is that we should be willing to posit 
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group-selection in those cases where the selective advantage of a behavior is best explained 
by appeal to between-group selection, as is the case in the vervet monkey alarm calls. This 
model, thus, shares a number of important methodological characteristics with the model of 
collective mentality that I have been suggesting. 
Building upon this account of multi-level selection, D.S. Wilson argues that because 
psychological traits are biological phenomena, we should expect that some psychological 
traits would be explained in terms of group-selection rather than individual selection. In 
short, the claim is that “groups can also evolve in adaptive units with respect to cognitive 
activities such as decision making, memory, and learning” (D.S. Wilson 1997a, S128). 
Building on insights derived from evolutionary psychology, D.S. Wilson claims that 
evolutionary pressures would be significant for determining how people will evaluate 
information. He claims that the sorts of decision processes in which people typically engage 
are likely to be significant not just at the individual-level but also at the level of social 
groups. Now, since there will likely be a number of important consequences for both 
individuals and the groups of which they are a part, “it is likely that the psychology of 
decision making has been strongly shaped by natural selection at both the individual and 
group levels” (D.S. Wilson 1997, 346). Perhaps more importantly, D.S. Wilson claims that 
there may even be cases in which groups are so integrated and the contributions to particular 
goals so partial that “the group could literally be said to have a mind in a way that the 
individuals do not, just as brains have a mind in a way that neurons do not.  
Having developed a theoretical apparatus for the possibility of collective mentality, 
D.S. Wilson then argues that his model is satisfied in a number of cases. D.S. Wilson (1997, 
358) begins his analysis of collective cognition within the multi-level selection framework by 
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distinguishing between two hypotheses about cognitive cooperation. The first hypothesis is 
that there are cases in which individuals act as individual decision makers with the goal of 
making a decision that is good for the group. The second hypothesis is that there are cases in 
which an individual’s cognitive activity is important precisely because of the functional role 
that it fills in contributing to the cognitive activity of a collectivity. However, as R.A. Wilson 
(2001, S268) notes, only the second hypothesis will provide evidence for the existence of 
collective cognition. After all, the mere fact that individuals are capable of working together 
to solve problems does not provide evidence that they are thinking as a group. As I have 
argued throughout this thesis, only a system that consists of functionally organized 
components dedicated to collective computation will count as a genuinely cognitive 
collective system. The question, then, is whether there is any data on cognitive cooperation 
that lends credence to the latter hypothesis. 
D.S. Wilson et al (2000) suggest that one promising place to look for cognitive 
cooperation is in the role of gossip in groups. By engaging in gossip, groups police their 
members and insure that people do not defect from their assigned role. The hypothesis is that 
a person who fears being gossiped about if she defects from her social role is less likely to 
defect than a person who does not share this fear. In order to test this hypothesis, Wilson et al 
(2000) used a survey style experiment to test people’s intuitions about the normative status of 
gossip. Wilson et al (2000) found that although people were highly critical of self-serving 
gossip, they thought that gossip was acceptable in cases where it is directed towards a norm 
violation (provided that the gossip occurs in a responsible manner). Building upon this data, 
Kevin Kniffin and D.S. Wilson (2004) decided to study the use of gossip in a more 
ecologically valid situation. They studied the use of gossip among the members of a 
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University rowing team, using a voice-activated tape recorder, carried by the first author 
when he was a member of the team, to track the content of conversations between team 
members. Kniffin and Wilson (2004) found that gossip served the function within the rowing 
team of enhancing conformity with the norms of the group. They then claim that because the 
rowing team shares a common fate with regard to the task of rowing, and because the use of 
gossip helps the group to satisfy its goals, this gossip should be seen as a sort of collective 
cognition. 
However, it is not clear that this data demonstrates anything more than Wilson’s 
(1997) first hypothesis: that there are cases in which individuals act as individual decision 
makers with the goal of making a decision that is good for the group. Clearly, the use of 
gossip to ensure cooperation in accordance with the goals of a group are significant for the 
success of a group such as a rowing team, and it is quite likely that gossip can play an 
important role in many other sorts of social groups as well. Moreover, Wilson might even be 
right that the cohesiveness exhibited by groups that engage in gossip will be likely to allow 
these groups to outperform other groups that do not engage in gossip (or something else that 
is functionally equivalent for norm enforcement). In fact, it is a near truism of social group-
selection (cf., Boyd and Richerson 2005) that some such structures for ensuring social 
cohesion, and likely even more complicated structures of punishment and meta-punishment, 
are a necessary condition on cooperative activity. However, the mere fact that people are 
working together does not tell us anything about whether or not they are thinking as a group. 
That is, the mere fact that a group that is constrained to act in accordance with a system of 
norms does not yet give us reason to think that we have found a case of genuinely collective 
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cognition. However, D.S. Wilson does have more data that he takes to lend credence to the 
hypothesis of collective cognition. 
Wilson et al (2003) ran two experiments on cognitive cooperation, based on the game 
‘20 questions’. In the first experiment, they set up a variety of more and less difficult games 
about job titles by modulating the obscurity of the word to be guessed. In a first condition, 
they assigned volunteers either to play the game alone or to play as part of a same-sex group 
consisting of 3 members. In a second condition, those volunteers who had been in groups 
played alone and those who had played alone played as members of same-sex groups 
consisting of 3 members. Wilson et al (2003) found that in games that were solved quickly, 
there was little difference between individuals and groups. However, as more questions 
needed to be asked in order to solve a game, groups begin to solve more games than even the 
best individuals. Wilson et al (2003) hypothesize that the increased memory load required to 
remember which questions have been asked, as well as the increased computations required 
to recognize which options had been closed off, allow groups to outperform individuals in 
more difficult games. 
In order to demonstrate that the mechanism at play in improving performance for 
groups was not merely an artifact of the number of people engaged in a particular game, 
Wilson et al (2003) ran a second experiment in which volunteers were asked to think of as 
many job titles as they could. In a second condition, volunteers were then provided with a 
partially completed game of 20 questions in which 7 questions had been asked and were 
asked to think of as many jobs as possible that had not been ruled out; volunteers were also 
assigned to either 1) a nominal group, in which two people worked alone but their answers 
were combined, or 2) a real group, in which two people worked together. Wilson et al (2003) 
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found that there was no statistically significant difference in performance between nominal 
and real groups in the first condition. However, in the second, more difficult, condition 
Wilson et al (2003, 237) found that real groups had a performance advantage of 
approximately 50% over nominal groups (94.8 vs. 60.8 items recalled, p = 0. 003). Based on 
this data, Wilson et al (2003) argue that the value of cognitive cooperation is most 
pronounced in those cases where task difficulty exceeds the cognitive abilities of single 
individuals. Importantly, this is precisely what is predicted by the model offered by D.S. 
Wilson (1997) in his defense of the multi-level selection of cognitive adaptations. The 
question, however, is whether this sort of data demonstrates that there actually are cases in 
which an individual’s cognitive activity is important precisely because of the functional role 
that it fills in contributing to the cognitive activity of a collectivity. 
Unfortunately, D.S. Wilson provides no reason to think that the sort of functional 
integration required for something to be a genuinely cognitive system are present in the cases 
that he addresses. Although it is clear that the individuals are using representational states, it 
is not clear that these representational states are being used in the production of genuinely 
collective representations. A plausible reading of the results collected by D.S. Wilson and his 
colleagues suggests that there are interesting facts about the way in which individuals behave 
when they are members of groups, and more importantly, the differences exhibited by 
individuals within collectivities could indeed provide selective advantage within the context 
of between-group selection. However, as R.A. Wilson’s SMH suggests, the mere fact that 
there are numerous cognitive phenomena that emerge only within the context of groups is not 
itself sufficient to demonstrate the existence of collective mentality. The collectivities with 
which D.S. Wilson is concerned may indeed possess internal states with the function of 
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adjusting the system’s behavior in ways that allow it to cope with features of its environment, 
and these states may also be capable of standing-in for features of the environment that are 
important to the system. However, until we have a better understanding of what sorts of 
mechanisms are sufficient to ground the functional specialization required for genuinely 
collective mentality, I am, at least at this point, unwilling to attribute collective mentality to 
the systems with which D.S. Wilson is concerned. Fortunately, there is a promising attempt 
to explain these mechanisms, and it is to this attempt that I now turn. 
 
5.4 Transactive memories and the group mind 
The most promising attempt to resuscitate the idea of a group mind from within the 
discipline of psychology has been developed by Daniel Wegner and colleagues (Wegner 
1986 and 1995; Wegner and Wegner 1995; Wegner et al 1985) in a series of papers on 
‘transactive memory’. Although memory is typically understood individualistically, Wegner 
argues that some groups form memory systems in which each person in the group possesses 
only a subset of the information relative to the to the activity of the group, but through the 
coordinated activity of the person’s that compose a collectivity, the collectivity as a whole 
can remember things that the individuals alone cannot (Wegner et al 1985, 256). Each 
individual has “in internal storage many items, labels, and locations, and knowing that the 
locations are in the other’s memory” (1986, 189-190). Wegner begins by thinking about how 
this system could be similar to a memory system in an individual.  
Individual memory is often divided into three stages. First, perceptual inputs must be 
encoded as discrete representations that are ‘understood’ by a system as having a particular 
content; they are then stored in such a way that they can later be retrieved. Making this 
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distinction, however, leads to a worry about how we are able to store information in such a 
way that retrieval will be fast and accurate enough to facilitate practical activity in an ever-
changing world. One promising answer to this question is to note that memories are not 
stored individually and separately from one another, but are organized in various associative 
networks. The thought is that by encoding information in such a way that it is already sorted 
topically, the mechanisms dedicated to recall won’t have to search the entire memory system 
but will only have to search within a particular topic. This, however, raises a question about 
how the recall mechanisms could know where to search. Wegner (1986) claims that the most 
promising theory of retrieval is grounded on the idea that retrieval mechanisms contain a 
system of metamemories, which are to be understood as directories of memories indicating 
the location of a particular sort of information. This is where things get interesting.  
While it might be true that memory processes depend crucially on neurological 
structures, there’s no reason to suppose that the information that’s been encoded and stored 
in memory couldn’t be located externally to the system possessing a particular metamemory. 
On the basis of the claim that memories and metamemories can be located in different 
systems, Wegner takes transactive memory to be the logical development of adopting a 
computational theory of memory. Wegner’s key claim is that on the assumption that our best 
understanding of individual cognition is computational, we ought to understand at least some 
sorts of social groups as computational networks (Wegner 1995, 319). Wegner (1995) 
elaborates on this suggestion by noting that networking a set of computers is often achieved 
by duplicating directories on all of the machines while physically locating the information 
specified by the directory on only one of the machines. This allows each computer in the 
network to make use of a virtual memory that spans across all of the machines, thus allowing 
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for increased speed in processing and decreased load on the memory for every particular 
machine, without a decrease in the number of tasks that can be executed by the network. 
Such a system requires that the various machines in the network be able to 1) update their 
directories without accessing all of the memory items on the various computers, 2) ensure 
that information is allocated to the various machines in such a way that the information does 
not become excessively redundant across the machines, and 3) ensure that the information 
that is spatially distributed is accessible to any machine that might happen to need that 
information (Wegner 1995, 324-326). The key question for this analogy, then, is whether 
there are analogous systems in place for purported cases of human transactive memory. 
To begin with, there are a number of different ways in which such metamemories can 
refer to memories located in other systems. Default assumptions based on morphology and 
surface characteristics of another person (e.g., stereotypes formed on the basis of the 
perceived gender, race, or class) are often used as a starting point for determining which 
persons in a collectivity ought to be responsible for a particular range of information (1995, 
327). However, such assumptions are often unwarranted, and as a collectivity develops the 
allocation of information begins to develop as well. Assumptions made on the basis of things 
we come to know about a particular person often play a key role in deciding who will be 
likely to store a particular range of information. In many cases, collectivities end up with 
ranges of specialization that are explicitly negotiated (Wegner 1995, 327), producing 
metamemories through explicit planning about what each person should focus on (e.g., you 
remember the first four digits of the pass code, I’ll remember the next four). Other times, the 
metamemories are classified merely on the basis of a perceived expertise grounded in the 
interaction of individuals within a group (e.g., Dylan always remembers Fodor’s arguments, 
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Felipe remembers Searle’s, and Jacek remembers Jackson’s). Such implicit judgments of 
expertise can take place either on the basis of functional specialization required by the 
structure of a particular organization or on the basis of quick judgments on the basis of 
paradigmatic cases of recall (Wegner 1995, 327).  
In all three cases, methods of information allocation produce a differentiated 
transactive structure that contain a lot of overlap in general information about who is likely to 
do what, but that reserves the particular details of a particular category for one persons 
memory alone (Wegner et al 1985, 264-65). These metamemories can then be updated on the 
basis of assumptions about which person is likely to be the specialist on some particular 
topic. Although this is not always a successful way to engage in the updating of memories 
(especially when you’ve made an unwarranted assumption about who is likely to specialize 
in remembering a particular sort of information on the basis of an ungrounded prejudice), it 
does, by and large, allow for the successful navigation of our social world. More importantly, 
assumptions about where a particular sort of information is likely to be located that are built 
up on the basis of explicit or implicit negotiations about who is to take care of a particular 
sort of information are likely to be far more successful. 
In order to demonstrate how this computational model of transactive memory works, 
Wegner must demonstrate that a person can retrieve the information in another person’s 
memory, and this has to be possible because she knows that this other person is the location 
of a piece of information with a certain label. Wegner  (1995, 334) claims that the first step 
of retrieving a memory occurs when one checks to see if this is the sort of information that 
they remember. If it fails to be the case that this is something that you are supposed to 
remember, you check to see if there is someone else in the group who is supposed to 
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remember this sort of information. When you look elsewhere you ask the person who is 
supposed to have that memory and then you deploy that information to solve the practical 
problem at hand. This system is, however, occasionally undercut by an immediate attempt to 
look elsewhere. In these cases, there are triggers (e.g., if I am asked about numerosities I’ll 
won’t feel that I know about such things, however, I’ll be immediately drawn towards asking 
Mr. Numberbaum) that indicate that this is the sort of information that is stored in some other 
location.  
This provides a theoretical foundation for a theory of collective memory. We begin 
by recognizing that memory has to be divided into three discrete sorts of processes. We then 
see that there are many things that can fulfill the functional role of storage. One way in which 
memories can be stored is in other people’s heads—they form a sort of external hard drive 
over which we have limited access. Given that there are ways of accessing the information 
that is stored in another person’s head, and given that there are metamemory systems in place 
that can recognize the information that is located in another person, we have good reason to 
think that other people can act as an external storage devise for one another. Now, if there are 
memory tasks on which the groups can outperform the individuals that compose these 
groups, we’ll have reason to think that these systems are acting as a single cognitive system. 
And fortunately, there are such data in the offering. 
Wegner et al (1991) report the results of a study of 118 individuals in close dating 
relationships. Pairs of subjects were asked to remember a list of 34 items from seven 
different categories. These pairs were either the dating pair (natural couple condition) or they 
were randomly assigned opposite-sex couples (impromptu couple condition). These couples 
were then randomly assigned to a condition in which areas of expertise were assigned (i.e., 
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each person in the assigned expertise condition was told to remember items from a specific 
category) or not assigned (i.e., each person in the unassigned expertise condition was allowed 
to focus on whichever information she or he could remember more easily). Wegner et al 
(1991, 926) found that in the unassigned expertise conditions natural couples (M=31.40) 
remembered more items than did impromptu couples (M=27.64). Moreover, the items that 
were remembered were, for the most part not overlapping.107 However, in the assigned 
expertise condition impromptu couples (M=30.14) remembered more items than natural 
couples (M=23.75)! This result initially looks somewhat surprising. However, this data lends 
credence to the value of functional specialization. 
Natural couples seem to develop a transactive memory system without being directed 
to do so. This system then facilitates improved performance on this sort of memory task. 
Here’s what appears to be happening. Very early in relationships, individuals within couples 
begin to realize that their partners specialize in retaining certain sorts of memories and that 
they specialize in retaining others. On the assumption that the relationship will last a long 
time,108 and that they will be able to act as a couple, people in relationships begin to rely on 
their partner to retain some or their memories. However, the interference produced by the 
introduction of a new functional architecture that’s produced by assigning expertise prevents 
the natural memory structure that has emerged in the natural couples from being used. More 
importantly, focusing on remembering the areas that you are supposed to focus on in the 
experiment takes an added toll on the subjects because they have to remember not to 
remember the things that they would usually remember in this couple. This provides us with 
                                                 
107 For overlapping memories (M=5.28) for non-overlapping memories (M=22.8) 
 
108 Wegner et al (1991, 925) report that 52.5% of the subjects believed that their relationship would last forever. 
An additional 31.4% of the subjects believed that the relationship would continue for some time.  
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very good reason for thinking that transactive memories tend to emerge in close couples. 
However, there are serious questions about how much further such transactive memory 
systems can be extended. 
In an interesting extension of the plausibility of transactive memory, Liang, 
Moreland, and Argote (1995) investigated the practical implications of Wegner’s claims 
about transactive memories for group performance. In the first phase of their experiment, 
they trained subjects in small groups, consisting of three people, to assemble transistor 
radios. In the second phase of their experiment, subjects were later asked to build the same 
sorts of radios, either in the same group where they were initially working or in a new three-
person group. Liang, Moreland, and Argote (1995) found that groups who trained together 
were better able to recall the assembly procedure and were thus able to build better radios. 
Moreover, when they coded videotapes of each of the work groups from the second phase of 
the experiment (in a third phase of the experiment), they found that the improvement in recall 
and performance occurred primarily by way of the functional specialization that is predicted 
by Wegner’s model of transactive memory. 
There are a number of ways in which these results could be explained by appeal to the 
individual states rather than the states of the collectivities. For example, recall that Robert 
Wilson’s (2004) SMH claims that there are likely to be state of the individuals that compose 
these work groups that will only be manifested when these individuals are part of the relevant 
collectivity. The question, then, is what sorts of states are these likely to be and why are they 
best understood as exclusively states of the individuals rather than states of the group that 
they compose? At this point, the most plausible response is to say that the structures of 
communication that obtain between the members of these groups are more highly developed 
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in groups that have trained together. People who have trained together know what sorts of 
questions to ask of one another in order to more effectively attack the problem at hand. If this 
were they case, then the increased capacity for communication, rather than the functional 
specialization within the group would be a much more plausible explanation of the 
phenomena—and the theoretical virtues of appealing to transactive memories as collective 
mental states would dissipate.  
Fortunately, however, this sort of explanation turns out not to be as plausible as it first 
seems. Moreland and Myaskovsky (2000) demonstrate that functional specialization within a 
group, in which each member of a group is responsible for retaining a particular range of 
memories, is responsible for the improved performance of groups in such tasks. They find no 
significant difference between the performance of groups that were trained together and those 
who were given handouts specifying the tasks that would be performed by their group 
mates—but each of these sorts of groups continued to have an edge on those groups in which 
such specialization of memory structures was established. 
The question, then, is how well transactive memory meets the desiderata that I have 
laid out for cases of collective mentality. The project of transactive memory is grounded on 
the claim that within collectivities, various individuals specialize in the sorts of information 
that they will remember. This is the sort of cognitive specialization that can facilitate the 
propagation of representational states across individual memories in order to achieve various 
sorts of collective cognitive projects. This means that at least the structure of the theory of 
transactive memory is of the right sort to count as underwriting a case of collective cognition. 
Moreover, Wegner’s data demonstrates that there are states of the transactive memory 
systems that are not exhaustively described by an appeal to the state of the individuals. 
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Because of the way in which informational specialization occurs, appealing to the cognitive 
states of collectivity yields both predictive and explanatory advantage beyond what can be 
achieved by an appeal to merely individualistic cognitive science.  
The collectivities studied by Wegner and his colleagues also appear to have the 
capacity to be in states that are specified internal to the system that facilitate coping with at 
least some memory tasks in ways that the individuals who compose the collectivity could 
not. Moreover, these strategies are not exclusively a function of the design of the system but 
emerge in the interaction between the individuals who compose the couples. Given that these 
states of the collectivities are memories, they are (almost by definition) capable of standing 
in for various features of the collectivities’ environments even in the absence of immediate 
environmental stimuli, and these transactive memories form larger representational schemes 
that allows a variety of possible memory contents to be represented. Finally, there are indeed 
proper and improper ways of producing, maintaining, modifying, and using the various 
memories under various conditions. However, there is a bit more to say on this point. 
In claiming that transactive memories should be considered genuinely cognitive states 
of collectivities, I am committed to the claim that there will be ways in which the transactive 
memory system can fail to function properly for the systems in question. Fortunately, there 
are a number of places were we start to see evidence of the improper functioning of 
transactive memory systems. To begin with, there are some cases in which we find 
transactive memory systems that contain incomplete specifications of the relevant pathway 
information about who’s responsible for what. Such incomplete pathway information can 
easily lead to new sources of error within the group (1986, 198).109 Moreover, unwarranted 
                                                 
109 Suppose Mark makes a mean martini; however, when Margaret, the mistress of margaritas, mojitos, and 
martinis was hired at the bar, he began to focus on Manhattans—he thought that any time he needed to make a 
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‘feelings of knowing’ can occur when an individual overestimates what other people in the 
group are likely to remember.110 Finally, when one of the members of a small group leaves, 
this can leave metamemories without access to the locations where the relevant memories are 
stored. This can produce all sorts of failures of practical activity by the collectivity. Things 
that the collectivity used to be able to do with ease will now be either much harder or maybe 
even impossible to do. 
Given that transactive memory systems meet the criteria for collective mentality that I 
have discussed in this thesis, Wegner’s claim that transactive memory provides a new 
foundation for claims about the group mind are well placed. However, there are still 
significant questions about the value of such structures. Wegner’s data focuses primarily on 
two-person heterosexual couples in close romantic relationships. Liang, Moreland, and 
Argote (1995) and Moreland and Myaskovsky (2000) focus only on very small work groups. 
I contented that the success of transactive memory for these sorts of small groups provides us 
with good reason to pursue research on various other sorts of small groups, as well as on 
larger groups such as laboratories, corporations, and philosophy faculties. 
 
5.5 Distributed Cognition: 
While the experiments developed by Wegner and his colleagues establish the 
functional specialization required for collective mentality in small groups, extending these 
                                                                                                                                                       
martini, he could get Margaret’s advice. However, if Mark’s metamemory fails to specify Margaret as the one 
who possesses memories relevant to making masterful martinis, there is a real chance that Mark’s martinis will 
be merely mediocre.  
 
110 Suppose Tracy thinks that Theodore knows how to change a tire. When her mother asks if they’ll be safe on 
their drive to Tuscaloosa, she might believe that they know how to deal with any difficulties that they might 
encounter. However, if Theodore thinks that Tracy is trained in all things automotive, when the tire blows in 
Twin Falls, the two of them will be in real trouble. 
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methods to larger groups proves incredibly difficult. As we turn to larger groups, the methods 
required become far more theoretical and far more ethnographic. Building on the insights 
concerning the use of external representations developed within the sociology of science 
(e.g., Latour 1999 and Latour and Woolgar 1979) the method of cognitive anthropology has 
developed in order to lend credence to the existence of distributed cognition. According to 
proponents of distributed cognition, distributed and collective systems are capable of 
possessing cognitive properties that differ from the cognitive properties of the units out of 
which they are composed, and no matter how much we know about the properties of 
components, we cannot infer the cognitive properties of the collectivity (Hutchins, 1995b).  
When researchers study such distributed systems, however, there are a number of 
things that they must keep in mind. First (following Kirsch 2006), the study of distributed 
cognition must focus on the variety of ways in which coordination is possible within groups 
of humans. As should be familiar to anyone who has engaged in collective deliberation, the 
members of a group bring a wide variety of beliefs, beliefs, and goals to the deliberation—
and it is rarely the case that all of these mental states are consistent with one another. For this 
reason, the “key question which the theory of distributed cognition endeavors to answer is 
how the elements and components in a distributed system—people, tools, forms, equipment, 
maps and less obvious resources—can be coordinated well enough to allow the system to 
accomplish its tasks” (Kirsch 2006, 258). Although it is not likely that all groups will be 
organized in such a way that they allow for such coordination, there are a number of 
promising cases of such interdependence, and cognitive scientists have recently shown 
growing interest in these systems. 
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I have already discussed two interesting cases from the literature on distributed 
cognition. First, I considered Hutchins’ account of the “fix cycle” used by contemporary 
navigation crews to establish location and compute the trajectory of a naval vessel (Hutchins, 
1995). As I noted in the previous chapter, some of the representations used in this 
computation are internal to the individual crewmembers and others are external 
representations conveyed from individual to individual in the service of the collective 
cognitive task of constructing a representation that directs the behavior of the ship. Because 
of the training that these crewmembers receive, the representations produced by various 
different subsystems are capable of being understood only by those who are trained to take 
measurements using a particular device. Thus, none of the crewmembers working on their 
own particular tasks is capable of representing the position of the ship by herself. It’s only 
the output of the navigation crew as a whole that is capable of representing the location of the 
ship.  
The second case is crime scene investigation (CSI).  As I noted in the previous 
chapter, in CSI, “evidence is likely to be collected by one group of people, analyzed by 
another, and interpreted and presented to Court by another group” (Barber et al, 2006, p. 
358). Evidence must be analyzed to determine whether there’s sufficient evidence to 
prosecute and must then be converted into a narrative structure in order to facilitate 
prosecution. This narrative structure, however, is just the end result of a complex. In this case 
too, the various investigators and interpreters only need to know what to do when they are 
presented with a range of conditions in their immediate environment. However, through the 
interaction of systems concerned only with local information, a narrative emerges that 
facilitates the achievement of the goal of prosecuting a particular person.  
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In the remainder of this section I turn to some other ways in which distributed 
cognition has been developed in the service of establishing the actuality of collective 
mentality. 
5.5.1 Distributed assessment systems: In a recent paper, Christophe Heintz (2006) has 
argued for the existence of two sorts of collective systems dedicated to the assessment of the 
quality of a piece of work. First he considers the system dedicated to assessing the quality of 
a particular Web page. This system consists of the community of Web-users who link 
documents and a search engine, such as Google. Heintz argues that these subcomponents of 
the assessment system are functionally specialized for particular tasks that contribute to the 
efficient use of cognitive resources for Web users. “In these cognitive systems, the cognitive 
task of Web users (as authors of Web pages) is to assess Web documents, and the cognitive 
task of the search engine is to compile these assessments an produce a usable representation 
of the result” (Heintz 2006, 387). Consider the way in which Google operates.  
In ranking the results of a search, Google takes as input the linking behavior of Web-
users. The more links that exist for a particular page, the more highly ranked that page will 
be. Heintz (2006, 388) claims that it is a consequence of this design “that search engines 
together with web-users constitute a distributed cognitive system for the attribution of 
reputation, visibility, and, eventually, credibility.” Although it could easily be the case that 
none of the individual authors of Web pages would rank pages in the way that Google ranks 
them, through the interaction of these various individuals and the algorithm utilized by 
Google, a ranking emerges that many Web users are willing to take as an reliable source of 
credibility.  Because of the way in which the results of such searches are presented by 
Google, the people who use search engines are able to adopt as sort of “bounded rationality, 
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which relies on a simple heuristics with quick halting procedures rather than complying with 
the demoniac rationality” that we might think would be required for evaluating the reputation 
of Web pages (Heintz 2006, 398). Web-users recognize that it would be nearly impossible to 
search through all possible results for a particular search term and they thus offload this sort 
of evaluation onto the system that consists of other Web-users and Google.  
Building on such distributed structures of assessment, Heintz draws an analogy 
between search engines and considers a second case of the distributed machinery used by 
scientists to determine the credibility of one another. Scientists evaluate the reputation, 
visibility, and credibility of one another by appeal to publication record, academic home, 
collaborators, and mentors. Moreover, individual research often depends to a significant 
extent on collective judgments about which articles are important, which articles are of a 
high quality, and which articles are relevant to a particular project. In order to determine 
which articles ought to be read, scientists often appeal to the community’s judgments about 
the reputation of particular authors and particular journals. In most cases, the evaluative 
judgments of the scientific community are more determinative of what a person will read 
than are her own interests and judgments. Heintz thus argues that the “evaluation of a 
scientist could not be brought about by a single person: every scientist goes through a very 
large number of assessments, which stretch over a whole career, and may require different 
kinds of specific expertise. Thus, the evaluative process in science is fundamentally 
distributed” (Heintz 2006, 402). The question, now, is whether this sort of distribution and 
functional specialization is sufficient to qualify such structures of assessment as cases of 
collective mentality. 
To begin with the specialization of function in both the case of the assessment of the 
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quality of Web pages and the assessment of scientific data does facilitate the propagation of 
representational states across representational media. However, it is unclear how such states 
are more than a mere aggregation of the individual cognitive states. In fact, the algorithm 
designed by employees of Google is designed to do nothing more than to look for the most 
frequently cited Web pages. This is precisely what allows for the possibility of the 
‘Googlebomb’.111 The Google algorithm is merely an aggregative tool that looks for the 
statistically most common link on public Web pages. Thus, if we had full knowledge of the 
psychological states of the individuals who were building Web pages and knowledge of the 
algorithm used by Google, we could produce a ranking exactly like Google’s. Admittedly, 
this would be a hard task. However, because appealing to the states of this system yields no 
explanatory advantage beyond the advantage of a fully informed cognitive science, such 
appeals are unwarranted. Something similar is also true of the judgments of reputation used 
by scientists in evaluating one another. Although the psychological states that are fed into 
this system are much more complex, they are surely explicable in terms of the aggregated 
judgments of people within a particular discipline. Although it may be useful to treat the 
community of scientists as a cognitive system because of our current pragmatic situation, this 
is likely to be an artifact of our own epistemic imperfections. 
5.5.2 Science as distributed cognition: The most promising attempt to extend 
distributed cognition to larger systems is developed by Karin Knorr Cetina and Ronald Giere 
to show that some scientific labs should be treated as cognitive systems.112 In a pair of 
                                                 
111 The most famous case of a Googlebomb occurred when a savvy Web-user worked out the algorithm used by 
the Google search engine and built a Web pages in which the words ‘miserable failure’ were repeatedly linked 
to the official government Website of George W. Bush. Eventually, there were enough links in the Web page 
that the first hit on a Google search for the words ‘miserable failure’ pulled up the Bush Website. 
 
112 Giere, however, is unwilling to concede to these systems any sort of mental states. His objection is 
bewildering. It runs as follows. Suppose we attribute knowledge to a collectivity. Some of the computational 
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ethnographic studies, one focusing on the production of knowledge in a molecular biology 
lab (MB), the other focusing on a high energy physics (HEP) lab, Knorr Cetina (1999) argues 
that because of differences in the standards for collaboration in the two fields, HEP labs 
should count as a single cognitive system but MB labs should be understood as consisting of 
a number of individual scientists working together as discrete cognitive systems. Building on 
the insights developed by Hutchins (1995), Giere argues that we should understand the 
Hubble space telescope system as a single cognitive system. I’ll address each of these 
systems in turn. I’ll then argue that both the HEP lab and the Hubble system should count as 
genuinely cognitive systems in the sense required by my theory of collective mentality. 
5.5.2.1 Epistemic Cultures: Knorr Cetina (1999) offers ethnographic data, drawing 
from an extensive study of experiments conducted between 1987 and 1996 at the European 
Center for Nuclear Research (CERN). The CERN is a massive HEP lab, employing as many 
as three thousand scientists at a time, with collaboration on particular experiments often 
occurring between as many as a thousand scientists.113 Knorr Cetina argues that because of 
the size, and complexity of the detectors that are used in experiments, the duration of the 
experiments (some lasting as long 20 years), and because of the degree of collaboration on a 
                                                                                                                                                       
systems to which we will want to attribute mental states that are distributed across huge distances both 
physically and temporally. However, our ordinary concept of a mental state is intimately bound up with our 
concept of a mind. Our commonsense notion of a mind holds that minds are localized rather than distributed. 
So, our commonsense understanding of mental states takes these states to be localized rather than distributed. 
So the states of distributed computational systems cant count as mental states. I have two responses. First, it is 
not clear to me that our commonsense understanding of minds actually precludes the distribution of mental 
states across a group (cf., Knobe and Prinz, forthcoming, Arico et al., in prep, and Huebner et al., under review). 
Secondly, even if our commonsense notion of mental states holds that they must be local rather than distributed, 
I’m not sure why we should believe commonsense on this point. After all, our best scientifically and 
philosophically informed theories hold that minds can be distributed—or so I’ve argued—so, so much the worse 
for commonsense! 
 
113 Knorr Cetina notes that when experimental results are published by CERN they list the authors in 
alphabetical order, without regard to seniority. These lists of authors typically run up to 5 pages of a journal 
article! 
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particular experiment, there is good reason to think that the importance of the particular 
individuals becomes less important than the role that they are playing in the production of a 
particular piece of scientific knowledge. 
In establishing this point, Knorr Cetina (1999, 127) argues that the physiological and 
psychological differences between individuals are less salient in a HEP lab than they are in 
most other situations. Her data suggests that members of this lab are not concerned with what 
their colleagues look like (much of the information that is passed between people is passed in 
the form of emails and memos) or what they do when they are away from the lab.114 Knorr 
Cetina (1999, 128ff) builds her argument for this claim by noting that if there are strong 
enough structures of social coercion to force a person to see herself, at least for the purposes 
of her lab, as filling a particular functional role, then there will be good reason to think that, 
at least for the purposes of working in the lab, these people will begin to occupy those roles 
in a way that will allow them to adopt particular computational roles in much the same way 
that the parts of the parts of a computer function together. 
Knorr Cetina notes that the structure of the lab is conducive to such a view of the 
individuals who work there. CERN is divided into a variety of groups, each of which is 
focused on the collection or evaluation of a particular sort of information. Each group 
consists of a number of people and a number of devises for measuring or evaluating various 
sorts of data. The persons who are employed in a group are the only ones that have access to 
the data that is studied by that group, and they constantly have to appeal to people from other 
groups in order to obtain information collected by that group. The various groups are 
functionally specialized to focus only on the collection or evaluation of a particular sort of 
                                                 
114 Knorr Cetina (1999, 328) reports an interaction with one physicist in which her informant reported never 
having been asked anything about her personal life in the three years that she had been employed at CERN 
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data, and it is only through the transmission of information from one group to another that 
the results obtained by one group can be coordinated in order to produce anything worthy of 
being called an experimental result (Knorr Cetina 1999, 129).  
This structure emerges through the regimes of trust that develop at CERN, and this 
causes CERN to have a democratic structure in which authority is necessarily distributed. In 
the experiments that are carried out at CERN, data that is passed from one group to another 
will only be taken seriously if it viewed as being passed along by an expert. However, 
because of the size of CERN and the diversity of the data that is being collected and 
interpreted, this expertise simply cannot be centralized. There is no one at CERN who knows 
everything that needs to be known in order to carry out any of the experiments that are done 
at CERN. This enforces a ‘management by content’ in which the most important and 
experienced experimenters coordinate the information produced by their group rather than 
determining what ought to be done within that group. “What gets done, and when, depends 
mostly on the technical problems that need to be solved to achieve the goal of a meaningful 
and reliable result” (Giere 2002c, 2-3). More importantly, the structures of trust that underlie 
the transmission of information from one group to another are kept in place by a sort of 
professional gossip. As D.S. Wilson aptly notes, the use of gossip can play an incredibly 
important role in stabilizing functional roles within a group. If a group contains members that 
are not fulfilling the roles that they are supposed to fulfill in collecting or interpreting data, 
for example if they are ore concerned with their own research than the collective research in 
which they are engaged, members of other groups will gossip in such a way that suggests that 
these people and their groups are not to be trusted in producing collaborative data (Knorr 
Cetina 1999, 201ff). This sort of criticism plays a very strong role in insuring that various 
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members of a the HEP lab fill the roles that they are meant to fill rather than worrying about 
their own personal interests. To put it bluntly, as Knorr Cetina (1999, 25) does, in a HEP 
laboratory such as CERN, “the subjectivity of participants is put on the line—and quite 
successfully replaced by something like distributed cognition”  
Having laid out her account of a HEP lab as a sort of collective cognitive system, 
Knorr Cetina turns to the analysis of a MB lab. In analyzing a MB lab, Knorr Cetina (1999, 
217) finds that “the person remains the epistemic subject” such that “laboratory, 
experimentation, procedures, and objects obtain their identity through individuals. The 
individual scientist is their intermediary—their organizing principle in the flesh, to whom all 
things revert.” Knorr Cetina argues that because of the way in which publishing in MB is 
conceived, individuals are forced to focus on their own research projects rather than focusing 
on anything collective. In MB, as with many of the sciences but as opposed to HEP, an 
individual is credited with discovering an experimental result only if she is first author on a 
paper. Rather than developing a community of trust in which individuals rely on one another 
for the acquisition of various sorts of information, MB produces collaborations that are often 
tenuous. Each scientist has her own project, and although there may be some overarching 
goal toward which the lab as a whole is dedicated, collaboration takes a back seat to 
individual achievement. Thus, Knorr Cetina argues that there is no room for genuinely 
distributed cognition to emerge in a MB lab. 
5.5.2.2 The Hubble space telescope: Building upon a long-standing interest in the 
cognitive science of science, Giere (2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2003, and 2004) has focused, in a 
series of recent papers, on the way in which the team of scientist interpreting data from the 
Hubble space telescope, when coupled with their technological apparatuses, ought to be 
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understood as a unified cognitive system from the standpoint of a cognitive science of 
distributed systems. The problem with which Giere is concerned is that when we learn that 
the Hubble team has come to some interesting conclusion, we want to know how it is that we 
can “understand the process leading to the conclusion about 13 billion old galaxies as a 
cognitive process.” The standard answer that would be offered by a cognitive scientist of 
science would be that there are a number of individual cognitive agents, each of whom has a 
series of symbolic representations (presumably in a language of thought) over which she can 
run inferences in order to come to some conclusion about the 13 billion year old galaxies 
(Giere 2003, 2pdf). However, as Giere correctly recognizes: 
There are a number of difficulties that arise when one attempts to apply this 
paradigm to the Hubble System. One is locating the cognitive agent that acquires 
the representations and does the computations. The difficulty is not that there are 
no agents to be found. Rather, there seem to be too many agents. There is a whole 
team of people who control the movements of the telescope in space. Then there 
are whole teams of people at the Data Operations Control Center, the Data 
Capture Facility, and the Space Telescope Science Institute. And of course there 
are computers all over the place. One thing is clear. There is no one person that 
can be identified as the cognitive agent acquiring the representations and doing 
the computations. (2003, Pdf2) 
 
Giere suggests that in order to have an adequate understanding any claim about the 
knowledge of a 13 billion year old galaxy, we must appeal to a system that contains a number 
of people an a number of technological apparatuses that are distributed widely over both time 
and space.115 
The relevant system for understanding knowledge about the 13 billion year old galaxy 
consists first of a very complicated telescope (which includes the infamous mirror, a series of 
electronic detectors that are sensitive to electromagnetic radiation, and an onboard computer 
that organizes and synthesizes the information from these detectors). The information from 
                                                 
115 The following description of the system is derived from the account in (Giere 2003) 
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this computer is then sent to a Tracking and Data Relay Satellite and is then retransmitted to 
the White Sands Complex near Las Cruces, New Mexico. At this point, the data are 
interpreted and then retransmitted to the Data Operations Control Center at the Goddard 
Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland, routed to the Data Capture Facility, and then it 
is finally sent to the Space Telescope Science Institute where a team of astronomers and 
space scientists interpret the data. (2003, Pdf2) 
In making sense of this system as a cognitive and computational system, Giere 
divides the system into three sorts of computational apparatuses. First he suggests that there 
is a set of input systems that have the function of taking analog information about the world 
and converting it to digital information that can be interpreted by later computational 
structures. The second system then takes the digital output of these systems and converts it 
into the sorts of images that can be interpreted by scientists. Finally the third system consists 
of the team of scientists that interpret the images and converts the data into a form that can be 
reported in scientific journals and in the popular press. The important thing to keep in mind 
about all of these systems, however, is that “Each of these components is itself a distributed 
cognitive system including the hardware, software, and the many people who operate it” 
(Giere 2003, 3pdf). Each of these systems is dedicated to the acquisition and interpretation of 
a particular sort of information. Moreover, this information must be interpreted sequentially. 
Later systems always take as input the information that has been processed by earlier 
systems. To put the point briefly, throughout the process that propagates information forward 
throughout the system, “the representation is transformed in many ways thought to make it 
most informative to the astronomers who will eventually judge its scientific significance” 
(Giere 2003, 3pdf). 
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Finally, and most importantly for the thesis of distributed cognition, Giere 
demonstrates that at the third stage of interpretation, there are a number of scientists who are 
looking at images, comparing them to previous images, and interacting with one another in 
order to interpret the data that is presented in the final image that results from the sequential 
processing addressed above. Giere then argues that because of the way in which the 
processing of information occurs in this system, cognitive scientists should be less concerned 
with what is going on in the heads of individual scientists and should instead focus on the 
way in which the external representations are “evaluated for their implications regarding 13 
billion year old galaxies” (Giere 2003, 4pdf). 
5.5.2.3 Are these cases of genuinely collective cognition? The first thing to note about 
each of these cases is that the specialization of function in both CERN and in the Hubble 
system facilitates the propagation of representational states across representational media. 
Each of the subsystems within CERN and the Hubble system is dedicated to processing a 
particular sort of information, and unless it does so, none of the other systems will be capable 
of doing their job. In the case of CERN there appears to be a more densely interconnected 
system that consists of a variety of mutually interdependent systems. In the case of the 
Hubble system it appears to be the case that the system is more clearly a feed forward system 
in which information is propagated from one system to another in a linear fashion.116 
However, regardless of this structure, it seems reasonable to say that there are a number of 
dependant systems that are functionally specialized for processing a particular sort of 
information. 
                                                 
116 Given that the description offered by Giere relies much less heavily on a thorough ethnographic study of the 
system in question, it is hard to say exactly how the system is organized. However, because it does not matter 
for my purposes, I’ll take the Hubble system to be a linear feed-forward system until we have further data on its 
actual organization. 
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Second, the cognitive states of both these collectivities look to be more than the mere 
aggregation of individual cognitive states. Because of the way in which the information from 
these various systems is coordinated and because of the way in which each of the systems is 
dependent on the local states of the systems to which it is connected, we will need a complete 
story about the state of the entire system and the way in which information is being processed 
by each of the systems in coordination in order to have a complete story about the cognitive 
state of the system. Moreover, because of the way in which each of the functionally 
specialized systems in both the case of CERN and the Hubble system operates as a 
functionally specialized system, the particular scientists that happen to be working on a 
particular issue are far less important than the functional roles that they happen to play. For 
this reason, numerous people can come and go from the collectivity throughout a variety of 
projects without this having significant implications for the functioning of the collectivity as 
a whole. For this reason, there will be a number of important facts about the cognitive state 
of the collectivities that will not be captured by appeal to the cognitive states of individuals in 
aggregation. 
Clearly there are collective states here, and clearly they produce collective 
representations. However, there remain a number of questions as to whether theses systems 
are genuinely psychological systems. In establishing the case for the existence of genuinely 
cognitive states in the case of both CERN and the Hubble system, we must note that each of 
these systems does in fact possess a number of internal states that have the function of 
adjusting the system’s behavior in ways that allow it to cope with features of its environment 
in ways that are not fully determined by the design of the system. Moreover, these states are 
capable of standing-in for various salient features of the world. A number of the components 
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of CERN operate over data that has been collected over a twenty-year period; In a number of 
cases, no one is actually looking at what is going on in a bubble chamber or looking at the 
readouts from a detector—they are instead operating on the physical representations of the 
outputs of detectors in an attempt to make sense of what happened in the world at another 
point. In the case of the Hubble system, people are looking at the information on computer 
screens and comparing them to other representations that have been produced in the past. 
Even in the absence of immediate environmental stimuli, each of these systems is dedicated 
to interpreting and running computations over a variety of representations. 
The representations that are produced at any given time by any of the subsystems 
within either CERN or the Hubble systems are also best understood as part of larger 
representational schemes that allow the people within these groups to represent a variety of 
possible contents in a systematic way by manipulating the representations and producing 
other representations for consumption by other systems. Finally, there are indeed proper and 
improper ways of producing, maintaining, modifying, and using the various representations. 
This is clearest in the case of CERN. The use of regimes of trust and the use of gossip to 
ensure that each of the individuals in a particular group are producing representations in the 
way that they are supposed to is meant to ensure that the representations are produced in such 
a way that they adequately represent facts about the physical substrates of the world. More 
importantly, if the systems fail to operate as they are supposed to, then they will misrepresent 
the world, and they will produce publications that will be refuted, shown to be somehow 
mistaken, or mistakenly adopted by other collectivities. To put the point briefly, CERN is 
capable of misrepresenting the physical facts.  
Finally, in order to prevent the production of misrepresentations, CERN runs 
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numerous experiments over numerous hypotheses in order to produce the most accurate 
representation of the world that it is capable of producing. This allows CERN to produce 
hypotheses that allow their hypotheses to die in their stead by deciding which papers will be 
published on the basis of internal models and a series of internal checks and monitors. CERN 
can even bee seen as a sort of Gregorian collectivity (Dennett 1996, 99-101) that engages in 
meta-representation to the extent that they can genuinely ask if they are correctly modeling 
the world in a way that produces the optimal publications.  
I see no reason, then to deny the status of a cognitive system to at least some 
scientific labs. How far this can be extended is of course an empirical question, and as Knorr 
Cetina (1999) aptly demonstrates, there are some sorts of labs with structures in place that 
actively militate against the possibility of collective representations. However, it is only by 
taking the thesis of distributed cognition seriously that it is possible to engage in the 
ethnographic research that can underwrite any claim to collective mentality in scientific labs. 
More in depth studies such as the ones offered by Knorr Cetina would be quite useful in 
studying the cognitive science of science. 
 
5.3 Intuitively plausible cases of distributed cognition: 
I want to close with a couple of cases about which we do not yet have data, but that 
have gained a prominent place as intuitively plausible cases of distributed cognition. To 
begin with, I’ve considered the existence of collective memory from the standpoint of the 
literature on transactive memory; however, in a recent article on the theoretical 
underpinnings of distributed cognition, John Sutton (2006) argues that autobiographical 
memory should, at least in some cases, be recognized as a sort of distributed cognition. 
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Although Sutton concedes that there will be a number of cases in which we remember 
significant facts about our lives on our own, there are also many cases in which 
autobiographical memories can be reconstructed only by depending on the memories of 
others. In agreement with Wegner, Sutton (2006, 238) argues that the sharing of memory is 
“an ordinary human activity with great psychological and social significance” and it is often 
the case that sharing “memories brings into being new emergent form and content through 
the transactive nature of collaborative recall” (Sutton 2006, 238).  The question, then, is: 
what distinguishes the cases of genuinely collective memory from merely aggregative 
memories. 
To begin with, we should take a cue from Wegner. Although we might expect our 
own lives to be something about which we are more likely to be specialists than are our 
friends, families, and coworkers. The important thing to keep in mind, however, is that to a 
large degree we are indeed strangers to ourselves. In a significant number of cases, our 
actions are more significant to others than they are to us. I might not remember the biting 
criticism that I made of a friends thesis project, or the flirtatious comment I made to a 
member of the wait-staff at a restaurant that I frequent. However, these things might be 
significant to my friend or to my romantic partner. Given the intimate links between 
significance, attention, and the strength of a memory, it is safe to assume that there will be a 
number of cases in which facts about my autobiography will be more likely to be internally 
stored by the people around me than they will be to be stored by me. This provides for a sort 
of specialization that distributes the facts about my life across various individuals. The 
interesting thing about cases of collective reconstruction in autobiographical memory is that 
the distribution here is likely to have a very different structure from the one posited by 
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Wegner. We are, for example, in a number of cases not going to have meta-memories that 
assign another person as the location of my memories. Although there will no doubt be such 
cases (e.g., you might know that your mom remembers all of your important—and 
unimportant—achievements from kindergarten through graduating high school), the majority 
of cases in which autobiographical memories are distributed will lack any sort of formal 
structure. Collective autobiographical memories are often produced by a process in which 
one person’s memory causes another person to remember something else, and this continues 
until the group produces a narrative, and at some point, all of the members agree that the 
narrative is probably what happened. This process of reconstruction is far less like recall than 
it is like telling a story, and just as we’ve seen in the case of CSI, the distribution and 
integration of information in the production of a narrative can often have an importantly 
collective structure. 
One additional intuitively plausible case of distributed cognition is the process of 
coauthoring a paper.117 I have recently done collaborative work with a pair of friends on the 
attribution of phenomenal states to groups. In writing up our results, the three of us had rather 
clear and importantly unique specializations as regards the sort of paper that we were writing. 
In writing the paper, we each wrote up the parts of the project about which we had the most 
                                                 
117 This case is suggested by Pierre Poirier and Guillaume Chicoisne (2006, 229). Unfortunately, Poirier and 
Chicoisne are no friends to this case as a case of genuinely collective cognition. Although they agree that there 
are some cases in which collective mentality might emerge from the interactions of individuals, they suggest 
incredibly stringent conditions on anything counting as genuinely collective mentality. Poirier and Chicoisne 
argue that the only cases in which we are warranted in attributing mental states to a collectivity are those cases 
in which it is necessarily the case that if one person were removed and replaced with someone who is 
functionally equivalent for the purposes of the collectivity, the project could never be completed. The strange 
thing about this claim is that it would also seem to preclude the possibility of individual cognition. After all, if 
one neuron dies, or if a new neuron is born in the hippocampus, this change in the overall structure of the brain 
does not eliminate the possibility of individual cognition. More importantly, the human brain is incredibly 
plastic, and as we know bits of neural architecture can be recruited to perform different tasks when there is 
damage to the area that is typically implicated in a particular sort of processing. I will thus ignore this stringent 
condition on distributed cognition and stick to the functional specialization on which I have relied in the rest of 
this thesis. 
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expertise, we then read what each author had wrote, commented on their work, rewrote 
things that we were unhappy with an then met to discuss, debate and argue about the specific 
ways in which the project should be developed. The resulting paper was nothing that any of 
us could have produced individually, it was not a paper that any of us would be willing to 
endorse as individuals, but it was the result of a collective effort to produce a paper on 
collective mentality. This is not to say that every case of collaboration will be a case of 
collective cognition. However, in cases where each of the authors has specific expertise such 
that the content of the paper is the result of distributed intelligence across the authors, it is 
reasonable to count this as the result of collective cognition. 
At this point, it is important to note that these cases currently have the function of 
being nothing more than intuition pumps. They are cases where it seems reasonable to 
attribute collective mental states; however, in order to conclusively demonstrate that there 
truly is a specialization of function within these collectivities that facilitates the propagation 
of representational states throughout the group, and in order to demonstrate that there really 
are cognitive states of the groups in question, it would be quite useful to collect ethnographic 
data on both autobiographical recall and on collaborative authorship. I cannot engage in the 
collection of this data now. So, I leave this open as a future research project to be developed 
by myself or in conjunction with others who are willing to collaborate with me on these cases 
of collective cognition. 
5.5.4. A concluding note on distributed cognition: In 2005, Francis Heylighen and 
Frank Van Overwalle submitted a research proposal to the Free University of Brussels 
entitled “The self-organization of distributed cognition: a connectionist approach”. 
Heylighen, Overwall, and a team of 15 other researchers proposed to study the possibility of 
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distributed cognition by way of computer simulation, experiments on the dynamics of within-
group communication, and computer mediated games. Specifically, they propose to test the 
hypothesis that human groups are best understood as self-organizing systems in which 
individuals learn to cooperate with and trust one another in a way that facilitates the 
coordination and distribution of information and labor. They further propose that the 
mechanisms at play in the distribution of computational capacities within a collectivity is 
organized as a connectionist network in much the same way that computational capacities are 
organized in single human agents.  
The Project knows as the Evolution, Complexity and Cognition group (ECCO) 
directed by Frances Heylighen will likely produce a number of intriguing results. However, 
at this point, this is merely a research program. I can only hope that the research in this lab 
will lend more credence to the defense of collective mentality.  
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